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Abstract 
Since the emergence of Threat and Error Management (TEM), it has been well 
regarded as an effective method to improve aviation safety. International Civil 
Aviation Organisation’s (ICAO) acknowledged the need for TEM training, and 
recommended that TEM be introduced to all pilot training syllabi. In response to 
ICAO’s endorsement on TEM training, Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) in 
Australia mandated TEM as an additional assessment item for various levels of flight 
tests and ground examinations, effective from July 2009. Although it has been more 
than eight years since the implementation of TEM in Australian general aviation, there 
are, to date, no definitive data available to suggest whether implementation of TEM 
training has been well received, and whether a positive effect of such training has been 
witnessed, experienced and translated as intended in Australian general aviation. The 
purpose of this thesis was to fill this knowledge gap by conducting a formal post-
implementation review and assessment of TEM by conducting three separate studies. 
The first study was exploratory in nature, and was the first step in examining how 
TEM is regarded among Australian general aviation pilots in terms of its use and 
effectiveness. A total of 59 general aviation pilots participated in a survey, and the 
results indicated a variable uptake of TEM principles, and differing opinions regarding 
its effectiveness. This warranted further study to be conducted in regard to TEM 
implementation and practice. 
The second study was a qualitative (first) phase of mixed methods research approach 
using an exploratory sequential design. This two-phase design involved a collection 
of qualitative data followed by separately collecting quantitative data. The exploratory 
sequential design was preferred as there were a lack of definitive data and theory 
established after TEM was introduced in Australian general aviation. The study aimed 
to gather insights before and after TEM was implemented to enable appreciation as to 
how it was introduced and the effects of the use of TEM training. Five highly 
experienced flight examiners from Australian general aviation were interviewed. 
Based on thematic analysis, four themes arose from the interview data: impracticality, 
lack of support and guidance, TEM implementation and TEM in practice. The results 
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indicated that all participants shared very similar or the same views that TEM was not 
implemented well because of seemingly impractical TEM principles and a lack of 
guidance and support. All participants collectively agreed that the first three themes 
would have adversely affected the way TEM was taught and practised in Australian 
general aviation. 
Based on the above four themes, a survey was devised to verify and test hypotheses 
generated from the findings in Study 2, and this was the quantitative (second) phase 
of mixed methods sequential design. A total of 97 survey responses were analysed, 
and the majority of hypotheses based on Study 2 were supported. Based on structural 
equation modelling, it was found that both impracticality and a lack of guidance and 
support adversely affected the way TEM implementation was viewed, and the lack of 
guidance and support was also found to adversely affect how TEM was practised. 
The collective findings suggested that TEM was poorly implemented in Australian 
general aviation. This would likely have caused negative views on the use of TEM 
among general aviation pilots in Australia. However, the collective responses from 
Study 3 suggested that the survey participants highly valued and applied TEM 
principles when undertaking flying activities, and consequently considered TEM an 
important part of the flight preparation process. This is an encouraging finding because 
considering TEM principles and concepts prior to and during flying will further 
improve safety within general aviation in Australia. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the early afternoon of 27 March 1977, two Boeing 747s—Pan American 
World Airways flight 1736 and KLM flight 4805—diverted from their 
intended destination, Gran Canaria Airport, because of terrorist activity, 
and landed at Los Rodeo Airport on Tenerife Island. In the late afternoon 
of this day, KLM flight 4805 was cleared to enter Runway 12, and 
backtracked to the end of the runway to line up on Runway 30. After 
KLM’s Boeing 747 entered the runway, Pan American flight 1736 was 
also cleared to enter Runway 12 and exit on the third taxiway to allow 
KLM flight 4805 to take off. With low visibility because of heavy fog and 
many other causal and contributing factors presented on the day, KLM 
flight 4805 initiated a take-off roll without clearance, while Pan American 
flight 1736 was still backtracking on the runway. The two Boeing 747s 
collided on the runway, causing the deaths of 583 people on board. This 
is still the world’s deadliest commercial aviation disaster. 
 
Despite major technological advances and enhancements, this accident was one of 
several high-profile accidents that marked the human factors era and placed a stronger 
focus in aviation on human factors issues, such as the human–machine interface. 
Continuous efforts to improve safety initiatives and training to address these human 
factors issues have resulted in civil aviation to be considered an ultra-safe industry. 
According to Amalberti, Auroy, Berwick and Barach (2005), the rate of catastrophic 
accidents per flight is better than 1 × 10-6, compared with other safety critical 
industries, such as surgery and road safety (both 10-4). To view this from the Australian 
perspective, in 2010, Australia experienced 14 fatal aviation accidents, compared with 
1,248 fatal accidents involving road transportation (ATSB, 2017; Pink, 2012). This 
impressive safety record for civil aviation is attributed to a constant drive to develop 
and improve safety initiatives and training. One of the recent safety initiatives was the 
introduction of Threat and Error Management (TEM). The Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority (CASA) (2008) defined TEM as “the process of detecting and responding 
to threats and errors to ensure that the ensuing outcome is inconsequential, i.e. the 
outcome is not an error, further error or undesired state” (p. 5). 
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TEM emerged during the development of the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) 
and was developed to capture the full operational complexity of a flight (Merritt & 
Klinect, 2006). The concept has attracted strong interest from airlines, regulatory 
authorities and academia, and the benefits of such training have been widely witnessed 
(Merritt & Klinect, 2006). Consequently, the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) endorsed and recommended that TEM training be an integral 
part of pilot training and a licencing requirement for all pilot licences, and it has since 
become a requirement for initial and recurrent flight crew training (CASA, 2008; 
Maurino, 2005b). 
 
In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that pilots who continuously receive TEM 
training as part of their flight training from the ab initio1 stage demonstrate earlier 
achievement of the required competencies, compared with pilots who receive 
insufficient and/or irregular TEM training (P. Murray, personal communication, July 
29, 2009). This is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Bove, 2002) that demonstrated 
a higher achievement of post-training performance among trainees exposed to TEM. 
 
In response to ICAO’s acknowledgement of the need for TEM training and 
recommendation that TEM be introduced to all pilot training syllabi, CASA (2009) 
mandated TEM as an additional assessment item for various levels of flight tests and 
ground examinations, effective from 1 July 2009. It has been more than eight years 
since the introduction of TEM training in general aviation in Australia; thus, it is 
timely to conduct a formal post-implementation review and assessment of TEM in 
terms of the effectiveness of TEM training and its current practice in Australian 
general aviation. 
 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
 
Since the very first flight, it has been clear that there is an element of risk involved in 
flying, and this risk occasionally results in an incident or accident. Broadly, the risk 
has been considered to stem from deficiencies involving either technical or human 
                                               1	Oxford dictionary (2018) defines ‘ab initio’ as starting from the beginning. This is a commonly 
used term to describe student pilots in an early stage of flight training.	
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factors. In the early days, risk was perceived to be mainly due to inadequate 
advancement of technology, although several studies (e.g., Feggetter, 1985; Hobbs, 
2004; Murray, 1997) suggested that human factors have been the primary safety issue 
since the early days of aviation. Following the advancement and enhancement of 
technology, it has become clear that the main cause of the majority of accidents is the 
flight crews in the cockpit (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). 
 
It has been suggested that approximately 70 to 80% of aviation accidents are attributed, 
at least partly, to human error (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). As a result of the 
ubiquitous nature of human error, efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate pilot 
errors (Thomas, 2004). However, it has been acknowledged that it is unrealistic to 
believe that errors could be totally eliminated, given the physical and psychological 
limitations of humans. Adams (2006) stated that even competent humans completing 
a simple task continue to make errors. However, in most cases, these errors are 
recognised and corrected, so the results are inconsequential. Therefore, efforts have 
been made to identify errors and, more importantly, develop and refine training to 
appropriately manage those errors to avoid or mitigate negative consequences. Merritt 
and Klinect (2006) argued that the overarching objective of error management—later 
renamed TEM—provides the best possible support for pilots in managing everyday 
threats and errors. 
 
Airlines around the world have devoted many resources to human factors training—
particularly Crew Resource Management (CRM) and TEM, which are both endorsed 
and recommended by ICAO. In addition, more and more airlines of different sizes 
around the world are conducting LOSA to proactively determine their performance 
strengths and weaknesses (P. Murray, personal communication, September 25, 2018). 
Despite the positive effects of extensive human factors training in the airline sector, it 
often appears to be a neglected component in general aviation. Although there has 
been growing recognition of its importance in general aviation there are, to date, only 
a limited number of formal ongoing human factors training courses offered to general 
aviation, when compared with the airline environment. Sarter and Alexander (2000) 
suggested that, to improve overall aviation safety, the focus needs to be on the weakest 
links—that is, single pilots, low-technology and less rigorously trained pilots in 
general aviation. The lack of appropriate, formal human factors training and 
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recurrency training offered in general aviation may explain why overall aviation safety 
has not significantly improved. 
 
According to the National Transportation Safety Board (2014), general aviation 
accidents in 2011 accounted for approximately 95% of all aviation accidents and 94% 
of fatal aviation accidents in the United States (US), while only accounting for 
approximately half of the total industry flight time. Although the discrepancy between 
the commercial and general aviation sectors in Australia does not seem to be as severe 
as the US’s statistics, the accident statistics in Australia involving general aviation 
indicate a similar trend. According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) 
(2018), the numbers of fatal accidents and fatalities between 2007 and 2016 in the 
commercial sector were 13 and 18, respectively, while accounting for 1.6 times more 
hours flown than general aviation (ATSB, 2018). In contrast, the numbers of fatal 
accidents and fatalities during the same period within general aviation were 142 and 
207, respectively (ATSB, 2018). These statistics highlight the importance of placing 
a stronger focus on the weakest link to improve overall aviation safety. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Thesis 
 
Since the emergence of TEM, it has been well regarded as an effective method to 
improve aviation safety. Following ICAO’s acknowledgment and recommendation of 
the need for TEM training for all pilot training (ICAO, 2006), CASA (2008) mandated 
the Day Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Syllabus on 1 March 2008 to reflect this initiative. 
In addition, CASA (2008) mandated from 1 July 2009 that TEM be formally assessed 
for the General Flying Progress Test (GFPT), Private Pilot Licence (PPL), 
Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL) and Air Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL) flight tests. 
 
It has been more than nine years since TEM training was implemented in Australian 
general aviation. However, to date, there are no definitive data available to suggest 
whether implementation of TEM training has been well received, and whether a 
positive effect of such training has been witnessed, experienced and translated as 
intended in the Australian general aviation sector. This thesis aims to fill this gap by 
conducting a formal post-implementation review and assessment of TEM in terms of 
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the effectiveness of TEM training and current practice in Australian general aviation. 
It is expected that the findings will add to the body of knowledge to better inform 
CASA and regulatory authorities in other countries as to how the requirement of TEM 
training is addressed. This will then allow National Aviation Authorities (NAA) to 
appropriately develop and enhance education and training materials in the area of 
TEM and human factors accordingly. In addition, the findings have the potential to 
provide information regarding pilot attitudes to safety initiatives more generally, 
which will be valuable in shaping future safety implementation in other growing 
sectors of general aviation, such as the Recreational Aviation Australia (RAA) and 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) sectors. 
 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis comprises eight chapters, including the current chapter as the introduction. 
A brief description of each chapter is provided below. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review—This chapter provides a literature review of three main 
topics: LOSA, CRM and TEM. The concept of TEM was originally conceived as a 
data collection framework for LOSA after it was realised that flight crews deal with 
threats and errors on normal everyday flights. The TEM concept was also a framework 
for the sixth generation of CRM that further improved conventional CRM skills as an 
effective means to manage everyday threats and errors. 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology—This chapter describes four elements of the research 
process when developing this study. The first two elements—epistemology and 
theoretical perspective—are described with the three most prevalent research 
paradigms: post-positivism, constructivism and pragmatism. The third element—
methodology—is then described that corresponds to the aforementioned research 
paradigms. The methodologies are quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods, 
respectively. The fourth element—methods—is also described. The chapter concludes 
by justifying why mixed methods was chosen as the preferred methodology, and 
exploratory sequential design was selected as the preferred method.  
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Chapter 4: Study 1 (Exploratory Study)—The research in this chapter served two 
purposes. The first was to determine whether a further post-implementation review of 
TEM training on a large scale was worthwhile. The second was for the researcher to 
select appropriate methodology and methods following the trial run. A total of 59 
participants completed a short survey that aimed to collect information on the ways 
the requirement for TEM training was addressed, and gather views on the benefits and 
effectiveness of TEM. The main findings were published as a journal article in 
December 2016. 
 
Chapter 5: Study 2 (Qualitative Study)—This chapter presents the qualitative (first) 
phase of mixed methods research approach using an exploratory sequential design. 
The study aimed to gather insights before and after TEM was implemented to gain an 
in-depth appreciation as to how it was introduced and the effects of the use of TEM 
training. A total of five highly experienced Flight Examiners (FE) were interviewed, 
and four main themes emerged from the interview data: impracticality, lack of 
guidance and support, TEM implementation and TEM in practice. Each theme is 
thoroughly discussed in this chapter. general aviation.  
 
Chapter 6: Study 3 (Quantitative Study)—This chapter presents the quantitative 
(second) phase of mixed methods research approach using an exploratory sequential 
design. The study aimed to verify and test hypotheses generated from the findings in 
Study 2. To achieve this aim, a survey was devised based on the four themes, and a 
total of 97 responses were analysed. The combined findings from Studies 2 and 3 were 
expected to provide a better understanding of how TEM is implemented and its effects 
on the way TEM has been practised in Australian general aviation. 
 
Chapter 7: Overall Discussion—This chapter presents a general discussion of the key 
findings from the three studies. The first major finding was that the perceived 
impracticality of TEM was a major contributor to the collective views among the study 
participants regarding poor TEM implementation. Lack of guidance and support from 
CASA was also found to have contributed to the collective views of participants on 
poor TEM implementation. The second finding, perhaps counterintuitively, was that 
TEM is highly valued and regularly used when flying activities are undertaken. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion—This chapter provides a summary of key findings from the 
studies. The findings suggested that the effect of TEM implementation in Australian 
general aviation have not been experienced and translated as intended. However, 
despite the poor TEM implementation, it was found that TEM principles were highly 
valued among the study participants, which is an encouraging finding, as the ultimate 
aim of TEM is to further improve safety in Australian general aviation. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
TEM is described as a process of detecting and responding to threats and errors by 
maintaining adequate safety margins to ensure that outcomes are inconsequential 
(CASA, 2008). Simply stated, TEM is a required everyday exercise for pilots to fly an 
aircraft safely between two points (Maurino & Murray, 2009). This chapter provides 
a review of the literature on three topics: LOSA, CRM and TEM. The concept of TEM 
was originally conceived as a data collection framework for LOSA (Klinect, 2005) 
after it was realised that flight crews deal with threats and errors on normal everyday 
flights. The TEM concept was also a framework for the sixth generation of CRM that 
further improved conventional CRM skills as an effective means to manage everyday 
threats and errors (Maurino & Murray, 2010). 
 
2.1 Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) 
 
LOSA is a safety management tool, as well as a methodology for monitoring airline 
safety performance by collecting and analysing data on managed, mismanaged and/or 
unmanaged threats and errors occurring during everyday normal operations (Earl, 
Bates, Murray, Glendon, & Creed, 2012; Klinect, 2005). Klinect (2005) argued that, 
previously, although airlines continually collected various safety performance data, 
the majority were either reactive (e.g., incident reports) or incomplete in terms of 
safety performance. For instance, data gathered from quick access recorders provide 
information on flying parameters, such as aircraft speed and altitude, yet do not 
provide insights, such as pilot proficiency or flight crew harmony and behaviour 
(Klinect, 2005). This led to the development of a proactive and targeted cockpit 
observational method based on the TEM framework that ‘gathers system safety and 
flight crew performance data during regularly scheduled flights in normal operations’ 
(Klinect, 2005, p. 4). 
 
There exist a number of indicators to illustrate airlines’ performance in terms of safety. 
Some examples include incident and accident reports, collection of flight data and line 
checks. The first is considered reactive, as they identify system deficiencies after 
incidents and accidents, which is often too late. In addition, they may mislead airlines 
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to falsely assume that their safety performance is high when there is an absence of 
incidents and accidents. Moreover, the use of incident and accident reports naturally 
poses certain limitations. These include, but not limited to, missing key information 
and different interpretations of causal and/or contributing factors for very similar 
accidents (Lee, Bates, Murray, & Martin, 2017). 
 
In contrast, the other two indicators (i.e., collection of flight data and line checks) are 
considered proactive, yet do not portray a complete picture of normal operations. 
Flight data collected often lack context regarding the situation in which the data were 
collected. For instance, data may suggest a deviation from an approach profile during 
an instrument approach, yet do not necessarily provide context for this deviation, such 
as the flight crew’s level of competency, fatigue level or group harmony (Klinect, 
2005). In addition, these data do not explicitly show external influences, such as poor 
ATC instructions. Simply stated, the data show ‘what’, yet do not show ‘how’ and 
‘why’. Consequently, it is difficult to provide accurate and appropriate intervention. 
 
Considering the above concerns, line checks are generally a good source of uncovering 
proficiency weaknesses (Klinect, 2005). However, they do not represent true normal 
operations, as these line checks are directly related to flight crews’ employment status 
where failures may result in the termination of employment and, thus, subsequent 
behaviours, so-called ‘angel behaviours’, do not necessarily reflect what the crew 
actually do during normal operations (Klinect, 2005). These known limitations, 
alongside over-reliance on reactive safety data sources, necessitated the need for 
another innovative approach to collect reliable safety-related data (Klinect, 2005). 
Thus, LOSA was developed to complement other safety performance data to provide 
‘a unique perspective of flight crew performance’ during normal flight operations 
(Klinect, 2005, p. 5). 
 
The birth of LOSA can be traced back to the period after the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) introduced the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP)—a 
voluntary program that allowed airlines to develop individual airline-specific training 
syllabi (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). In return, airlines were required to 
provide both CRM and Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) to all flight crews, and 
fully incorporate CRM concepts into technical training (Helmreich et al., 1999). Delta 
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Air Lines first responded to the FAA’s initiatives by developing a new CRM course 
for their flight crews in 1994; however, questions were raised with regard to its 
transferability as to whether the newly developed CRM course worked as intended 
(Klinect, 2005). Delta management was concerned that the CRM performance data 
from regular line checks and LOFT during flight simulator sessions would not provide 
line pilots’ true CRM performance standards during normally scheduled flight 
operations (Klinect, 2005). This promoted a collaborative partnership between Delta 
and the University of Texas Human Factors Research Project (UTHFRP) team to 
develop a mechanism to better understand the actual CRM performance of Delta’s 
flight crews (Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmreich, 2003). 
 
The first LOSA was conducted within Delta Air Lines in 1994, and involved over 450 
jump seat observations on regularly scheduled flights (Klinect et al., 2003). Each 
observer provided a written narrative based on the phase of flight, and provided 
behavioural performance marker ratings, which together presented a complete picture 
of the flight crew’s CRM performance in terms of their strengths and weaknesses 
(Klinect, 2005). The results from the first LOSA provided Delta Air Lines with an 
operational baseline of CRM strengths and weaknesses for the airline to prioritise 
areas to be improved for the revised CRM training (Klinect et al., 2003). The findings 
also assured Delta management of the reliability of CRM data (Klinect et al., 2003). 
 
The second LOSA was conducted within Continental Airlines in 1996, and was the 
first LOSA that was based on the TEM framework for data collection (Klinect, 2005), 
The TEM-based LOSA was on the basis of notions that everyday flight crews 
encounter threats and commit errors that have the potential to develop into an incident 
or accident (Klinect et al., 2003). The LOSA recorded threats and errors, and, more 
importantly, indicated how these were managed by flight crews (Klinect et al., 2003). 
In response to the findings, Continental Airlines established operational CRM targets 
and implemented certain changes, such as introducing error management training for 
its flight crews (Klinect et al., 2003). 
 
A follow-up LOSA in Continental Airlines was conducted in 2000, and positive 
outcomes were noted when compared with the results from the earlier LOSA, with a 
greater improvement in the area of checklist usage, a dramatic reduction in unstable 
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approaches and an increase in overall crew performance (Gunther, 2002). Klinect 
(2005) highlighted that the LOSA not only provided a ‘diagnostic snapshot of 
operational performance’, but also offered benchmarks for the ‘effectiveness of 
organisational safety changes’ when it was conducted routinely (p. 33). This 
operational performance can also be compared with other airlines, as more and more 
LOSA data are gathered. 
 
As the LOSA methodology continued to develop and mature, it was formally endorsed 
by ICAO (2002) as a proactive organisational strategy. Findings from LOSA could 
provide airlines with operational strengths and weaknesses to guide organisational 
strategies or tactics with regard to training and operations to achieve a higher level of 
safety (ICAO, 2002). Other governing organisations—such as the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ 
Associations (IFALPA) and Airline Pilots Association (APA)—also endorsed LOSA 
as a key driver to monitor and diagnose airlines’ safety performance during normal 
operations, and proactively develop appropriate safety interventions (Eames-Brown 
& Collis, 2007). 
 
2.1.1 Line Operations Safety Audit data measures.  
 
Each observational flight gathers four types of LOSA data based on the TEM 
framework: demographic, narrative, CRM behavioural markers and TEM measures 
(Klinect, 2005). Demographic measures refer to several flight characteristics, such as 
city pairs, flight time and aircraft type (Klinect, 2005). Any information that could 
jeopardise anonymity is not collected, such as flight numbers and date of flight 
(Klinect et al., 2003). Narrative measures refer to textual information provided by 
LOSA observers when they are unable to find a suitable code or they consider it 
appropriate to provide written narratives to supplement coded information (Klinect, 
2005). CRM behavioural markers, as the name suggests, refer to a predetermined set 
of behaviours that indicate aspects of CRM performance (Flin & Martin, 2001). TEM 
measures refer to observed data on the flight crew’s TEM performance, which 
encompasses three elements: threat management, error management and Undesired 
Aircraft State (UAS) management (Klinect, 2005). Given that this thesis’s primary 
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focus is TEM, the remainder of this section provides further elaboration on TEM 
measures. 
 
The first element of TEM measures is threat management, which is divided into three 
variables: threat type, threat response and threat outcome (Klinect, 2005). Table 2.1 
presents the three variables and their categorical levels. For LOSA observers to 
determine whether a threat is managed or not, the observers first need to determine 
which type of threat presented. The nature of threats can be expected, unexpected, 
latent or overt. In the University of Texas TEM framework, there are two types of 
threats: environmental and airline threats (Klinect, 2005). The former is outside the 
airline’s direct control, while the latter—also referred as systemic threats—originates 
within the flight operations of the airline (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). There are four 
categories of environmental threats and seven categories of airline threats (Klinect, 
2005), as presented in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Primary Threat Management Variables. 
Variables Categorical levels 
Threat type 
Environmental threats Airline threats 
• Adverse weather • Aircraft malfunction 
• Airport • Airline operational 
pressure 
• ATC • Cabin 
• Environmental operational 
pressure 
• Dispatch/paperwork 
 • Ground/ramp 
 • Ground maintenance 
 • Manuals/charts 
Threat 
response 
Was the threat discussed or planned before it was encountered? 
Yes/no  
Threat 
outcome 
Inconsequential  
Linked to flight crew error  
Source: adapted from by Klinect (2005, p. 51). 
 
The second variable of threat management is threat response, and this is the first part 
of threat management (Klinect, 2005). For LOSA observers, this is simply recorded 
as ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (Klinect, 2005). A ‘yes’ answer indicates that the flight crew either 
discussed or planned for a threat before it was encountered, while a ‘no’ answer 
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indicates that either a threat was presented unexpectedly or the flight crew failed to 
plan ahead for the threat (Klinect, 2005). 
 
The third variable of threat management, threat outcome, is the final quantitative 
measure of threat management (Klinect, 2005). The threat outcome is either 
inconsequential or linked to flight crew error (Klinect, 2005), and is depicted in Figure 
2.1. Inconsequential threat outcome refers to a threat that was successfully managed 
or did not evolve into an error or UAS. An example of this threat is an Air Traffic 
Controller (ATC) failing to provide adequate lateral spacing between two aircraft 
(environmental threat), yet the flight crew of the following aircraft changing their 
course slightly to maintain the required spacing. For threat management, failure of the 
ATC to provide the adequate lateral spacing was not expected, but was nevertheless 
well managed; thus, the outcome was inconsequential. The second threat outcome is 
linked to flight crew error and refers to a mismanaged threat that has developed to a 
threat-induced error (Klinect, 2005). For example, a radio call from an ATC may 
interrupt the flight crew when they are performing a pre-landing checklist, and the 
crew consequently miss an item in the pre-landing checklist. This indicates an 
unexpected threat that was not managed, which escalated into the flight crew 
committing a threat-induced error of omitting a pre-landing checklist item. 
 
Following threat management, the second element of TEM measures is error 
management, which is again divided into three variables: error types, error responses 
and error outcomes (Klinect, 2005). Table 2.2 displays these three variables, the error 
types and their categorical levels. In the TEM framework, there are three types of 
errors: aircraft handling errors, procedural errors and communication errors (Klinect, 
2005). Aircraft handling errors refer to errors in the area of ‘the flying, direction, speed 
and configuration of the aircraft’ (Klinect, 2005, p. 52). There are five categories under 
aircraft handling errors, as presented in Table 2.2. Procedural errors involve deviation 
from rules, regulations and set procedures, such as Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) (Klinect, 2005). There are seven categories under procedural errors (Table 2.2). 
Communication errors concern poor communications or an absence of 
communications between flight crews or between the flight crew and external agents, 
such as the ATC, as presented in Table 2.2 (Klinect, 2005). 
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Table 2.2 Primary Error Management Variables. 
Variables Categorical levels 
Error type 
Aircraft handling 
errors Procedural errors 
Communication 
errors 
• Automation • Briefings • Crew to external 
• Flight control • Callout • Pilot to pilot 
• Ground 
navigation • Checklist  
• Manual 
handling • Documentation  
• Systems/radio/ 
instruments 
• Pilot flying/pilot 
not flying duties  
 • SOP cross-verification  
 • Other procedural  
Error 
response 
Detected and actioned 
Failing to respond 
Error 
outcome 
Inconsequential 
Additional error 
UAS 
Source: adapted from Klinect (2005, p. 57). 
 
For LOSA observers to determine whether an error was managed or not, the LOSA 
observer first needs to determine which type of error was committed. The nature of 
errors can either be a simple slip or lapse (non-threat-induced or spontaneous error) or 
‘a by-product of the threat environment’ (threat-induced error) (Klinect, 2005, p. 51). 
For instance, if a pilot simply misses a checklist item without apparent threat presented, 
this would be considered a non-threat-induced error. In contrast, if the same pilot 
misses a checklist item because a flight attendant interrupts while the flight crew is 
completing a particular checklist, this would be considered a threat-induced error. 
 
The second variable of error management is error response, and this is the first part of 
error management (Klinect, 2005). In LOSA, there are two types of responses: (i) 
detected and actioned and (ii) failing to respond (Klinect, 2005). The former refers to 
an error that was committed, yet actively managed by the flight crew. For example, a 
flight crew is instructed by the ATC to climb to 25,000 feet, but the Pilot Monitoring 
(PM) incorrectly reads this back as 24,000 feet. If the PM then immediately realises 
his or her incorrect read-back and subsequently reads back the correct altitude of 
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25,000 feet, this would be considered an error response being detected and 
appropriately actioned. The other type of error response is failing to respond, and this 
involves the flight crew either failing to detect or ignoring an error, thereby leaving 
the error unmanaged (Klinect, 2005). For example, if the PM incorrectly reads back 
the newly assigned altitude and there is no subsequent correction, this would be 
considered an error response of failing to respond. 
 
The third variable of error management, error outcome, is the final piece of 
information to construct overall error management (Klinect, 2005). The three types of 
outcomes are inconsequential, additional error and UAS, as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
Similar to an inconsequential threat, an inconsequential error refers to an error that 
does not develop into the flight crew committing additional errors or UAS. For 
instance, using the same example above, the PM incorrectly reads back the newly 
assigned altitude, and neither the Pilot Flying (PF) nor the PM realise their read-back 
error. However, the ATC corrects their read-back error and the PM subsequently reads 
back the assigned altitude correctly. This is considered an inconsequential error. The 
second outcome is committing an additional error and causing an error chain to 
develop. For instance, the flight crew incorrectly reads back the new assigned altitude 
and this error is not noticed by the flight crew or corrected by the ATC. The final 
outcome is an error or a series of errors developing into UAS, which is defined as an 
undesired ‘crew-error-induced aircraft state’ in which the required safety margins are 
compromised (Klinect, 2005, p. 58). Using the same example above, the incorrect 
read-back of an assigned altitude and subsequent setting of incorrect altitude on the 
mode control panel will result in the aircraft levelling off at the incorrect altitude, 
which will reduce safety margins, such as reduction in vertical and/or lateral 
separation from other aircraft in the vicinity. 
 
Following error management, the third element of TEM measures is UAS 
management, which is again divided into three variables: UAS types, UAS responses 
and UAS outcomes (Klinect, 2005). Table 2.3 presents the three variables and their 
categorical levels. As per the definition of UAS in the earlier paragraph and Figure 
2.1, UAS management is the final opportunity for the flight crew to return the aircraft 
to its intended and/or optimal state, so that the event does not escalate to an incident 
or accident. 
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Table 2.3 Primary UAS Management Variables. 
Variables Categorical levels 
USA type 
Aircraft handling 
Ground navigation 
Incorrect aircraft configurations 
UAS response Detected and actioned Failing to respond 
UAS outcome Inconsequential Additional error 
Source: adapted from Klinect (2005, p. 60). 
 
For LOSA observers to determine whether UAS was managed, the LOSA observers 
first need to determine the types of UAS. An example of aircraft handling UAS 
includes unstable approach (Klinect, 2005). An example of ground navigation UAS 
includes taxiing above the speed limit (Klinect, 2005). An example of incorrect aircraft 
configurations UAS includes incorrect altitude selection on the mode control panel 
(Klinect, 2005). 
 
The second variable of UAS management is UAS response, and this is the first part of 
UAS management (Klinect, 2005). Similar to the TEM described above, there are two 
types of responses: (i) detected and actioned and (ii) failing to respond (Klinect, 2005). 
The former refers to the detection of UAS and acting appropriately to manage UAS. 
An example of the former response (detected and actioned) is as follows. After the 
flight crew levels off at an incorrect altitude, the crew realises their error and takes 
appropriate action, such as requesting to climb/descend to the correct altitude. The 
second type of response—failing to respond—involves the failure of the flight crew 
to return the aircraft to its intended and/or optimal state, thereby resulting in safety 
margins being compromised. An example of the latter response (failing to respond) is 
the same as the previous example, except the flight crew does not realise their error 
and no further action is taken until a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) 
warning alerts the flight crew. 
 
The final variable of UAS management, UAS outcome, is either inconsequential or 
linked to additional error (Klinect, 2005). The earlier example of levelling off at the 
incorrect altitude, yet taking appropriate action, such as requesting to climb/descend 
to the correct altitude, would be considered inconsequential if this vertical deviation 
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did not escalate into an incident or accident. An example of the second UAS outcome 
(linked to additional error) is as follows. After an aircraft deviates from its intended 
vertical profile (either too high or too low) during an instrument approach, the flight 
crew fixates on regaining the correct vertical profile and does not notice that the 
aircraft has deviated from its intended lateral profile (either left or right of its intended 
track). 
 
Collecting reliable data, such as TEM measures, is an essential aspect of LOSA. For 
LOSA to be successful and to collect quality data, it involves 10 core operating 
characteristics, each of which has equal importance (Klinect, 2005; Klinect et al., 
2003). These characteristics are described in the next section. 
 
2.1.2 Ten Line Operations Safety Audit operating characteristics.  
 
Klinect (2005) described that, in response to years of field work experience and 
continued research in the observational research design, LOSA was developed in its 
current form with 10 operating characteristics that define the UTHFRP LOSA. These 
10 operating characteristics are as follows (Klinect, 2005, pp. 34–35): 
 
1. jump seat observations of regularly scheduled flights 
2. voluntary flight crew participation 
3. anonymous, confidential and non-punitive data collection 
4. joint management/union sponsorship 
5. secure data collection repository 
6. trusted and trained observers 
7. systematic observation instrument 
8. data verification roundtables 
9. data-driven targets for enhancement 
10. feedback of results to line pilots. 
 
To ensure that the data collected are of high quality, all LOSA observations are 
performed during regularly scheduled flights, which is the first operating characteristic 
of LOSA (Klinect, 2005). Formal line checks and evaluation flights are off limits 
because they will not exhibit the true behaviour of flight crews (Klinect et al., 2003). 
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To ensure the success of LOSA, the project needs to gain pilot trust. The more trust 
LOSA gains from its participating flight crews, the more likely the LOSA data will 
reflect the flight crews’ normal behaviours (Klinect et al., 2003). The second, third, 
fourth and sixth operating characteristics are essential to increase the level of pilot 
trust. Voluntary participation reinforces that LOSA is not another form of evaluation 
flight (Klinect et al., 2003). Anonymous, confidential and non-punitive data collection 
ensures that no potentially identifying information—such as flight numbers and 
dates—are collected, and observers do not discuss their observations in public or 
private (Klinect, 2005). A formal agreement between airline management and the 
pilot’s association further strengthens pilot trust in LOSA (Klinect et al., 2003).  
 
Another essential characteristic to achieve successful LOSA and gain pilot trust is to 
appoint trusted and well-trained observers who are typically ‘unobtrusive and non-
threatening’ (Klinect et al., 2003, p. 666). The majority of observers recruited are 
regular line pilots in the airline, with a high level of operational familiarity and 
technical expertise. However, the team of LOSA observers can also include other 
individuals, such as retired line pilots or external observers (Klinect 2005; Klinect et 
al., 2003). Potential observers are identified separately by the airline management and 
pilots’ association, and individuals who appear on both lists are approached to 
participate as observers (Klinect et al., 2003). 
 
The use of regular line pilots as observers can potentially result in collecting subjective 
data, such as ‘what should have been done’ instead of ‘what was done’ (Klinect, 2005). 
This will clearly affect the validity and reliability of the LOSA findings. Therefore, it 
is important to establish a systematic observation instrument that minimises the 
opportunity for subjective biases to emerge within the LOSA data (Klinect, 2005). 
Additionally, there needs to be a trusted data collection point, either jointly managed 
by representatives from both management and the pilots’ association, or use of an 
independent third party, as well as a secure data repository to assure confidentiality 
(Klinect, 2005; Klinect et al., 2003).  
 
After collecting all the LOSA data, a joint data verification roundtable is convened to 
check the consistency and accuracy of the data before analysing them (Klinect, 2005). 
The roundtable typically consists of three to five representatives from various sections 
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of the airline (e.g., a fleet manager, pilot representative and so forth) who scan the 
LOSA data for any errors or inconsistencies (Klinect, 2005). After the roundtable 
session, the data are checked for consistency with the airline’s SOPs (Klinect et al., 
2003). During data analysis, specific patterns emerge, such as frequent errors during 
a particular phase of flight. These patterns serve as safety targets that the airline will 
work towards, as well as a benchmark for follow-up LOSAs, so that the subsequent 
findings can be measured against safety targets to assess whether relevant intervention 
plans and strategies implemented were successful (Klinect, 2005). The patterns, safety 
targets and relevant intervention plans and strategies must be communicated in a 
timely manner to relevant stakeholders, such as flight crew within the airline (Klinect, 
2005). 
 
LOSA has been well received as a proactive methodology to collect safety data that 
provide a snapshot of the strengths and weaknesses of an airline and its operations. 
For LOSA to be successful, data are collected from normal operations after gaining 
pilot trust by ensuring that the data collection is voluntary and non-punitive. The 
quality, validity and reliability of the data are further enhanced by certain 
characteristics, such as data verification roundtables. The findings provide areas of 
safety concerns on which to focus and develop organisational strategies or tactics to 
further improve the safety performance of the airline. In addition, LOSA data from an 
airline can be compared with de-identified findings from other airlines that already 
undertook LOSA to assess the airline’s performance against other airlines. These 
characteristics and the proactive nature of LOSA were endorsed by ICAO and other 
international governing organisations, such as IATA, IFALPA and APA. 
 
2.2 Crew Resource Management 
 
The birth of CRM can be traced back to a 1979 workshop, titled ‘Resource 
Management (RM) on the Flight Deck’, which addressed the fact that the majority of 
accidents resulted from so-called pilot error, and primarily involved failures of 
interpersonal communication, decision-making and leadership (Helmreich et al., 
1999). The workshop also challenged the long-held belief that ‘pilot proficiency plus 
aircraft reliability equals to safe flight’ (Maurino & Murray, 2009, pp. 10–13). Since 
 	 20	
then, CRM has evolved through different generations with varying foci to reach its 
current state. Maurino and Murray (2009) argued that it is undisputed that CRM is a 
significant contributor to the safety and efficiency of the aviation system. The 
following provides a brief description of each generation of CRM and the changes that 
occurred over time. 
 
2.2.1 Generations of crew resource management.  
 
The first generation of CRM mainly focused on pilot personality and its influence on 
effective crew coordination (Klinect, 2005). The topics covered in the first generation 
of CRM were predominantly psychological in nature (Helmreich et al., 1999), with a 
strong focus on individual behaviour, style, communication, managerial effectiveness 
and psychological testing (Maurino & Murray, 2009; Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 
2001). The underlying safety paradigm was that the level of safety was directly and 
exclusively related to the performance of the flight crew (Maurino & Murray, 2009). 
Hence, the first generation of CRM primarily focused on changing individual styles, 
and identifying and correcting deficiencies in the flight crew’s behaviour—commonly 
called the ‘wrong stuff’ (Salas et al., 2001). The primary focus on individuals with the 
‘wrong stuff’ caused resistance from some pilots who deemed this approach to be an 
attempt to manipulate their personalities. As a result, a revised version was presented 
as the second generation of CRM (Helmreich et al., 1999), which shifted from 
focusing on personality to training pilots by offering examples of desirable crew 
behaviours and relating them to the daily operational contexts (Klinect, 2005). 
 
One distinct change in the second generation of CRM was a change of the first letter 
‘C’ from meaning ‘cockpit’ to meaning ‘crew’, as it was recognised that other aviation 
personnel also required such skills, including cabin crew (Helmreich et al., 1999). The 
refinement process included, but was not limited to, greater use of specific aviation 
concepts and a stronger team orientation (Helmreich et al., 1999). However, similar to 
the first generation, the second generation of CRM maintained two separate 
dichotomies: technical training and non-technical (e.g., CRM) training (Maurino & 
Murray, 2009). The level of acceptance of the second generation of CRM greatly 
improved compared with the first generation of CRM, and this, along with the 
introduction of glass cockpits, led to the third generation of CRM (Klinect, 2005). 
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The commencement of the third generation of CRM coincided with the introduction 
of glass cockpits, and some of the highlights of this generation included an attempt to 
integrate CRM into technical training and to broaden its audience further to include 
other groups, such as dispatchers and maintenance personnel (Helmreich et al., 1999). 
The third generation also considered systemic influences (e.g., organisational culture 
and regulatory influence) and their effect on flight crews’ performance, although it 
was recognised that these influences were external and beyond flight crews’ control 
(Klinect, 2005). In addition, the third generation ‘revisited the human–machine 
interface and introduced the concepts of mental models, stress and fatigue 
management, automation management, vigilance and human reliability’ (Koeppen, 
2012, p. 36). The attempt to fully integrate CRM into technical training led to the next 
generation of CRM. 
 
The fourth generation of CRM in the 1990s encompassed a full integration of CRM 
into technical training, with the aim of solving the problems of human errors 
(Helmreich et al., 1999), as well as focusing on cultural issues, with particular 
attention to issues involving multinational crews (Maurino & Murray, 2009). In 
addition, in this generation of CRM, FAA (1991) introduced the Advanced 
Qualification Program (AQP), which allowed airlines to tailor their fully integrated 
CRM and technical training, as appropriate, to fit each airline’s specific requirements 
(Salas et al., 2001). However, there were rising concerns that the key objective of 
CRM had been diluted because of the too-broad strategic concepts of safer flight and 
ways to achieve it. Hence, the fifth generation of CRM was presented (Maurino & 
Murray, 2009) after a re-examination of the original CRM principles discussed at the 
1979 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) workshop (Klinect, 
2005) and the introduction of LOSA (Koeppen, 2012). 
 
The fifth generation of CRM saw a shift from training for error prevention to error 
management, after it was realised and accepted that error was a ubiquitous and natural 
part of every flight and could not be totally eliminated (Thomas, 2004). The fifth 
generation also marked ‘back to basics’ by narrowing the goals of CRM to specifically 
consider the goal that CRM was fundamentally intended to achieve on a tactical 
level—error management (Maurino & Murray, 2009). This was a result of two major 
findings from LOSA. The first was that human error is inevitable, and the second was 
 	 22	
that flight crews employ specific countermeasures to fly safely from Point A to B 
(Maurino & Murray, 2009). To achieve its aim, the focus of the fifth generation of 
CRM was improving teamwork skills that would promote: ‘(a) error avoidance, (b) 
early detection of errors, and (c) minimisation of consequences resulting from CRM 
related errors’ (Salas et al., 2001, p. 642). 
 
Continued research on LOSA and CRM suggested that the variability of the 
operational environment, which was beyond flight crews’ control, had a significant 
effect on the way error management was exercised (Maurino & Murray, 2009). 
Koeppen (2012) added that, although potentially adverse environments were outside 
flight crews’ control, the situations or events still required flight crews to manage them. 
Thus, error management was developed into TEM, which became the framework for 
the current generation of CRM. CRM training has become a core type of human 
factors training in airlines and other communities, such as medical and offshore oil 
production sectors, which have increasingly adopted and modified CRM principles 
and concepts in their activities (Flin, O’Connor & Crichton, 2008). This trend 
highlighted the need for a systematic review of CRM’s effectiveness, which is 
described in the following section. 
 
2.2.2 Crew resource management effectiveness.  
 
Salas et al. (2001) conducted a systematic review of 58 published articles on CRM 
training, using Kirkpatrick’s typology (Kirkpatrick, 1994), to determine CRM 
training’s effectiveness in the aviation industry. O’Connor et al. (2008) acknowledged 
the utility of the framework to assess the effects of post-training intervention in an 
organisation, as it considers multiple levels. Kirkpatrick’s evaluation approach 
consists of four levels of evaluation: (i) participants’ reaction to a newly implemented 
program or training initiatives (reaction), (ii) changes in participants’ attitude and 
improved skills and knowledge (learning), (iii) changes in behaviour (behaviour) and 
(iv) achievement of the predetermined final objectives of a program (results) 
(Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006).  
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The first level, reaction, involves gauging a level of satisfaction from, for instance, 
participants in a new training initiative to assess the effectiveness of the new initiative 
and the areas for improvement (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006). The satisfaction 
level results from participants’ different perceptions of a program, such as whether it 
was worthwhile attending, relevant to their job and interesting to hear (Salas et al., 
2001). The review found that a total of 27 studies (46%) collected reaction data with 
the main focus of affective feelings towards CRM programs (12 of 27), the usefulness 
of these programs (nine of 27) and a combination of both (seven of 27) (Salas et al., 
2001). The review suggested that CRM training was found to produce positive 
reactions, which was an encouraging finding because this would likely improve the 
credibility and necessity of CRM training and enhance trainees’ motivation to learn 
(Salas et al., 2001). 
 
The second level, learning, involves measuring the learning outcomes imparted, such 
as improvement in participants’ knowledge and skills and participants’ desired attitude 
change (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006). Some of the outcomes can be assessed 
easily and often immediately after training (e.g., improvement in knowledge), whereas 
others are more gradual (e.g., changes in attitude) (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
The review found that a total of 30 studies (52%) collected learning data, and the 
majority of studies assessed changes in attitude after CRM training using the Cockpit 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) or a modified version of it (Salas et 
al., 2001). The overall findings indicated that CRM training produced positive changes 
to participants’ knowledge and targeted attitudes (Salas et al., 2001). The findings thus 
far have been positive and encouraging, yet further evaluation is needed to assess 
whether positive reaction and learning from CRM training result in changes to 
participants’ desirable behaviour on the job. 
 
The third level, behaviour, is described as the assessment of changes in behaviour 
(e.g., knowledge, skills and attitude) after learning has occurred (Kirkpatrick & 
Kirkpatrick, 2006). The review found that a total of 32 studies (55%) collected some 
form of behavioural data using the measurements of CRM-related behaviour during a 
training session (e.g., LOFT), online assessment or combination of both (Salas et al., 
2001). The overall findings suggested that CRM training had a positive effect on 
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crews’ CRM performance, such as improving decision-making, enabling greater 
adaptability and improving team communication (Salas et al., 2001). 
 
The fourth level, results, involves determining the achievement of the predetermined 
final objectives of a program, such as CRM training. The results are assessed in several 
ways, such as considering improved quality, reduced accidents and incidents, and 
higher profits (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006). The review found that only six 
studies (10%) collected data at this level (Salas et al., 2001) which is understandable 
given the difficulties in terms of time and resources. The rare occurrences of incidents 
and accidents for gathering definitive, and often longitudinal, data to determine how 
successfully a program (e.g., CRM training) has achieved its predetermined final 
objectives (Salas et al., 2001). The six studies and their findings based on anecdotal 
evidence (e.g., accident/incident reports) and longitudinal studies (e.g., trends in 
quarterly air carrier discrepancy reports) weakly suggested that improved CRM 
behaviours would reduce the effects of human and mechanical errors on the level of 
an organisation’s safety (Salas et al., 2001). 
 
The review of 58 published articles on CRM training—using Kirkpatrick’s typology 
(Kirkpatrick, 1994) to determine CRM training’s effectiveness in the aviation 
industry—indicated that, at each level, the findings were positive, as the CRM training 
was found to produce positive reactions by the participants, which led to positive 
changes in their attitude and behaviour in the desired direction (Salas et al., 2001). 
Salas, Wilson, Burke, and Wightman (2006) conducted another review of 28 published 
articles both within the aviation industry and in other industries, such as medicine and 
offshore oil production and maintenance, as CRM can be conceptualised as a team 
training instructional strategy to improve coordination and performance among team 
members. The following describes the findings from this updated review. 
 
As stated above, the updated review (Salas et al., 2006) identified 28 published articles 
within and outside the aviation industry, and the breakdown of the domains was as 
follows: commercial aviation (two studies), military aviation (seven studies), air 
traffic control (one study), aviation maintenance (three studies), medicine (11 studies), 
offshore oil production and maintenance (one study), shipping/maritime navigators 
(two studies) and nuclear (one study). The updated review also used Kirkpatrick’s 
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typology (Kirkpatrick, 1994) to determine the effectiveness of CRM within the 
aforementioned domains (Salas et al., 2006). 
 
A total of 13 studies (46%) evaluated the effectiveness of CRM training at the lowest 
level of Kirkpatrick’s evaluation approach—reactions—mostly using self-report 
surveys, such as CMAQ or a modified version (Salas et al., 2006). The findings 
indicated that, similar to the earlier review, the trainees found the training enjoyable 
and useful (Salas et al., 2006). Similar findings were noted in a study that performed 
a meta-analysis using 16 published CRM evaluation research outputs (O’Connor et 
al., 2008). These were considered encouraging findings, as this would likely improve 
CRM training’s credibility and enhance trainees’ motivation to learn (Salas et al., 
2001). Indeed, O’Connor, O’Dea and Keogh (2013) found that participants in 
healthcare responded positively to CRM-type training which led to a large effect on 
the participants’ knowledge.    
 
In terms of learning—the second level of Kirkpatrick’s evaluation approach 
(Kirkpatrick, 1994)—12 studies (43%) evaluated the effectiveness of CRM training at 
this level, and there was evidence of learning occurring in all domains with varying 
degrees (Salas et al., 2006). There were mixed findings that indicated positive transfer, 
where positive reactions resulted in positive learning and desirable attitudes, yet there 
were also findings that suggested a neutral result, where scores on knowledge and 
attitude were similar between trained and untrained groups (Salas et al., 2006). Ford, 
Henderson, and O’Hare (2014) conducted a similar study using Flight Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaires (FSAQ) to evaluate the effectiveness of newly developed CRM 
training for flight attendants at an Asia-Pacific airline. The findings indicated a 
significant improvement in understanding job roles and perceptions of the importance 
of team work and communication, which led to greater attitudinal change, particularly 
for senior and short-haul cabin crews (Ford et al., 2014). These findings further 
supported the importance of CRM training within and, most likely, outside the aviation 
industry. 
 
Learning and subsequent positive changes in attitude likely lead to a change in 
behaviour in the intended direction, which is the third level of Kirkpatrick’s evaluation 
approach (Kirkpatrick, 1994). A total of 16 studies (57%) examined a transfer of 
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learning to the desirable behaviour after CRM training, and, unlike the earlier review 
(Salas et al., 2001), the updated review noted inconsistent transfer of behaviour, with 
some studies identifying partial and negative transfer, and others noting positive 
transfer (Salas et al., 2006). Salas et al. (2006) added that, even with an initial positive 
transfer of behaviour, there was a tendency for the behaviour to regress to the pre-
training state. This tendency highlights the importance of conducting such training on 
a regular basis. 
 
The fourth level of Kirkpatrick’s evaluation approach (Kirkpatrick, 1994) is results, 
and, similar to the earlier review, the number of studies that evaluated the effectiveness 
of CRM training at this level was small (five studies), with conflicting findings 
regarding achievement of the predetermined final objects of the CRM training (Salas 
et al., 2006). Three studies’ findings indicated a positive effect on safety, based on the 
reduced number of errors and incidents, yet the findings from two other studies were 
neutral (Salas et al., 2006). Understandably, with limited definitive data, there was 
weak indication that CRM training had a positive effect on improving safety. This 
requires continued research on the effectiveness of CRM training and its evaluation, 
as the adoption and use of CRM grows in various industries. 
 
The two reviews (Salas et al., 2001; Salas et al., 2006) suggested that, despite the 
variability of the findings, CRM training generally appears to be effective and has a 
positive effect in a number of high-reliability industries, both within and outside the 
aviation industry. Therefore, the following section describes some of the high-
reliability industries that have adopted the principles and concepts of CRM training, 
and their experiences. 
 
2.2.3 Crew resource management in high-reliability industries.  
 
O’Connor et al. (2008) proposed that the aviation industry has been playing a pivotal 
role in developing training programs that aim to ultimately make the industry safe. 
One such training program is CRM, which was originally confined to flight crews in 
the cockpit, yet quickly moved to other parts of the aviation industry through its 
evolution. With continued research, the concepts of CRM and training were extended 
beyond the aviation industry into other high-reliability industries, such as air medical, 
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healthcare and nuclear power plant industries. Fisher, Phillips, and Mather (2000) 
acknowledged that appropriately instituted CRM was expected to promote safe and 
efficient operations within these industries. This section describes some of the research 
on CRM implementation and evaluation in these industries. 
 
The primary role of the air medical industry is using aircraft to transport patients from 
one place to another, such as an accident scene to a hospital. Fisher et al. (2000) 
administered a survey asking whether each participant from the air medical teams 
received three identified areas of training (i.e., CRM training, team building exercises 
and effective communication training). Approximately half of the participants 
responded that they had received all three types of training. The findings indicated that 
the participants who completed all three types of training exhibited attitudes and 
behavioural patterns that would promote and encourage open communication and 
safer operations within the air medical environment (Fisher et al., 2000). These 
findings were consistent with findings (e.g., Salas et al., 2001) in the aviation industry 
after CRM training was introduced. 
 
Continued research and a growing body of evidence on the benefits of CRM resulted 
in the concepts and principles of CRM extending to the healthcare industry, such as 
the operating room (Wakeman & Langham, 2018). The operating room is a place 
where a group of professionals with different backgrounds and skillsets work in a 
coordinated and harmonised manner to deliver optimum patient care (Wakeman & 
Langham, 2018). Therefore, it is important for each medical professional to 
understand their duties and perform them accordingly. One of the ways to improve 
this area is through preoperative briefing. According to Wakeman and Langham 
(2018), teams in the operating room were found to perform significantly more 
briefings, surgical pauses and debriefings after CRM training, which led to greatly 
improved communication among medical professionals, and a reduction in annual 
procedural mortality and all-cause morbidity. 
 
Introduction of CRM principles and a training program was also observed in the 
nuclear power plant industry. A CRM training program with a focus on the area of 
non-technical skills—such as leadership, teamwork and communication—was 
developed because it was identified that team performance was one of the key factors 
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to promote safety in the digitalised control room of a nuclear power plant (Kim & 
Byun, 2011). The main findings indicated that individual attitude and team 
performance improved after the CRM training program was implemented (Kim & 
Byun, 2011). In addition, the CRM training program was found to be more effective 
than other similar programs that aimed to enhance team skills in the field of crew 
coordination and communication (Kim & Byun, 2011).  
 
Maurino and Murray (2009) argued that CRM was one of the significant contributors 
to the safety and efficiency of the aviation system. Continued research activity and the 
success of CRM have resulted in the principles and concepts of CRM being extended 
to other high-reliability industries, such as the healthcare and nuclear power plant 
industries. Maurino and Murray (2009) added that the evolution of CRM led to varying 
foci within each CRM generation, and led to its current sixth generation, which 
includes TEM as its framework. 
 
2.3 Threat and Error Management (TEM) 
 
TEM is described as a process of detecting and responding to threats and errors to 
ensure that the outcome of an event is inconsequential by maintaining adequate safety 
margins (CASA, 2008). Simply stated, TEM is a required day-to-day exercise for 
pilots to fly an aircraft safely between two points (Maurino & Murray, 2009). TEM 
emerged during the development of LOSA, with the aim of capturing the full 
operational complexity during flights (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). The following 
sections describe the theoretical framework of TEM in more detail. 
 
2.3.1 Introduction of TEM in Australian aviation.  
 
TEM is endorsed by ICAO as an integral part of pilot training at all licence levels, and 
has been generally accepted in the airline industry as an effective method of improving 
flight safety (CASA, 2008). In addition, anecdotal evidence has suggested that pilots 
who continuously receive TEM training in a structured manner as part of their flight 
training from the ab initio stage demonstrate earlier achievement of required 
competencies, compared with pilots who receive insufficient and/or irregular TEM 
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training (P. Murray, personal communication, July 29, 2009). This is consistent with 
previous studies that demonstrated a higher achievement of post-training performance 
among trainees exposed to TEM (Bove, 2002). In response to ICAO’s 
acknowledgement of the need for TEM training and recommendation that TEM be 
introduced to all pilot training syllabi, CASA (2009) mandated TEM as an additional 
assessment item for various levels of flight tests and ground examinations, effective 
from 1 July 2009. 
 
2.3.2 Threat and error management model.  
 
Maurino (2005a) described a TEM model as the theoretical foundation that ‘assists in 
understanding, from an operational perspective, the inter-relationship between safety 
and human performance in dynamic and challenging operational contexts’ (p. 1). 
CASA (2008) stated that TEM involves more than the traditional role of airmanship, 
as it encourages pilots to be more proactive in identifying and managing threats and 
errors, even before the flight commences. The model consists of three major 
components: threat, error and Undesired Aircraft State (UAS). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. TEM model. Reproduced with permission from the LOSA Collaborative. 
 
A threat is defined as an event that occurs outside the influence of the flight crew, and 
consequently increases the operational complexity of a flight (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). 
Hence, the crew’s attention to and management of the threat is required so that the 
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safety margins can be maintained (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). Two types of threats are 
environmental threats and airline threats. The former is outside the airline’s direct 
control, while the latter—also referred as systemic threats—originates within the flight 
operations of the airline (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). There are four categories of 
environmental threats and seven categories of airline threats (Klinect, 2005). These 
categories and their examples are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
The nature of threats can be classified as overt or latent (Maurino & Murray, 2009). 
Overt threats are easily observable and identifiable external events that are either 
expected or unexpected, while latent threats are not readily observable and are 
frequently not easily fixed at the crew level (Maurino & Murray, 2009). Examples of 
overt threats include adverse weather (environmental threats) and aircraft system 
malfunctions (airline threats). Some adverse weather conditions can be expected based 
on weather forecasts, such as thunderstorms and icing. In contrast, sudden engine 
failures or other system failures may be unexpected, yet flight crews are nevertheless 
required to manage these issues to maintain the required level of safety. Examples of 
latent threats include poor ATC training (environmental threats) and an inadequate 
and/or inappropriate training manual (airline threats). Understandably, complete 
avoidance of these types of threats is almost impossible. Thus, proper management of 
the threats is needed to maintain the required safety margins; otherwise, a mismanaged 
threat has the potential to develop into an error or result in a threat-induced accident 
or incident. According to Klinect (2016), approximately 25% of threats develop into 
an error with greater mismanagement of threats (46%) when threats are not anticipated. 
One of the ways to minimise the occurrence of mismanagement of threats is to ensure 
good pre-flight briefings, planning and active system monitoring. 
 
The second major component of the TEM model is error. Errors are defined as flight 
crews’ actions or inactions that lead to a deviation from crew or organisational 
intentions or expectations, and consequently reduce the required safety margins 
(Merritt & Klinect, 2006). This creates the potential for adverse operational events to 
develop while the flight crew are on duty (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). As displayed in 
Figure 2.1, the origin of errors can be either spontaneous (non-threat induced) or threat 
induced. In the TEM framework, errors are categorised based on the primary 
interaction of the flight crew at the time an error is committed (ICAO, 2005b). There 
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are three types of errors: aircraft handling errors, procedural errors and communication 
errors. The types of errors and their examples are presented in Appendix 2. According 
to Klinect (2016), the highest mismanagement of errors involves aircraft handling 
errors. Any mismanaged errors can develop into a UAS or additional error, thereby 
creating an error chain. Thus, proper management of errors is essential to maintain the 
required safety margins. 
 
According to Klinect (2005), error management focuses on the environmental 
influences and psychological mechanisms involved after an error is committed. There 
are three phases involved in the error management process after an error is committed: 
detection, localisation and correction (van der Schaaf, 1995). The first phase, detection, 
is the most important phase of the error management process because undetected 
errors cannot be corrected and managed. The second phase, localisation, essentially 
involves understanding the error, including its origin. The final stage, correction, 
refers to planning and devising timely and effective counter-actions to return to a 
stable status (van der Schaaf, 1995) or at the very least prevent the error from causing 
further complications (Klinect, 2005). 
 
The third major component of the TEM model is UAS, which is defined as the safety-
compromising state of an aircraft that has deviated from its intended and/or optimal 
state because of mismanagement of the flight crew’s error, leading to a consequent 
reduction of the required safety margins (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). ICAO (2005b) 
added that this is a transitional state between a normal operational state and an 
outcome (e.g., incident or accident). This is the result of ineffective management of 
threat and/or error, and is the last opportunity for the flight crew to return the aircraft 
to its intended and/or optimal state, so that the event is inconsequential. Types of UAS 
and their examples are presented in Appendix 3. 
 
Thus far, the three major components of the TEM model have been described. Now, 
this section moves on to describe three accidents involving aircraft in Australian 
general aviation, as well as a brief analysis using the TEM model. The first accident 
occurred as follows: 
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On 29 September 2011 at 1240 Central Standard Time, a Gippsland 
Aeronautics GA-8 Airvan, registered VH-AJZ, departed Marree, South 
Australia with one pilot and six passengers for a scenic charter flight over 
Lake Eyre and surrounding regions. About 45 minutes after takeoff and 
while flying at a height of about 500 ft above ground level the pilot felt a 
shudder through the airframe, then heard a loud pop and the propeller 
stopped. The pilot carried out a successful forced landing on the Birdsville 
Track, approximately 135 km north-north-east of Marree. (ATSB, 2013) 
 
In this example, based on the TEM model, an airline threat (aircraft malfunction) was 
present, and the threat was correctly managed by successfully performing a forced 
landing without power. The second accident occurred as follows: 
 
On 29 September 2012, a Cessna P206B aircraft, registered VH-EGG, 
departed Gympie on a private flight to Monduran, Queensland. On board 
the aircraft were the pilot and four passengers. On arrival at the 
Monduran aeroplane landing area (ALA), the pilot noted the windsock 
was indicating gusty wind conditions, from about 310–320°, and elected 
to land on runway 02. When on the base and final legs of the circuit, the 
pilot reported that wind gusts in excess of 20 kts were experienced, along 
with moderate to severe turbulence. During the landing, at about 10 ft 
above the runway, the flare was commenced. Immediately after, a 
significant wind gust was experienced, resulting in a hard landing on the 
main landing gear. The aircraft bounced and the pilot applied a small 
amount of power in an attempt to regain control. A second wind gust of 
greater intensity then occurred. The aircraft stalled and touched down 
hard, collapsing the nose landing gear. The pilot maintained directional 
control and the aircraft came to a stop. The aircraft sustained damage to 
the propeller, nose landing gear and lower engine cowls. (ATSB, 2012) 
 
In this example, based on the TEM model, an environmental threat (gust of wind in 
turbulent conditions) was clearly present in the accident report, and the threat was not 
adequately managed. A threat-induced error (aircraft handling error) followed, but 
was not correctly managed; hence, a UAS occurred, where the aircraft stalled, and the 
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outcome was collapsed nose landing gear. The third accident occurred as follows: 
 
On 7 November 2012, at about 1000 Eastern Standard Time a Cessna 
172N registered VH-JGR (JGR) departed Archerfield Airport, 
Queensland on a training flight. The purpose of the flight was to conduct 
solo pre-test revision, prior to the pilot performing the Private Pilot 
Licence (PPL) flight test. The aircraft was booked for 2 hours. During the 
flight, the aircraft impacted terrain and was substantially damaged. The 
pilot reported that he had very little memory of the flight, but did recall 
that he intended to fly to the southern training area, to practice holding 
heading and altitude for his upcoming flight test. The pilot stated that his 
usual practise was to track via Jimboomba, Beaudesert and Boonah 
before returning to Archerfield via Jimboomba. The pilot had not 
submitted a flight plan or left a flight note with a responsible person or 
lodged a Search and Rescue Time (SARTIME) with the Airservices 
Australia. Following the accident, the pilot recalled regaining 
consciousness and crawling to JGR to broadcast a distress call on the 
aircraft radio. The aircraft was fitted with a personal locator beacon (PLB) 
but the pilot was unable to locate it after the accident to activate it. At 
about 1330, an aircraft in the area reported hearing two mayday calls on 
the Brisbane Centre Frequency, the calls were very faint and not heard by 
Brisbane Centre. The area controller requested the pilot of another 
aircraft in the area to track south from Kagaru to investigate. At about 
1410, a Cessna 172 was sighted in a paddock in uneven tussock strewn 
country about 2.5 Km south of Kagaru aeroplane landing area (ALA) on 
the runway heading. The pilot was the only person on board and suffered 
severe injuries as a result of the accident and at about 1500, he was 
airlifted to hospital. (ATSB, 2013) 
 
In this example, based on the TEM model, there was no clear evidence of a threat 
present; however, it is likely that a spontaneous aircraft handling error was not 
adequately managed. Hence, an error-induced accident occurred. This is one of many 
accidents in which threats are not prerequisites for errors to occur. Maurino and 
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Murray (2009) confirmed that approximately 50% of errors are independent of the 
presence of threats. 
 
2.3.2.1 Threat and error management applications.  
 
There are various ways in which TEM can be applied and adopted in areas such as 
system health checks, safety analysis and teaching. In terms of performing system 
health checks, Reason (2000) explained that there are two ways to determine the level 
of system health: the person’s approach and the system’s approach. The person’s 
approach focuses on the unsafe acts of people, typically at the sharp end (e.g., pilots), 
and provides countermeasures that aim to reduce unwanted variabilities in human 
behaviour (Reason, 2000). Conversely, the system’s approach focuses on the blunt 
end (e.g., airlines) that supports and shapes the people within it (Dekker, 2006). The 
TEM model accommodates both approaches in an integrated manner.  
 
Maurino (2005a) argued that, because the TEM model is descriptive and diagnostic in 
nature, it can simultaneously focus on human and system performance. Kharchenko, 
Chynchenko, and Raychev (2007) added that the TEM model is descriptive because it 
can capture and assess the performance of both humans and systems in the normal 
operations context. Further, the TEM model is considered diagnostic, as it allows the 
quantification of complexities related to describing human and system performance in 
the operational context (Kharchenko et al., 2007). TEM, when combined with LOSA, 
can then produce an understanding of systemic patterns within a sequence of events, 
thereby helping to clarify human performance, needs, strengths and vulnerabilities 
(Earl et al., 2012). The findings can subsequently be proactively incorporated into the 
existing initial and/or recurrent training syllabi, and, if necessary, additional training 
can be provided. Maurino (2005) further highlighted the adaptability of the TEM 
model, in that it can be used for different levels and sectors within an organisation and 
across different organisations within the aviation industry.  
 
Another application of TEM is to use it as a safety analysis tool focusing on a single 
event, such as analysing accidents/incidents, or a large set of events, similar to 
conducting operational audits. Wiggins (2005) described that a number of factors can 
surface as an accident investigation proceeds. The use of TEM as a safety analysis tool 
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can highlight specific areas of failure within the system, where further investigation 
can be conducted to achieve tangible improvement in overall system safety (Maurino, 
2005; Wiggins, 2005).  
 
Another application of TEM is in the instructional area, and the use of the TEM model 
in the training environment has had positive effects (Thomas, 2004). Thomas (2004) 
explained several benefits associated with the interpretation and analysis of 
simulation-based training syllabi that could well be translated into the actual aircraft 
cockpit. Incorporating types of common operational threats increases the realism of 
training and training efficiency, and allows trainees to adopt systematic approaches to 
error management training (Thomas, 2004). Klinect (2005) added that, although TEM 
was originally developed as a data collection measure for LOSA, it has become widely 
recognised and accepted as a foundation for human factors and CRM training in the 
airline industry. 
 
Similar to CRM and its expansion to other high-reliability industries, TEM has also 
seen application in those industries, such as offshore drilling and healthcare, despite 
the shorter time it has been around. However, it is worth noting that, because of its 
shorter period of existence, at the time of writing, there were very limited, if any, 
studies available evaluating TEM. Therefore, the following section primarily focuses 
on the ways in which the principles and concepts of TEM have been applied in some 
high-reliability industries. 
 
2.3.2.2 Threat and error management in high-reliability industries.  
 
It is generally accepted that the aviation industry has played a pivotal role in helping 
other industries (such as the healthcare industry) develop and shape numerous 
techniques to continue to improve (patient) safety (O’Connor et al., 2008). The 
application of TEM principles and concepts in the healthcare industry was no 
exception. Ruskin et al. (2013) developed a TEM-based predictive risk taxonomy 
applicable to anaesthesiologists. The taxonomy contained a list of threats for each 
stage of surgical anaesthesia to better prepare and manage situations that would 
otherwise develop into undesired patient states (Ruskin et al., 2013). The study also 
had an emphasis on identifying specific threats and associated errors and their 
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management to be considered when developing or revising education programs and 
other quality improvement initiatives for current and future healthcare professionals 
(Ruskin et al., 2013). 
 
Catchpole et al. (2006) conducted LOSA-style research that involved a direct 
observation methodology based on a TEM model to examine the systemic sources of 
threats and errors that led to minor and major failures in paediatric cardiac surgery. 
Based on 24 successful operations, the study identified a total of 366 minor failures 
that were associated with 406 threats and 218 errors. The most frequent type of threat 
was a task-related threat, such as equipment failure, and the most frequent type of error 
was a non-technical error, such as breakdown in coordination and communication 
among the surgical team (Catchpole et al., 2006). The study also found that seven 
operations could have been unsuccessful because of major failures associated with a 
greater number of minor failures, and cumulative effects, such as operations being 
high risk and/or long in duration (Catchpole et al., 2006). The findings from the study 
supported the application of the TEM model to identify threats and errors that develop 
into minor and major failures. Importantly, a closer examination of threat and error 
linked minor and major failures and lessons learned from it can inform 
recommendations on potential safety-related interventions and education programs for 
relevant healthcare authorities. 
 
Kvalheim and Haugen (2014) examined the application of the TEM framework to the 
offshore drilling industry by using case studies. Similar to aviation, the offshore 
drilling industry has realised the importance of diverting away from the ‘traditional 
sharp end compliance-based approach towards gaining a deeper understanding of the 
context’ that drilling crews experience on a daily basis (Kvalheim & Haugen, 2014, p. 
390). To this end, the TEM framework was adopted to help unfold complex 
accidents/incidents, so that areas of concern could be identified, followed by 
implementing appropriate strategies to properly address these concerns, identify the 
challenges of real-life drilling situations, and importantly determine how drilling 
crews manage such challenges (Kvalheim & Haugen, 2014). These findings are being 
used as a base to improve current training content and practices in the offshore drilling 
industry. 
 
 	 37	
2.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a review of the literature on LOSA, CRM and TEM. LOSA 
is a proactive and targeted observational methodology to gather data on system safety 
and flight crew performance during normal operations. The findings from LOSA are 
predominantly non-technical skills and CRM related, which are a major focus to 
improve the safety and efficiency of the system in the aviation industry. Both CRM 
and TEM training are endorsed and recommended by ICAO for flight crews to 
effectively use all the resources available to avoid, mitigate and manage everyday 
threats and errors that present during normal operations. The benefits of such training 
and concepts within aviation have attracted other safety critical industries, such as 
healthcare, to adopt them and appropriately modify them as required, so they can 
further improve current training programs and practices.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Crotty (1998) suggested that two fundamental questions need to be answered when 
planning a research study: which methodologies and methods should be adopted, and 
how is this choice justified? The provision of adequate and appropriate justification 
regarding the methodologies and methods planned or proposed to be adopted is based 
on the researcher’s theoretical perspective, which is embedded, in and informed by, 
the proposed methodology and epistemology (Crotty, 1998). Figure 3.1 below 
illustrates these four different process elements. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Four elements of research process when developing a study. Source: 
adapted from Crotty (1998, p. 4). 
 
Crotty (1998) argued that a solid understanding of the elements of the research process 
and correctly following the research process will ensure the soundness of the proposed 
research, a robust research process and convincing outcomes. Thus, it is appropriate 
to provide a brief description of these elements for the current study. 
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3.1 Epistemology and Theoretical Perspective 
 
Maynard (1994) described epistemology as a set of philosophical groundings that 
informs researchers’ decision-making on the types of knowledge they are seeking, and 
ensures their research and findings are adequate and legitimate. Simply stated, 
epistemology describes ‘a way of understanding and explaining how we know what 
we know’ (Crotty, 1991, p. 3). The term ‘epistemology’ has also been referred to as a 
‘worldview’ (Creswell, 2014), ‘paradigm’ (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011) and 
‘evolving position to research methodologies’ (Neuman, 2011). A number of 
epistemologies inform different types of methodologies. The following three 
subsections briefly describe post-positivism, constructivism and pragmatism, within 
which three widely used methodologies are embedded: quantitative, qualitative and 
mixed methods, respectively (Creswell, 2014).  
 
3.1.1 Post-positivism.  
 
Crotty (1998) described post-positivism—the thinking after positivism that is strongly 
influenced by unchallengeable natural laws—as a less attenuated form of positivism, 
claiming a certain level of objectivity, instead of absolute objectivity. This shift in 
viewpoint arose after scientists, including positivist scientists, realised that the world 
addressed by positivist science often differed from the real world (Crotty, 1998). This 
was particularly the case when studying the behaviour and actions of humans, and 
trying to solve issues empirically (Creswell, 2014). Neuman (2011) argued that, in 
terms of social science, humans exhibit qualitative differences from one another and 
from the types of objects studied, which led to uncertainty about whether differences 
in human characteristics and the environment in which they live require small or entire 
adjustments to the research approach. Despite such limitations, post-positivism still 
holds a philosophy that is deterministic and reductionist (Creswell, 2014). The former 
involves cause-finding research that aims to determine and/or identify causes for 
effects, while the latter refers to reducing ideas to a small, discrete set for the purpose 
of testing hypotheses and research questions (Creswell, 2014). This type of 
epistemology is more strongly embedded in research that is quantitative in nature. 
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3.1.2 Constructivism.  
 
While positivism and post-positivism base their viewpoints on the objectivism that is 
embedded in quantitative research, constructivism rejects the idea of discovering 
objective reality and meaning that is independent from, for instance, variability among 
individuals (Crotty, 1998). Rather, constructivism is based on subjectivism, and 
argues that truth or meaning is constructed and comes in existence while individuals 
interact with reality (Crotty, 1998). Therefore, constructivist researchers focus on 
understanding others’ subjective viewpoints of the world to generate a theory or 
pattern of meaning (Creswell, 2014). This inductive approach is typically aligned with 
qualitative research. It is noteworthy that, although constructivism has had substantial 
influence as a key epistemology on the development of qualitative research, this is not 
exclusive, as there are other epistemologies (e.g., interpretivism) that have influenced, 
to a certain degree, diverse ranges of qualitative research (Lee, 2012). 
 
3.1.3 Pragmatism.  
 
While the paradigm–method fit issue between two conflicting epistemologies (post-
positivism and constructivism) was debated, a third epistemology—pragmatism—first 
surfaced in the 1950s (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) and rose to prominence in the 
late 1980s (Creswell, 2014). The central focus of pragmatism is practicality and the 
importance of gaining both objective and subjective knowledge, thereby allowing 
researchers to adopt a pluralistic approach to derive knowledge about the research 
problem, rather than subscribing to a certain epistemology-embedded methodology 
(Creswell, 2014). This flexibility allows researchers, for example, to commence a 
study using the deterministic and reductionist nature of post-positivism to obtain 
specific variables and empirical measures to test a theory. This is followed by taking 
advantage of the in-depth and contextual nature of qualitative findings, within a single 
study, to supplement and/or complement the overall research findings (Creswell, 
2014). The reverse order or alternating of more than two epistemologies can also be 
adopted within a single study. Ultimately, use of such a dialectical approach in a field 
such as aviation is dependent on the research questions and answers sought (Ferroff, 
Mavin, Bates, & Murray, 2012). This approach involves epistemology associated with 
a mixed methods methodology. 
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3.2 Methodology 
 
Crotty (1998) defined methodology as ‘the strategy, plan of action, process or design 
lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use 
of methods to the desired outcomes’ (p. 3). As aforementioned, there are three 
methodologies commonly used in research: quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
methods. Simply stated, quantitative research involves numeric data, whereas 
qualitative research involves written data. Research adopting mixed methods as a 
methodology implements an integrative approach that ‘attempts to consider multiple 
viewpoints, perspective, position and [paradigmatic] standpoints of qualitative and 
quantitative research’ (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 113). 
 
3.2.1 Preferred methodology.  
 
Ferroff et al. (2012) identified that, although the quantitative research methodology is 
preferred in aviation research, inevitable loss of detail through the numeric 
representation of the qualitative process is often experienced. Bryman (2006) added 
that the purpose of illustrating findings is ‘often referred to as putting meat on the 
bones’ (p. 106) of quantitative findings, so that research questions can be more 
accurately and completely answered. Therefore, the qualitative process within a single 
study—whether at the beginning of or after the quantitative process—is desirable so 
that generalised and representative findings can be supplemented and complemented 
with in-depth, contextual findings. 
 
Neuman (2011) supported this pluralistic approach by using an example of surveyors, 
who observe and measure a distance between objects from multiple angles to obtain a 
good fix on the object’s true location. Neuman (2011) emphasised the importance of 
the process of triangulation—a direct comparison between two different, yet often 
supplementary and complementary, datasets (quantitative and qualitative data) to 
promote synergism, where the weakness of using a single dataset is reduced, while the 
strengths of each approach are further enhanced. This results in a better understanding 
of the studied phenomenon and subsequently more credible corroboration and 
validation of the findings (Neuman, 2011).  
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Bryman (2006, pp. 104–107) conducted a content analysis of 232 social science 
articles that integrated two research approaches (quantitative and qualitative), and 
provided the 16 rationales propounded for this integration, as listed below: 
 
1. triangulation or greater validity—refers to the traditional view that 
quantitative and qualitative research might be combined to triangulate 
findings so that they may be mutually corroborated 
2. offset—refers to the suggestion that the research methods associated with 
both quantitative and qualitative research have their own strengths and 
weaknesses, so that combining them allows the researcher to offset the 
methods’ weaknesses to draw on the strengths of both 
3. completeness—refers to the notion that the researcher can bring together a 
more comprehensive account of the area of enquiry in which he or she is 
interested if both quantitative and qualitative research are employed 
4. process—quantitative research provides an account of structures in social 
life, yet qualitative research provides sense of process 
5. different research questions—the argument that quantitative and 
qualitative research can each answer different research questions 
6. explanation—one approach is used to help explain the findings generated 
by the other approach 
7. unexpected results—the suggestion that quantitative and qualitative 
research can be fruitfully combined when one generates surprising results 
that can be understood by employing the other 
8. instrument development—refers to contexts in which qualitative research 
is employed to develop questionnaires and scale items, for example, so that 
better working or more comprehensive closed answers can be generated 
9. sampling—refers to situations in which one approach is used to facilitate 
the sampling of respondents or cases 
10. credibility—refers to suggestions that employing both approaches 
enhances the integrity of findings 
11. context—refers to cases in which the combination is rationalised in terms 
of qualitative research providing contextual understanding, coupled with 
either generalisable, externally valid findings or broad relationships among 
variables uncovered through a survey 
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12. illustration—refers to the use of qualitative data to illustrate quantitative 
findings, often referred to as putting ‘meat on the bones’ of ‘dry’ 
quantitative findings 
13. utility or improving the usefulness of findings—refers to a suggestion (that 
is more likely to be prominent among articles with an applied focus) that 
combining the two approaches will be more useful to practitioners and 
others 
14. confirm and discover—entails using qualitative data to generate 
hypotheses and quantitative research to test the hypotheses within a single 
project 
15. diversity of views—this includes two slightly different rationales: (i) 
combining researchers’ and participants’ perspectives through quantitative 
and qualitative research, respectively, and (ii) uncovering relationships 
between variables through quantitative research, while also revealing 
meanings among research participants through qualitative research 
16. enhancement or building on quantitative/qualitative findings—this entails 
a reference to making more of augmenting either quantitative or qualitative 
findings by gathering data using a qualitative or quantitative research 
approach. 
 
The majority of Bryman’s (2006) rationales are closely aligned with the central aim 
of this thesis—exploring the effects of TEM on Australian general aviation. It has been 
more than nine years since TEM was implemented in Australian general aviation. 
However, there has been very limited formal review, assessment or evaluation to 
examine the situation after the introduction of TEM in Australian general aviation. To 
properly and adequately examine this issue, a dataset is required (such as recounts of 
experienced pilots in general aviation), and this dataset needs to be supplemented with 
another dataset such as survey results (Bryman’s credibility and context). This can be 
achieved by designing a study so that the weaknesses arising from a single 
methodological approach are minimised, while the strengths gained from a 
combination of two methodological approaches are enhanced (Bryman’s triangulation, 
offset, completeness and enhancement). Therefore, a mixed methods approach was 
selected to be the appropriate methodology for this thesis. 
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3.2.2 Brief history of mixed methods.  
 
Similar to the development of the aviation industry to date, the mixed methods 
approach underwent several stages to reach its current form. According to Johnson et 
al. (2007), although the use of mixed research (as it was referred to in the early stage 
of the development of mixed methods) was adopted in research during the early years 
of the twentieth century, Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) article was often credited as the 
first to formalise the practice of using multiple research methods. The authors 
employed multiple quantitative datasets in a single study when validating an 
underlying psychological phenomenon or trait (Johnson et al., 2007). Denzin (1978, 
as cited in Johnson et al., 2007) added that, despite the use of multiple datasets in a 
within-methods triangulation study (use of either multiple quantitative or qualitative 
approaches in a single study), the limited value of the study was soon realised because 
of the inherent weakness stemming from the use of a single approach. This 
subsequently encouraged researchers to adopt between-methods triangulation (use of 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single study). Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2011) observed more and more researchers advocating for and advancing this 
methodological pluralism, while it underwent several periods of transformation—
formative, paradigm debate, procedural development, advocacy, expansion and 
reflective—for it to receive appropriate credence as the third methodology within day-
to-day research practice. 
 
3.2.3 Definition of mixed methods.  
 
While mixed methods as a methodology underwent its developmental stages, various 
terms and definitions were provided. Johnson et al. (2007) held a discussion via 
electronic means with 21 distinguished and highly regarded researchers in the field of 
mixed methods, and reviewed 19 definitions of mixed methods to consolidate and 
provide a composite definition of mixed methods. Johnson et al. (2007) offered the 
following definition: 
 
The type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines 
elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
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techniques) [in a single study or in multiple phases of a program of study] 
for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration. (p. 123) 
 
Johnson et al. (2007) also identified that, although some definitions were homogenous 
while others were heterogeneous, the definitions shared common themes. Creswell 
and Plano Clark (2011, p. 5) provided the following consolidated list of common 
characteristics of mixed methods found in the diverse range of viewpoints. Mixed 
methods research: 
 
• persuasively and rigorously collects and analyses both qualitative and 
quantitative data (based on research questions) 
• mixes (or integrates and links) the two forms of data concurrently by 
combining them (or merging them) sequentially by having one build on the 
other, or embedding one within the other 
• gives priority to one or both forms of data (in terms of what the research 
emphasises) 
• uses these procedures in a single study or in multiple phases of a program 
of study 
• frames these procedures within philosophical worldviews and theoretical 
lenses 
• combines the procedures into specific research designs that direct the plan 
for conducting the study. 
 
These characteristics were the result of many years of evolution in mixed methods as 
the third methodology. It is noteworthy that, because of the practicality and flexibility 
found in mixed methods designs, there are different types of mixed methods designs. 
Section 3.2.4 and its subsections discuss the four major mixed methods designs that 
are commonly used in research. 
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3.2.4 Four major mixed methods designs.  
 
After a researcher has determined that the use of mixed methods is most appropriate 
for given research questions, the researcher must select the most appropriate mixed 
methods design from the different types of designs, as ‘each major design has its own 
history, purpose, considerations, philosophical assumptions, procedures, strengths, 
challenges, and variants’ (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 53). The four most 
common mixed methods designs are: convergent parallel design, explanatory 
sequential design, exploratory sequential design and embedded design (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011). Primarily, the differences among these designs are based on the 
point at which the collected quantitative and qualitative data are mixed, which is 
referred to as the point of interface or timing of data collection. The following 
subsections provide a brief description of each design and a summary of research that 
has adopted each design as an example. 
 
3.2.4.1 Convergent parallel design.  
 
Convergent parallel design (Figure 3.2) is the most well-known, and perhaps the most 
common, approach to mixed methods (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The design 
refers to the concurrent, yet separate, collection and analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data within the same phase of the research process, prior to merging the 
two sets of results to provide the overall interpretation (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
Both quantitative and qualitative data are given equal priority, and this differentiates 
the convergent parallel design from another similar type of design—embedded design, 
which is described below (Section 3.2.4.4). The point of interface is after the 
quantitative and qualitative data are independently collected and analysed. A brief 
summary of a study that adopted this type of design is presented below as an example. 
 
Wittink, Barg, and Gallo (2006) conducted a study using convergent parallel design 
to better understand the aspects of the doctor–patient relationship that may influence 
the way patients discuss their depression status. The first phase of the study was 
quantitative in nature, and compared the doctors’ assessments of the patients’ level of 
depression with the results from a 36-item short-form health survey specifically 
devised for this study (Wittink et al., 2006). In the second phase, transcribed data from 
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semi-structured interviews were separately analysed (qualitative) to develop themes. 
The point of interface occurred after these two data sources were separately analysed. 
The authors’ recount suggested that the additional interview data provided possible 
contributing factors to better illustrate the dynamic process of the doctor–patient 
interaction on depression (Wittink et al., 2006). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Convergent parallel design. Source: adapted from Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2011, p. 69). 
 
 
3.2.4.2 Explanatory sequential design.  
 
Explanatory sequential design (Figure 3.3) refers to a two-phase, mixed methods 
design that includes collecting and analysing quantitative data first, followed by 
collecting and analysing qualitative data (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The main 
reason for employing this type of follow-up design is to use the qualitative phase of 
study to explain the findings from the initial quantitative phase—hence the name of 
the design. The quantitative findings that are of interest to the research inform the 
development and refinement of the design of the follow-up qualitative phase (Creswell 
& Plano Clark, 2011). After collecting and analysing the secondary qualitative data, 
the two datasets are merged to provide more complete answers to the research 
questions. A brief summary of a study that adopted this type of design is presented 
below as an example. 
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Friday (2011) adopted explanatory sequential design in an attempt to better answer the 
central research question: how could the current FAA certification process be 
modified for a private pilot to more safely operate in the National Airspace System 
with the introduction of advanced technology in general aviation aircraft? This study 
sequentially collected and analysed both quantitative and qualitative data. The author 
first collected and analysed quantitative data to gather participants’ demographic 
information (e.g., professional qualifications and flight experience) and overall 
perceptions about the influence of advanced technology in certain key areas of interest 
(Friday, 2011). The first part of study was followed by qualitative interviews to further 
investigate the areas of interest and explore potential solutions to the central research 
question. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Explanatory sequential design. Source: adapted from Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2011, p. 69). 
 
 
3.2.4.3 Exploratory sequential design.  
 
This design (Figure 3.4) is also referred to as a two-way, instrument development (e.g., 
survey) mixed methods design; however, the sequence is opposite to explanatory 
sequential design. The design begins by devising the first phase of the study, which 
includes collection and analysis of qualitative data to explore a topic (hence its name), 
followed by developing an appropriate instrument and identifying variables or stating 
propositions for testing to generalise the findings from the first phase of the qualitative 
study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). A brief summary of a study that adopted this 
type of design is presented below as an example. 
 
Martin (2013) chose mixed methods as a preferred methodology for his doctoral thesis 
on the effects of pathological phenomena—startle, freeze and denial—on a situation 
outcome. The study used an exploratory sequential design, where qualitative data were 
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obtained through semi-structured interviews with pilots who had experienced 
emergency situations or unexpected critical events. The data were analysed to create 
a clear picture of the concepts and likely involvement of the phenomena in aviation 
accidents and incidents (Martin, 2013). This was followed by conducting an 
experiment to collect quantitative and qualitative data from ‘startle’ experiments in a 
Boeing 737 simulator (Martin, 2013). The findings were combined and interpreted to 
generate a complete picture of the potential threats that the pathological phenomena 
presented. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Exploratory sequential design. Source: adapted from Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2011, p. 69). 
 
 
3.2.4.4 Embedded design.  
 
This design (Figure 3.5) is similar to the convergent parallel design previously 
described. However, the difference is that embedded design does not collect secondary 
data, whether quantitative or qualitative, that are given the same priorities and keeping 
them independent (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Instead, supplemental quantitative 
or qualitative data are collected and added to major data collection—qualitative or 
quantitative, respectively—to enhance the overall design and findings. These 
supplemental data can be collected prior to an experimental trial to provide 
preliminary exploration (sequential/before), during the experimental trial to provide a 
more complete understanding of the experimental trail (concurrent/during) and after 
the experimental trial to provide follow-up explanations (sequential/after) (Creswell 
& Plano Clark, 2011). A brief summary of a study that adopted this type of design is 
presented below as an example. 
 
Foster, Curtis, Mitchell, Van, and Young (2016) conducted a prospective, two-year 
longitudinal study involving the parents of children (aged zero to 12) who were 
severely injured, and using the embedded design as part of a program of research on 
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paediatric trauma. Foster et al. (2016) considered data collected from semi-structured 
interviews as their primary source, and these were collected at four time points: the 
acute hospitalisation phase and then six, 12 and 24 months after the severe injury of 
the child. These data were expected to provide an in-depth understanding of parents’ 
emotional wellbeing and to ascertain the factors that supported or impeded the parents’ 
ability to manage their child’s injury (Foster et al., 2016). The primary qualitative 
strand was supplemented with four self-report standardised measures: a paediatric 
inventory for parents to measure their own experiences of emotional functioning (e.g., 
stress); a parent quality-of-life measure with regard to parents’ physical and mental 
health; depression, anxiety and stress measures to assess parents’ risk of psychological 
distress; and the Connor Davidson resilience scale to assess parents’ resilience (Foster 
et al., 2016). The study findings were expected to provide evidence-based 
recommendations to better support the parents and families of injured children and to 
strengthen their capacity during this traumatic time (Foster et al., 2016). 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Embedded design. Source: adapted from Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, 
p. 69). 
 
 
3.2.5 Preferred mixed methods design.  
 
The emergence of TEM is well regarded as an effective method of improving aviation 
safety, with TEM becoming a mandatory assessment item for various levels of flight 
tests and ground examinations in Australia. Although it has been more than nine years 
since TEM training was implemented in Australian general aviation, there are no 
definitive data available to establish whether TEM training has been well received or 
whether a positive effect of this training has been witnessed, experienced or translated 
in the general aviation sector. The present study intends to fill the gap by exploring 
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the effect of introducing TEM among general aviation pilots in Australia. The overall 
results from the exploratory study (Study 1 in Chapter 4) indicated a variable uptake 
of TEM principles and differing opinions regarding its effectiveness. Given the lack 
of definitive data or theory established, and the differing opinions in this area, 
exploratory sequential design was adopted in this thesis to initially better understand 
how TEM has been implemented in Australian general aviation, followed by 
generalising the findings. Figure 3.6 below illustrates the research design adopted in 
this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Research design adopted for the thesis. 
 
 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a brief overview of epistemology and the theoretical 
perspective of three methodologies commonly used in research (quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed methods). Justification for the preferred methodology (mixed 
methods) and descriptions of the four commonly adopted mixed methods designs were 
then provided. The current study adopted ‘exploratory sequential design’ because this 
was considered to appropriately agree with the central aim of this thesis—conducting 
a post-implementation assessment to examine the after-state of TEM implementation, 
in terms of the effectiveness of introducing TEM in Australian general aviation.  
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Chapter 4: Study 1 (Exploratory Study) 
 
4.1 Purpose 
 
This study was exploratory in nature and sought to identify the way in which TEM 
training was conducted and regarded among general aviation pilots. The main focus 
was its benefits and effectiveness, after it was mandated in July 2009. The findings 
better informed the researcher about whether further study on this topic on a larger 
scale was considered worthwhile. In addition, the study allowed the researcher to 
select an appropriate methodology and methods after this trial run. 
 
4.2 Methods 
 
4.2.1 Design overview.  
 
The primary purpose of the study was to collect preliminary information on how the 
requirement for TEM training is currently being addressed, and to gather general 
consensus on the benefits and effectiveness of TEM training. To collect the required 
data, the researcher devised a survey with his supervisors using questions based on an 
ATSB report (Cheng, Inglis & Godley, 2009). The survey contained several common 
questions (e.g., ‘I feel that appropriate use of TEM training improves non-technical 
skills, such as situational awareness and decision-making’) for all pilot groups (trainee 
pilots, private pilots, trainer pilots and other pilots, such as charter pilots), as well as 
group-specific questions (e.g., ‘I feel that incorporation of TEM has improved the way 
that airmanship is taught’). An open-ended question was included at the end of the 
survey to offer the participants the opportunity to share their opinions on TEM training. 
 
4.2.2 Participants.  
 
A total of 63 participants completed the survey; however, four participants failed to 
indicate their consent. Consequently, responses from 59 participants were analysed 
for this study. These participants comprised 26 trainee pilots working towards a PPL 
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or higher licence, five private/recreational pilots, 21 trainers (e.g., flight/ground 
instructors) and seven other pilots (e.g., a bible pilot and a charter pilot). 
 
4.2.3 Materials.  
 
Although no separate headings were used, the survey comprised three main parts. The 
first part aimed to categorise the general aviation pilots into four groups (trainee pilots, 
private pilots, trainer pilots and other pilots, such as charter pilots). The second part 
intended to gain insights into how TEM training was delivered. The third part aimed 
to determine how the benefits and effectiveness of TEM training were regarded among 
general aviation pilots. This part contained seven common questions (Table 4.1) and 
group-specific questions. Table 4.2 presents the group-specific questions for the 
trainee pilots and trainers. 
 
Table 4.1 Seven Common Questions. 
Q1. I feel that the number of accidents/incidents reduced in my organisation after 
TEM training was introduced. 
Q2. I feel that TEM training has improved overall aviation safety in general aviation. 
Q3. I use TEM principles in my day-to-day flying. 
Q4. I feel that CASA produces adequate training and guidance materials for TEM 
training for general aviation. 
Q5. I feel that appropriate use of TEM training improves my technical skills (i.e., 
aircraft handling skills). 
Q6. I feel that appropriate use of TEM training improves my non-technical skills, 
such as situational awareness and decision-making. 
Q7. I feel that the benefits of TEM training are overrated. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Group-specific Questions for the Trainee and Trainer Groups. 
Group Questions 
Trainees 
Q1. I feel that TEM training is well integrated into the flight training 
syllabus in my organisation. 
Q2. I feel that the TEM training methods/techniques used among flight 
instructors in my organisation are well standardised. 
Q3. I feel that my flight instructor strongly emphasises TEM during pre-
/post-flight briefings, as well as during instructional flights. 
Q4. I feel that TEM is appropriately assessed during dual flights. 
Q5. I feel that TEM is appropriately assessed during flight tests. 
Trainers 
Q1. I feel that TEM is well integrated into the flight training syllabus in my 
organisation. 
Q2. I feel that the TEM training methods/techniques used among flight 
instructors in my organisation are well standardised. 
Q3. I feel that my students value TEM training as part of flight training. 
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Q4. I feel that TEM is appropriately assed during flight tests. 
Q5. I feel that incorporation of TEM has improved the way that airmanship 
is taught. 
 
The survey questions in the third part allowed six response options: strongly agree, 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree and unsure. For the 
purpose of statistical analysis, the following numerical values were assigned to each 
of the potential responses: ‘strongly disagree’ = 1, ‘disagree’ = 2, ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ and ‘unsure’ = 3, ‘agree’ = 4 and ‘strongly agree’ = 5. 
 
4.2.4 Procedure.  
 
Invitations to participate in this study were sent to 14 flight training organisations, of 
which seven organisations agreed to participate (50%). As a result of the limited 
resources available, the majority of flight training organisations contacted were within 
an approximately 100 km radius of the area in which the researcher resided. The 
survey was designed to be used online; however, the survey questions were printed 
and sorted for appropriate groups because of the possibility of unreliable internet 
connections at some of the intended survey sites. A purposive sampling technique was 
used when recruiting potential participants. 
 
When approaching each participant, the overall purpose of the research was explained 
(the overall purpose was also available on the first two pages of the survey), and it was 
emphasised that participation in the survey was completely voluntary, and that 
participants’ anonymity and confidentiality would be strictly maintained. No 
remuneration was offered as an incentive to participate in the survey. 
 
This study was considered to involve the minimal level of risk and ethical issues in 
accordance with the National Statement of Ethical Conduct in Research Involving 
Humans. Therefore, an online Expedited Ethical Review Checklist was completed 
when applying for ethical clearance. Acknowledgement of ethics approval is presented 
in Appendix 4. 
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4.3 Results and Discussion 
 
A manuscript based on this exploratory study was submitted and subsequently 
accepted by the International Journal of Training Research. This peer-reviewed 
journal article was published in December 2016, and is presented in Section 4.3.3. 
Readers are referred to this journal article for the main findings and discussion. The 
results based on the group-specific questions are presented below. 
 
4.3.1 Results (group-specific questions).  
 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (Version 23 for Apple Macintosh 
computers) was used with the level of significance (alpha) set to be p < .05 for all 
statistical analyses. The results were presented in a combination of descriptive and 
inferential statistics. 
 
A mean score for each group-specific question was compared with the mean score of 
the scale of 3, which would indicate that the participants neither agreed nor disagreed 
and/or were unsure about the effect of TEM training and its assessment. Trainees’ 
responses to each of the five questions are presented in Table 4.3, which indicates the 
mean difference score, one-sample t-test, degrees of freedom and significance for the 
five questions. The results presented in Table 4.3 suggest that the participants were 
more in agreement with all five questions. 
 
Table 4.3 Trainee Group-specific Questions (Mean Difference from Neutral, One-
sample t-test, Degrees of Freedom and Significance for Individual Questions). 
Trainee group-specific questions 
Mean 
difference 
from neutral 
= 3 (SD) 
t df p 
Q1. I feel that TEM training is well integrated 
into the flight training syllabus in my 
organisation. 
1.31 (.74) 9.06 25 < .001 
Q2. I feel that the TEM training 
methods/techniques used among flight 
instructors in my organisation are well 
standardised. 
1.08 (.94) 5.88 25 < .001 
Q3. I feel that my flight instructor strongly 
emphasises TEM during pre-/post-flight 
1.08 (1.09) 5.03 25 < .001 
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briefings, as well as during instructional 
flights. 
Q4. I feel that TEM is appropriately assessed 
during dual flights. 
1.12 (.91) 6.26 25 < .001 
Q5. I feel that TEM is appropriately assessed 
during flight tests. 
1.08 (1.2) 4.59 25 < .001 
 
The same analysis was conducted for the group-specific questions for the trainer group. 
Table 4.4 presents the mean difference score, one-sample t-test, degrees of freedom 
and significance for the five questions. Again, the results presented in Table 4.4 
suggest that the participants were more in agreement with the majority of the questions. 
 
Table 4.4 Trainer Group-specific Questions (Mean Difference from Neutral, One-
sample t-test, Degrees of Freedom and Significance for Individual Questions). 
Trainer group-specific questions 
Mean 
difference 
from neutral 
= 3 (SD) 
t df p 
Q1. I feel that TEM is well integrated into the 
flight training syllabus in my organisation. 
.95 (.74) 5.9 25 < .001 
Q2. I feel that the TEM training 
methods/techniques used among flight 
instructors in my organisation are well 
standardised. 
.81 (.87) 4.25 25 < .001 
Q3. I feel that my students value TEM training 
as part of flight training. 
.81 (.81) 4.56 25 < .001 
Q4. I feel that TEM is appropriately assessed 
during flight tests. 
.67 (1.2) 2.55 25 = .019 
Q5. I feel that incorporation of TEM has 
improved the way that airmanship is taught. 
.86 (.91) 4.32 25 < .001 
 
Three questions from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 were identical. These questions were: 
• I feel that TEM is well integrated into the flight training syllabus in my 
organisation. 
• I feel that the TEM training methods/techniques used among flight 
instructors in my organisation are well standardised. 
• I feel that TEM is appropriately assessed during flight tests. 
 
A Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the trainee and trainer groups. The results indicated 
that they were not significantly different for all three questions: U = 197.5, z = ˗1.809, 
 	 57	
p = .071, r = ˗.26; U = 216.5, z = ˗1.341, p = .18, r = ˗.20; and U = 201.5, z = ˗1.646, 
p = .10, r = ˗.24. The results suggested that both the trainee and trainer groups were 
more in agreement that TEM was well integrated into the flight training syllabus in 
their organisations. In addition, both groups were more in agreement that the TEM 
training methods and techniques used among Flight Instructors (FI) in their 
organisations were well standardised. These are considered positive findings. 
However, there were mixed responses among the participants in the trainer group with 
regard to the appropriate assessment of TEM during flight tests. 
 
4.3.2 Interim discussion.  
 
The study findings suggested that participants from both the trainee and trainer groups 
were more in agreement with the group-specific questions. That is, the majority of 
participants agreed that TEM was well integrated into the flight training syllabus, that 
training methods/techniques were well standardised, that instructors emphasised TEM 
during pre-/post-flight briefings and during instructional flights, and that trainees 
valued TEM training as part of their flight training. In addition, the majority of trainees 
and trainers considered that TEM was appropriately assessed during dual flights and 
flight tests, although there were mixed responses among participants in the trainer 
group regarding the latter. These are considered encouraging findings because positive 
views of safety initiatives, such as TEM implementation, can strongly influence safety 
behaviours and the environment. 
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4.3.3 Results and discussion (main findings). 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
 
TEM is well regarded as an effective method for improving aviation safety, and has 
become a mandatory assessment item for various levels of flight tests and ground 
examinations in Australian aviation. Although it has been more than nine years since 
TEM training was introduced and implemented, there has been very limited formal 
review, assessment or evaluation to examine the after-state of TEM implementation, 
in terms of the effectiveness of introducing TEM. Therefore, this exploratory study 
was conducted to examine the ways in which the requirements for TEM training are 
addressed and regarded among Australian general aviation pilots in terms of its use 
and effectiveness. The findings indicated variable uptake of TEM principles and 
differing opinions regarding its effectiveness. Thus, these findings warranted further 
study in this area on a larger scale.  
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Chapter 5: Study 2 (Qualitative Study) 
 
5.1 Purpose 
 
This study involved a qualitative (first) phase of mixed methods research approach 
using an exploratory sequential design (Figure 3.6). This two-phase design involved a 
collection of qualitative data (study 2) followed by separately collecting quantitative 
data (study 3). The study aimed to gather insights before and after TEM was 
implemented to gain an in-depth appreciation as to how it was introduced and the 
effects of the use of TEM training. To fulfil this purpose, five highly experienced 
general aviation FEs were interviewed. The findings from this study were used when 
formulating survey questions for Study 3 (quantitative study) to verify and generalise 
the findings from the current study. 
 
5.2 Methods 
 
Crotty (1998) defined methods as ‘the techniques or procedures used to gather and 
analyse data related to some research question or hypothesis’ (p. 3). After reflecting 
on the epistemology and the theoretical perspective that informed the appropriate 
methodology in Chapter 3, the next logical step was the selection and adaptation of a 
specific design that best fit the research questions in the study. Methods should 
describe the process in detail, so that other researchers, who are not involved in the 
research, can replicate the same methods without difficulties (Crotty, 1998). Wiersma 
and Jurs (2009) added that qualitative research is more concerned with the 
comparability of the research findings. Comparability refers to providing an adequate 
description of the research procedures and theoretical constructs so that the findings 
can be better understood (Wiersma & Jurs, 2009). In this study, semi-structured 
interviews were used to gather information, and thematic analysis was conducted 
when analysing the interview data. 
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5.2.1 Interview.  
 
An interview is defined as ‘a face-to-face verbal exchange, in which one person, the 
interviewer, attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or belief from 
another person or persons’ (Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954, p. 449). Interviewing has a 
long history and circumstances frequently arise in daily life in which certain forms of 
interviewing are used to obtain information and/or elicit an individual’s feelings (e.g., 
visiting a medical clinic). The first use of interview as a method for a research activity 
was conducted by Charles Booth, whose research involved the seminal study of 
poverty in London in the 1880s (Morris, 2015). Despite its current ubiquitous use in 
daily life, the interview as a method—including in-depth interviews—did not gain 
reputation and traction as a useful method for qualitative research until the late 1930s 
or early 1940s (Lee, 2008). Nowadays, the interview is often at the core of qualitative 
research (Morris, 2015). Brinkmann (2017) highlighted the important point that the 
prevalence of this normalised sociocultural practice of interview in the postmodern 
age eliminated the need to justify why this is the best approach for research projects 
in many disciplines. 
 
Typically, there are three forms of interviews: relatively unstructured form, relatively 
structured form and semi-structured form (Brinkmann, 2017). The word ‘relatively’ is 
included in the first two forms to highlight that absolutely structured and unstructured 
forms can only exist in theory, and not in practice (Brinkmann, 2017). Parker (2005) 
explained that, in a structured interview, complete control over interviewees’ 
responses to the predetermined questions is not possible. Likewise, there is no absolute 
unstructured interview form (the other extreme) because, at the very least, interviewers 
have an idea of the topics to be discussed, and this frames an interview structure ‘in 
accordance with certain specific conversational norms rather than others’ (Brinkmann, 
2017, p. 579). 
 
Morris (2015) described a relatively structured interview as being closely aligned to 
the survey method, with the central premise that all structured interviews follow a 
predetermined and standardised format to ensure minimisation of interviewer 
variation and error. In this form of interview, the interviewer is expected to read, using 
the same tones, the pre-structured questions exactly the way they are written to every 
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participant, without addition or omission. This passive way of recording people’s 
opinions and attitudes on a specific topic may diminish the dialogical potential for 
knowledge production within conversations (Brinkmann, 2017). 
 
In contrast, a relatively unstructured interview lies at the other end of the spectrum, as 
a predetermined list of questions is unnecessary and often cannot be prepared, and 
interviewees tend to have considerable control over the entire process (Morris, 2015). 
In this form of interview, the interviewer’s main role is to be an active listener and 
facilitator, while not interrupting the interviewee after the opening request for a 
narrative (Brinkmann, 2017).  
 
As previously mentioned, absolute structured and unstructured forms of interviews 
only exist in theory (Brinkmann, 2017). Therefore, Parker (2005) concluded that, in 
practice: 
 
an interview in qualitative research is always ‘semi-structured’ because it 
invariably carries the traces of patterns of power that hold things in place 
and it reveals an interviewee’s, a co-researcher’s, creative abilities to 
refuse and resist what a researcher wants to happen. (p. 53) 
 
The current study adopted a semi-structured in-depth interview as the preferred 
method. 
 
5.2.2 Semi-structured in-depth interview.  
 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) defined the semi-structured interview as ‘an interview 
with the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the life [real] world of the interviewee in 
order to interpret the meaning of the described phenomena’ (p. 6). As previously 
established, and as the term suggests, the semi-structured interview—the preferred 
method of data collection in this study—is located somewhere between the relatively 
structured and unstructured interview forms. Morris (2015) explained that the exact 
location of the semi-structured interview on the spectrum is dependent on many factors, 
such as interviewees’ personality and experience, and the level of probing required. 
Similar to the relatively structured interview form, a list of predetermined questions is 
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available to the interviewer, yet the interview format allows flexibility, and permits 
interviewers and interviewees to digress, which may promote a detailed discussion to 
facilitate in-depth understanding and clarification (Morris, 2015). This can enhance 
the quality and relevance of the data collected through the knowledge-producing 
conversational process. In addition, this conversational interview, with purpose and 
built-in flexibility, will lead to a further enhanced understanding of the topic the 
researchers are examining. 
 
In-depth interviewing is the most common qualitative research method, as it is a 
powerful way to gather detailed data (Morris, 2015). In-depth interviewing generally 
involves two people (interviewer and interviewee) having a conversation on a research 
topic about which the interviewee has expertise. Therefore, the interviewee is at the 
centre of the interview, and the role of interviewer is to ensure that as much 
information as possible is extracted by asking probing questions that provide 
elaborated and further clarified detail on the research topic (Morris, 2015). As 
aforementioned, in-depth interviewing is an effective method to gather data on a 
research topic and, although there are some weaknesses, there are a number of 
strengths that contribute to this. A list of strengths and weaknesses is presented below 
(Figure 5.1). 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Strengths and weaknesses of in-depth interviews. Source: adapted from 
Morris (2015, p. 7). 
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Some of the weaknesses of in-depth interviews are inevitable (e.g., a large amount of 
time and effort is required, and transcribing is time consuming); however, other 
weaknesses (such as inability to generalise findings) can be overcome by using an 
appropriate methodology, such as an adoption of mixed methods.  
 
The central purpose of this study was to gather insights on the TEM implementation 
process in Australian general aviation, and its effect on the practice of TEM. With this 
in mind, conducting an in-depth semi-structured interview with highly experienced 
FEs in general aviation was considered the most appropriate approach to gain the 
required knowledge and understanding. 
 
5.2.3 Trustworthiness in research.  
 
The purpose of research is for the research findings to advance the body of knowledge 
and/or provide solutions to specific issues. To achieve this, the findings need to be 
accepted by the intended audiences. Trustworthiness is one of the ways to persuade 
the intended audiences that the findings are ‘worth paying attention to’ (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985, p. 290). According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the assessment criteria 
used to achieve trustworthiness are truth value, applicability, consistency and 
neutrality. These criteria appear differently between quantitative and qualitative 
research because of differences in epistemology and theoretical perspectives in the 
two research approaches. This section provides a brief description of each assessment 
criterion applicable to qualitative research (Table 5.1), followed by more detailed 
description in Section 5.2.3.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Assessment Criteria for Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research. 
Criterion Qualitative approach 
Truth value Credibility 
Applicability Transferability 
Consistency Dependability 
Neutrality Conformability 
Source: adapted from Krefting (1991, p. 217). 
 
Truth value refers to researchers’ confidence in the truth of the findings, based on 
research design, participants and context (Krefting, 1991). In qualitative research, 
credibility takes the position of truth value. It is subject oriented in that it endeavours 
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to discover the experience of participants as they have lived and perceived it (Krefting, 
1991). Study 2 in this chapter used in-depth semi-structured interviews to elicit and 
gather information from five highly experienced FEs in Australian general aviation, 
and this was deemed to satisfy the assessment criterion. 
 
Applicability refers to how successfully the findings can be generalised to alternative 
contexts, settings or groups (Krefting, 1991). In qualitative research, applicability is 
termed ‘transferability’ and this is supported when a researcher provides rich 
descriptive data about how particular research was conducted (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Krefting (1991) added that generalisation of research findings is not relevant in 
qualitative research because this type of research is typically conducted in naturalistic 
settings with fewer controlling variables. Throughout this chapter, detailed 
descriptions of the methods used in this study are provided to satisfy the assessment 
criterion. Moreover, the follow-up study (Study 3) in Chapter 5 generalises the 
findings from the present study (Study 2), which also satisfies the assessment criterion 
of applicability. 
 
Consistency is the third assessment criterion of trustworthiness applicable to 
qualitative research, and considers the consistency of the findings if a research study 
is repeated involving the same samples of participants or in a similar context (Krefting, 
1991). In qualitative research, dependability is an equivalent term to consistency. 
According to Krefting (1991), the findings from a repeated study with the same 
participants may differ from the initial findings. Lincoln and Guba (1985) described 
this by using an analogy that ‘one can never cross the same stream twice’ (p. 299). 
Despite this, detailed descriptions of the methods used in a qualitative study are 
important, and these are provided throughout this chapter. 
 
Neutrality is the fourth and final criterion of trustworthiness that determines the 
legitimacy of the findings of researchers without ‘biases, motivation, interests or 
perspectives’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 290). Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued that, 
when determining the neutrality of qualitative research, focus should be placed on the 
data, rather than the researchers, as it is inevitable for qualitative researchers to be 
distanced from their subjects. Conformability is the alternative criterion for neutrality, 
which is achieved when credibility and transferability are established (Krefting, 1991). 
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Therefore, in-depth semi-structured interviews with highly experienced FEs in 
Australian general aviation, as well as provision of detailed descriptions of the 
methods and procedures used in this study, were considered to satisfy neutrality in this 
qualitative study. 
 
5.2.3.1 Trustworthiness in qualitative research.  
 
The previous section included a brief description of the four assessment criteria 
employed to ensure trustworthiness (credibility, transferability, dependability and 
conformability) in qualitative research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) offered a number of 
techniques to achieve these assessment criteria, and a summary of the techniques is 
provided below (Table 5.2). This section expands on each assessment criterion, 
including their respective techniques and how the current study satisfies the 
assessment criteria. 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of Techniques for Establishing Trustworthiness. 
Criterion Technique 
Credibility 
Activities in the field that increase the probability of high credibility 
(prolonged engagement, persistent observation and triangulation—
sources, methods and investigators) 
Peer debriefing 
Negative case analysis 
Referential adequacy 
Member checks (in progress and terminal) 
Transferability Thick description 
Dependability Dependability audit, including the audit trail 
Conformability Conformability audit, including the audit trail 
Source: adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 328). 
 
Credibility is the first assessment criterion in qualitative research to satisfy 
trustworthiness (truth value). Krefting (1991) described credibility as a subject-
oriented assessment criterion that endeavours to discover the experience of 
participants. Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 301) offered five techniques to enhance the 
credibility of qualitative research: 
 
1. an activity that increases the likelihood that credible findings and 
interpretations will be produced 
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2. an activity that provides an external check of the enquiry process 
3. an activity aimed to refine working hypotheses as more and more 
information becomes available 
4. an activity that renders it possible to check preliminary findings and 
interpretations against archived ‘raw data’ 
5. an activity that enables direct testing of the findings and interpretations 
with the human sources from which they came—the constructors of the 
multiple realities being studied. 
 
The first technique to achieve a higher probability of producing credible findings and 
interpretations involves three activities: ‘prolonged engagement, persistent 
observation and triangulation’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 301). Prolonged engagement 
involves adequate submersion in the research settings to become intimately familiar 
with a research domain (Krefting, 1991), so that researchers can identify distortions—
intended or accidental—from research participants and build trust, so that more 
sensitive information can be shared between researchers and participants (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). The researcher of the present study already knew three participants well 
before the interviews were conducted, and the other two participants were familiar 
with the researcher’s background and extensive experience and involvement as an FI 
in general aviation. Therefore, prolonged engagement was achieved relatively easily 
for the researcher to build trust and develop an ability to identify any distortions that 
would adversely affect the trustworthiness of the data and findings. 
 
Persistent observation is the second activity that Lincoln and Guba (1985) offered to 
achieve a higher probability of producing credible findings. The central purpose of 
persistent observation is extensively searching to identify relevant characteristics and 
elements that are the core aspects of the research in question, and delving more deeply 
into them (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A simple description to highlight the major 
difference between prolonged engagement and persistent observation is simply that 
the former provides scope, while the latter adds depth of enquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). The researcher of the present study has almost 20 years of experience in general 
aviation in Australia and New Zealand, during which the researcher observed a 
number of changes, including the introduction of TEM as a licence requirement in 
both countries. This prolonged engagement and observation opportunity in general 
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aviation is expected to further enhance the credibility of the findings and accurate 
interpretation. 
 
Triangulation is the third activity to improve the probability of producing credible 
findings and their interpretation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Neuman (2011) described 
triangulation as searching for answers to research questions with improved accuracy. 
There are a few ways to achieve triangulation. Two common forms are triangulation 
of measures and triangulation of method (Neuman, 2011). Triangulation of measures 
refers to collecting and measuring multiple datasets (e.g., several quantitative or 
qualitative data or both quantitative and qualitative data) in a single study. 
Triangulation of method refers to combining quantitative and qualitative approaches 
and their data. The present study adopted mixed methods as a preferred methodology, 
and sequential exploratory design as a preferred method. Therefore, it was expected 
that the combined findings and their interpretations would be more credible through 
triangulation. 
 
The second technique to improve the credibility of qualitative research involves an 
activity (i.e., peer debriefing) conducted to review and discuss insights (e.g., research 
process and findings) of the particular research (Krefting, 1991; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). Krefting (1991) suggested employing an impartial colleague for this purpose. 
This chapter, as well as the other chapters of this thesis, were thoroughly proofread by 
a staff member within the university, who was independent from this study. This 
enhanced the credibility of this study and its interpretations and findings. 
 
The third technique to increase the credibility of qualitative research is employing an 
activity (i.e., negative case analysis) that involves constant update and refinement of 
the working hypotheses as more information progressively becomes available 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Brodsky (2008) described negative case analysis as a central 
data analytic approach in qualitative research involving appropriate management of a 
negative case (e.g., new data), so that the credibility of the research findings is 
supported, and the researcher biases in data analysis and theory generation are 
minimised. Broadsky (2008) further added that, after identifying negative cases, there 
are three steps to appropriately address them: understanding where and how these new 
data diverged from a working hypothesis, making appropriate revisions to address 
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these new data in the revised hypothesis, and testing the applicability of the revised 
hypothesis in the overall research results. This process naturally occurred in the 
current study, particularly during a data analysis phase (thematic analysis with several 
iterations), and was appropriately addressed in accordance with Broadsky’s advice.  
 
The fourth technique to increase the credibility of qualitative research is engaging in 
an activity that involves examining preliminary findings and interpretations against 
archived raw data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Use of thematic analysis was a suitable 
activity to increase the credibility of this study. Thematic analysis involves identifying, 
analysing and reporting themes and subthemes within the data as researchers follow a 
six-phase, recursive, two-way linear process to ensure the comprehensiveness and 
thoroughness of the analysis process (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Through this process, 
the accuracy of the findings and interpretations are checked against raw data as they 
are fine-tuned. This study followed the six-phase process suggested by Braun and 
Clarke (2006).  
 
Another way to satisfy this technique to increase the credibility of qualitative research 
is establishing the auditability of the research. Auditability suggests that, with an 
appropriate volume of information, replicated research will have a greater chance of 
attaining similar findings (Krefting, 1991), although Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued 
that ‘one can never cross the same stream twice’ (p. 199). Despite this, Shenton (2003) 
argued that researchers should endeavour to achieve repeatability—for example, by 
providing detailed descriptions of the phenomenon under study and presenting 
relevant documents (e.g., transcriptions, field notes or staged data analysis files) 
available for inspection if required. The current researcher provided a detailed 
description of the process used in this qualitative study in the present chapter, and 
saved all relevant documents in his computer, with a back-up copy stored in the 
university-approved Cloud storage for future reference. 
 
According to Shenton (2004), the fifth technique to increase the credibility of 
qualitative research involves an activity (i.e., member checking) that provides an 
opportunity for research participants to confirm the accuracy of data (e.g., 
transcription) and the researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon under study 
during conversation (e.g., interview). Lincoln and Guba (1985) considered this the 
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most important technique for establishing credibility. In this study, after each 
interview, the entire recording was transcribed by the researcher and the completed 
transcripts were then returned to each respective participant for their perusal and 
correction. Two participants returned their transcripts with a few changes. The rest 
were satisfied with the transcriptions without alteration. In addition, this study adopted 
the semi-structured in-depth interview as the preferred method, as this type of 
interview provides the flexibility for interviewers and interviewees to digress, thereby 
promoting a detailed discussion to enable in-depth understanding and better 
clarification (Morris, 2015). Further, in-depth interviewing with participants allowed 
the researcher to ask probing questions that provided elaborated and more clarified 
detail about how TEM is implemented and practised in Australian general aviation. 
Therefore, credibility was appropriately and adequately established in this qualitative 
phase of the study. 
 
Transferability is the second assessment criterion in qualitative research to satisfy 
trustworthiness, which, according to Lincoln and Guba (1985), is almost impossible 
to achieve in qualitative research. Shenton (2004) explained that, because the findings 
in qualitative research tend to derive from small specific contexts, demonstration of 
such findings and conclusions in other situations and/or populations is not achievable. 
However, despite the apparent impossibility of conventional generalisability in 
qualitative research, Shenton (2004) argued that it is important to provide sufficient 
contextual information, so that readers of the study can make informed decisions about 
the appropriateness and applicability of transferring such results and conclusions in 
other settings. The present study provides detailed information, such as information 
about the research process and interpretation of the findings. In addition, the aim of 
the present study was to identify key themes from which survey questionnaires could 
be devised for the subsequent quantitative study to enable generalisation of the 
findings. To this end, transferability was adequately addressed in the overall design of 
research in this thesis. 
 
Dependability is the third assessment criterion in qualitative research to satisfy 
trustworthiness, which is very closely tied to credibility (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This 
co-requisite nature of creditability and dependability suggests that adequately 
satisfying the former will also sufficiently satisfy the latter (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
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In this regard, the present study satisfied this assessment criterion. In addition, 
provision of detailed information—such as information on the research process and 
how the findings are interpreted—plays an important role in satisfying dependability. 
Further, Lincoln and Guba (1985) offered that overlapping and a dependability audit 
can be performed to further improve dependability. In the present study, as previously 
mentioned, detailed descriptions—such as information on the research process and 
interpretation of findings—are presented throughout this chapter. In addition, this 
study adopted mixed methods as the preferred methodology, which anticipates that the 
overall findings and their interpretation are more likely to be credible through 
overlapping data (triangulation). 
 
Confirmability is the fourth assessment criterion in qualitative research to satisfy 
trustworthiness. Lincoln and Guba (1985) offered two courses of action to address 
confirmability: auditability and triangulation of methods and data sources. As 
previously mentioned, auditability suggests that, with an appropriate volume of 
information, replicated research will have a greater chance of attaining similar findings 
(Krefting, 1991). To this end, qualitative researchers provide detailed descriptions of 
the phenomenon under study (Shenton, 2004) and present relevant documents (e.g., 
transcriptions, field notes or staged data analysis files) available for inspection if 
required. In this regard, the researcher provided detailed descriptions of the process of 
this qualitative study in this chapter, and saved all relevant documents in his computer, 
with a back-up copy stored in the university-approved Cloud storage for a possible 
audit. In addition, this study is part of a series of studies that adopted mixed methods, 
which sufficiently satisfied triangulation to further improve the confirmability of the 
overall findings and conclusions. In addition, conformability was deemed to have been 
established in this study, as creditability and transferability were satisfied. 
 
This section has described in detail the four assessment criteria to ensure 
trustworthiness in qualitative research, and provided certain techniques to further 
improve the assessment criteria. This section has also provided rationales regarding 
how each criterion was addressed and satisfied in this study. The following sections 
provide detailed descriptions on the participants and process of this study. 
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5.2.4 Participants.  
 
The central purpose of this phase of the study was to gain insights before and after 
TEM was implemented, so that the researcher had a better understanding of how TEM 
was implemented, and its effect on TEM practice in Australian general aviation. The 
ideal candidates were individuals who were part of the Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority—the regulatory body for Australian aviation—with extensive experience in 
general aviation that included, but was not limited to, flight examinations. Given the 
need for these highly experienced participants, there were only limited numbers of 
potential participants available.  
 
To recruit suitably experienced participants for this study, the researcher retrieved a 
list of Approved Testing Officers (ATO) who had delegation to conduct certain flight 
tests from the CASA website. The list provided each ATO’s contact details (telephone 
number and email address), as well as flight test permissions that indicated which 
flight tests the ATOs were authorised to conduct (e.g., CPL and instrument rating). 
Initially, the researcher sent an email to an ATO who was the researcher’s former 
colleague, asking him to take part in the study. After this interview, the researcher 
asked the participant to identify other suitable potential participants from the list. A 
total of five2 further suitable candidates were identified within a radius of 150 km from 
the location where the researcher resided. Each potential participant was contacted via 
email and follow-up telephone calls. One of the participants advised via a return email 
that he had been retired for some time, and showed little interest in participating in 
this research. Therefore, no further attempt was made to recruit him. The remaining 
candidates all agreed to participate in this study. 
 
All participants had considerable experience in both flight training and testing. Their 
combined experience in general aviation represented over 180 years, and two of the 
participants also had extensive military flight instructional experience. In addition, the 
majority of participants had extensive experience in flight testing over a wide 
                                               
2 After an email was sent to potential participants, the researcher learnt that one of the participants 
who agreed to participate no longer resided in Brisbane. However, given this individual’s vast 
experience in the regulatory environment and flight training in both the military and general aviation 
sectors, it was agreed to conduct an interview via Skype. 
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geographical area in Australia. A summary of the participants’ relevant experience 
and qualifications in general aviation is provided below: 
 
• all participants had considerable experience as FIs and FEs, and two 
participants had extensive military flight instructional experience 
• all participants were authorised to conduct a PPL flight test 
• four participants were authorised to conduct a CPL flight test 
• four participants were authorised to conduct a Command Instrument 
Rating flight test 
• three participants were authorised to conduct a FI rating flight test 
• four participants had previously worked for CASA 
• four participants were currently exercising flight testing functions 
• three participants were either a Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) or a Chief 
Pilot (CP) when TEM was mandated. 
 
5.2.5 Procedures.  
 
Each potential participant was initially contacted by email. In some cases, a follow-up 
email and/or telephone call was sent/made as a reminder. When approaching each 
potential participant, two documents—both approved by the university’s ethics 
committee—were attached in the email. The first document was a participant 
information sheet (Appendix 5) that provided the potential participants with adequate 
information about the intended study, and offered an opportunity for them to ask 
questions and/or clarify any concerns. The second document was a consent form 
(Appendix 6) that represented the participants’ formal agreement to participate in the 
research. No participants withdrew from the study. 
 
On the day of the interview, hardcopies of the participant information sheet and 
consent form were provided by the researcher, who discussed them with the 
participants. Given that no signed consent form was received prior to the scheduled 
interview, this form was signed on the day of the interview, before the interview 
commenced. Three participants elected to be interviewed at their workplace when they 
had no work commitments. The fourth participant preferred to be interviewed at a 
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cafeteria at an airport. The final participant was interviewed via Skype—one of the 
‘synchronous (real-time) methods’ that a growing number of qualitative researchers 
are using as ‘an alternative or supplemental choice’ for interviewing (Janghorban, 
Roudsari, & Taghipour, 2014, para. 2).  
 
On average, the interviews took approximately one hour. All interviews were audio 
recorded. All interview recordings were transcribed by the researcher and the 
completed transcriptions were sent back to each respective participant via email for 
verification purposes. This also allowed the participants to remove any transcribed 
conversation they did not wish to be used for analysis. Two participants returned their 
transcripts with a few changes. The rest of the participants were satisfied with the 
transcriptions without alteration. Part of the transcriptions is presented in Appendix 7. 
All data collected have been stored in the QRIScloud storage provided by the 
Queensland Cyber Infrastructure Foundation in accordance with the university’s 
research data management policy.  
 
5.2.6 Transcribing interview recordings.  
 
Broadly, there are two ways in which interview data are transcribed: through a 
commercial transcribing service or self-transcribing. Each approach has inherent 
advantages and disadvantages. The use of a commercial transcribing service is quicker, 
yet more expensive. Self-transcribing allows researchers to have a better 
understanding of the data collected, yet a large time investment is required to 
transcribe interview data, particularly for individuals who are not native English 
speakers and/or are very new to transcribing interview recordings. Despite this, the 
researcher decided to transcribe all five pieces of interview recordings himself, after 
seeking advice from the relevant literature and other qualitative researchers, who 
suggested that self-transcribing allows the researcher to be more familiar with the 
interview data. 
 
On average, each interview transcription was about 20 pages. Given that the researcher 
is not a native English speaker, and to offer participants the opportunity to review their 
interview in a written form, a copy of the transcript was returned to each respective 
participant for their perusal, correction, addition and endorsement prior to inclusion in 
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this study. No participant objected to the inclusion of their transcribed data, and two 
participants returned the transcripts with very minor typographical errors corrected 
and comments added. These were incorporated before the transcripts were analysed. 
 
5.3 Qualitative Data Analysis Method 
 
Qualitative data are often referred to as data in the form of words, and are typically 
collected through interviews, observations, documents and artefacts (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). These rich and holistic qualitative data, collected in 
naturally occurring settings, have the potential to provide in-depth appreciation of real 
issues beyond a mere description of ‘what’ and ‘how many’ (Miles et al., 2014). Prior 
to analysing qualitative data, they need to be appropriately prepared, and such 
preparation typically involves transcribing audio recordings, expanding raw field 
notes and saving the data in a computer using Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS). Section 5.3.2 provides in-depth descriptions of 
CAQDAS. 
 
Data analysis is ‘a systematic search for meaning’ through which the information that 
was learnt can be effectively and structurally communicated to intended audiences 
(Hatch, 2002, p. 148). It involves ‘organising and interrogating data in ways that allow 
researchers to see patterns, identify themes, discover relationships, develop 
explanations, make interpretations, mount critiques, or generate theories’ (Hatch, 2002, 
p. 148). Miles et al. (2014) categorised this iterative concurrent flow of activity into 
three phases: data condensation, data display, and drawing and verifying conclusions. 
These interactive and cyclical processes occur before, during and after data collection 
(Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2. Components of data analysis: interactive model. Source: adapted from 
Miles et al. (2014, p. 14). 
 
The first phase of data analysis is data condensation. Miles et al. (2014, p. 12) defined 
data condensation as ‘the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, 
and/or transforming the data that appear in the full corpus (body) of written-up field 
notes, interview transcripts, documents, and other empirical materials’. This process 
is embedded within the full lifecycle of any qualitatively oriented project from the 
beginning of research planning to anticipatory data condensation, until the completion 
of the final report (Miles et al., 2014). For instance, the process informs qualitative 
researchers on selecting appropriate research design and questions, data collection 
methods, and other associated works, often without researchers being fully aware of 
this (Miles et al., 2014). The process continues and affects researchers’ and/or data 
analysts’ decisions when collected data are analysed through several iterations of 
coding, theming and writing a final draft that draws final conclusions (Miles et al., 
2014). 
 
The second phase, which is interwoven with the first and third phases, is termed ‘data 
display’. This activity refers to ‘an organised, compressed assembly of information 
that allows conclusion drawing and action’ (Miles et al., 2014, pp. 12–13). Research 
findings presented in a long list of numbers and/or textual information are very 
difficult for researchers/data analysts to examine during data analysis, and even more 
difficult for readers to understand and draw conclusions based on them. Therefore, 
clear display of organised information in the form of images—such as graphs, charts 
and/or networks—is essential for researchers/data analysts to draw justified 
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conclusions or inform them to conduct further analyses (Miles et al., 2014). Miles et 
al. (2014) further added that this phase is a ‘major avenue to robust qualitative analysis’ 
(p. 13).  
 
The third phase, which again continuously interacts with the first two phases, is 
drawing and verifying conclusions. Preliminary conclusions are drawn as the data are 
collected and data analyses proceed. The justifiable final conclusions are reached after 
the transformation of data, and are verified through various methods, such as 
crosschecking field notes and/or memos for their confirmation (Miles et al., 2014). 
This improves the overall reliability and validity of qualitative research, as described 
above. 
 
In summary, the coding of data, as part of qualitative data analysis, leads 
researchers/data analysts to categorise data and subsequently identify themes and their 
relationships. These themes may be clearly displayed in the form of graphs and/or 
charts for researchers/data analysts to draw justified conclusions. Alternatively, they 
may be used to conduct further analyses (Miles et al., 2014). Final conclusions are 
then drawn and verified, which improves the overall robustness of qualitative data 
analysis. 
 
There are many different data analysis methods that can be adopted when analysing 
qualitative data. One way to categorise the various types of analysis methods is to 
consider whether a method is tied to a specific theoretical or epistemological position 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). This leads to ‘relatively limited variability in how the method’ 
is applied or whether the method is independent of theoretical or epistemological 
positions that are compatible with various schools of thought, while offering greater 
flexibility (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Thematic analysis falls in the latter category 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006), and this was the preferred method for the qualitative data 
analysis of the current study because of its flexibility and close alignment to the 
theoretical perspective of pragmatism. 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) argued that, although there are some overlaps and differences 
among various types of qualitative data analysis methods, thematic analysis is 
nevertheless a ‘foundational method for qualitative analysis’ (p. 78). Therefore, this is 
 	 89	
the first qualitative data analysis method that commencing qualitative researchers 
should learn, so that the core skills that researchers gather while undertaking thematic 
analysis will provide a solid foundation when later conducting other forms of 
qualitative data analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). One such generic core skill is 
thematising the meanings of collected qualitative data (Holloway & Todres, 2003). 
Braun and Clarke (2006) further remarked that thematic analysis offers theoretical 
flexibility when analysing qualitative data, and this was closely aligned to the 
epistemology (pragmatism) of the methodology in this thesis. 
 
5.3.1 Thematic analysis.  
 
Thematic analysis involves identifying, analysing and reporting themes within data 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). A theme refers to a pattern that typically appears across the 
dataset that relates to the research questions. Braun and Clarke (2006) cautioned that 
prevalence of a theme in terms of space and frequency is not necessarily dependent on 
a quantifiable measure. Rather, the researcher must identify meaningful themes, often 
with subthemes, that accurately and adequately describe a phenomenon in relation to 
a specific research question. To achieve this, Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 87) suggested 
the following six phases—presented in Table 5.3—with the emphasis that these phases 
do not necessarily suggest a linear process from one phase to another. Instead, the 
process is recursive, encouraging researchers/analysts to move back and forth to 
enable comprehensiveness and thoroughness in the analysis process (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). 
 
Table 5.3 Six Phases of Thematic Analysis. 
Phase Description of the process 
1. Familiarising 
oneself with one’s 
data 
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading 
the data, and noting initial ideas 
2. Generating initial 
codes 
Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic 
manner across the entire dataset, and collating data 
relevant to each code 
3. Searching for 
themes 
Collating codes into potential themes, and gathering all 
data relevant to each potential theme 
4. Reviewing themes Checking whether the themes work in relation to the 
coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire dataset (Level 2), 
and generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis 
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5. Defining and 
naming themes 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme and 
the overall story the analysis tells, and generating clear 
definitions and names for each theme 
6. Producing the 
report 
Final opportunity for analysis—selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples; final analysis of selected 
extracts; relating back the analysis to the research 
question and literature; and producing a scholarly report 
of the analysis 
Source: Adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 87). 
 
Prior to describing each phase, it is important to establish a working definition of a 
number of terms, as presented below (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79): 
 
• The ‘data corpus’ refers to all data collected for a particular research 
project. 
• A ‘dataset’ refers to all the data from the corpus that are being used for a 
particular analysis. 
• ‘Data items’ refer to each individual piece of data collected, which together 
make up the dataset or corpus. 
• ‘Data extract’ refers to an individual coded chunk of data that has been 
identified within, and extracted from, a data item. 
 
The first phase of familiarising oneself with one’s data involves reading and, often, 
re-reading the written data until the researcher is familiar with ‘the depth and breadth 
of the content’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 87). It was noted that researchers might be 
tempted to skip or fast track this phase, particularly if the researchers collected and 
transcribed the interview data themselves, as they have some level of familiarity with 
the collected data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). However, this first phase is the foundation 
of thematic analysis. Therefore, repeated reading of the data and active searching for 
meanings and patterns by making rough notes and writing early impressions is 
essential (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). The principal researcher collected and 
transcribed the interview data, yet still considered this advice by perusing the entire 
data corpus twice and then generating notes and ideas on the third reading, before 
moving to the second phase. During the first phase, the following ideas, as an example, 
were noted. 
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• TEM has been poorly introduced and implemented. 
• CASA, a regulatory body for civil aviation in Australia, has an inadequate 
understanding of general aviation. 
• There are differences among the FEs when assessing TEM elements during 
flight tests. 
 
The second phase of thematic analysis involves organising data in a systematic way 
and producing initial codes based on each segment of data that relate to research 
questions (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). A code is defined as ‘a word or short phrase 
that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative 
attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data’ (Johnny, 2009, p. 3). Table 
5.4 below presents examples of data extracts and codes from the transcribed interview 
data. Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 88) described coding to be either ‘data driven’ or 
‘theory driven’—that is, explorative or explanative, respectively. The findings from 
the pilot study (Study 1) indicated a variable uptake of TEM principles and differing 
opinions regarding TEM’s effectiveness. As such, this study adopted an explorative 
sequential design data-driven approach, which was considered when producing initial 
codes. 
 
Table 5.4 Examples of Data Extracts and Codes from the Second Phase of Thematic 
Analysis. 
Data extract Code 
‘Industry needed, certainly from the outset, an education 
roadshow to go around the regional centres, set up workshops 
and explain what it was, what they wanted, what outcomes they 
wanted out of TEM implementation. So, no, it was not well done. 
It left the industry pretty much on their own devices’ (Participant 
1). 
TEM was poorly 
introduced and 
implemented 
‘A regulator that is quite removed from industry, so if you look 
at the majority of people making the rules, or publishing the 
guidance material, they are many, many, many, many years 
removed from the cold face and things are quite often done 
reactively, rather than proactively, and without a huge amount of 
engagement’ (Participant 4). 
CASA’s 
understanding of 
general aviation 
‘…to this day, I would be fairly confident in saying that you 
could ask 15 inspectors at CASA and you’ll have 15 different 
opinions on threat and error management and their 
understanding’ (Participant 4). 
Differences 
among 
examiners when 
assessing TEM 
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The third phase of searching for themes commences after a long list of initial codes is 
produced. It involves grouping the different codes into potential themes and collating 
relevant data extracts accordingly (Braun & Clarke, 2006). There may be several main 
themes, and usually more subthemes. It was suggested that the use of visual 
representation can help researchers organise the different codes into appropriate theme 
piles (Braun & Clarke, 2006). As an example, Figure 5.3 below displays a preliminary 
thematic map that contains some of this study’s themes and subthemes. This 
preliminary phase of the theming exercise finishes after all data extracts are coded and 
sorted into appropriate candidate themes (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). 
 
Figure 5.3. Preliminary thematic map of candidate themes of this research. 
 
The fourth phase of reviewing themes involves a two-tiered approach of review and 
refinement of the candidate themes identified during the third phase, and these further 
undergo discarding, merging and/or dividing themes and subthemes (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). Two criteria that can be used for this review and refinement phase are internal 
homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Patton, 1990). Internal homogeneity 
‘concerns the extent to which the data that belong in a certain [theme] hold together 
or “dovetail” in a meaningful way’ (Patton, 1987, p. 154). This criterion is applied to 
the first-tiered approach of review and refinement in a localised sense, whereby the 
data extracts in each theme are carefully reviewed and refined for internal coherence 
and consistency. The second criterion of external heterogeneity ‘concerns the extent 
to which differences among [themes] are bold and clear’ (Patton, 1987, p. 154). This 
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is applied to the second-tiered approach of review and refinement in a more global 
sense that considers datasets’ and themes’ distinction from one another. At the end of 
this phase, further refined thematic maps were developed based on their major themes. 
As an example, a developed thematic map based on this study’s first main theme is 
presented in Figure 5.4.  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Developed thematic map on this study’s first main theme—CASA. 
 
The fifth phase of defining and naming themes involves ‘identifying the essence’ of 
the further defined themes’ meaning, both individually and collectively, as well as 
‘determining’ the specific aspects of the data each theme delivers (Braun & Clarke, 
2006, p. 92). In doing so, it can be established what each theme is about as well as 
how themes relate to one another (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). At the end of this phase, 
a working title for each theme is provided via a clear and concise permanent name 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). A final thematic map is presented in Figure 5.5, which 
contains four main themes. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Final thematic map for this study with four main themes. 
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The sixth phase of producing the report involves the final analysis and subsequent 
writing up of definitive themes, subthemes and their relevant data extracts (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). The final write up provides a ‘concise, coherent, logical, non-repetitive 
and interesting account of the study … within and across themes’, with appropriately 
embedded data extracts and analytic narratives that present plausible arguments to 
address the research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 93). In order to further 
improve the quality of thematic analysis Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 96) offered the 
following criteria (Table 5.5). These criteria were used as checklist items when 
analysing and presenting the interview data for this study. 
 
Table 5.5 Fifteen Criteria for Good Thematic Analysis and its Outcomes. 
Process No. Criteria 
Transcription 
1 The data have been transcribed to an appropriate level of 
detail, and the transcripts have been checked against the tapes 
for ‘accuracy’. 
Coding 
2 Each data item has received equal attention in the coding 
processes. 
3 Themes have not been generated from a few vivid examples 
(an anecdotal approach); rather, the coding process has been 
thorough, inclusive and comprehensive. 
4 All relevant extracts for all themes have been collated. 
5 Themes have been checked against each other and the original 
dataset. 
6 Themes are internally coherent, consistent and distinctive. 
Analysis 
7 Data have been analysed, interpreted and made sense of, 
rather than just paraphrased or described. 
8 The analysis and data match each other—the extracts 
illustrate the analytic claims. 
9 The analysis tells a convincing and well-organised story about 
the data and topic. 
10 A good balance between analytic narrative and illustrative 
extracts is provided. 
Overall 
11 Enough time has been allocated to complete all phases of the 
analysis adequately, without rushing a phase or giving a phase 
insufficient time. 
Written 
report 
12 The assumptions about, and specific approach to, thematic 
analysis are clearly explicated. 
13 There is a good fit between what the researchers claim they 
did, and what the researchers show they have done—i.e., the 
described method and reported analysis are consistent. 
14 The language and concepts used in the report are consistent 
with the epistemological position of the analysis. 
15 The researcher is positioned as active in the research process; 
themes do not just ‘emerge’. 
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From the start to the end of thematic analysis, CAQDAS, NVivo, was used to assist 
the researcher with data analysis and presentation for this part of the study. 
 
5.3.2 Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS).  
 
Computer-assisted basic content analysis of text became popular from the 1960s 
(Seale, 2008). Since then, the development of CAQDAS has continued, while 
improvement and refinement on various strands of qualitative data analysis methods 
were conducted. By 1990, there were over 26 qualitative analysis software packages 
available, all aiming ‘to facilitate data management and promote the rigour of 
qualitative research’ (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013, p. 6). Although earlier versions of 
these programs and their functionalities were somewhat limited (e.g., mainly text-
retrieval tasks) because of the lower computer capabilities at that time, these 
limitations were gradually lifted with the advancement of computer technologies 
(Seale, 2008) 
 
As a result of subsequent updates and versions, newer and more sophisticated features 
and functions were made available (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). These improved 
features offer a broad range of support for the common tasks of qualitative data 
analysis, including organisation, exploration, interpretation and integration of 
gathered data (Gilbert, Jackson, & di Gregorio, 2014). It is noteworthy that the use of 
CAQDAS helps researchers/data analysts with the management, retrieval and analysis 
of qualitative data. However, it does not replace high-level cognitive exercises, such 
as defining and developing conceptual themes, writing memos and journals, gaining 
insights into phenomena and promoting theoretical understanding (St John & Johnson, 
2000). 
 
The use of CAQDAS is well established in the qualitative research domain because of 
the advantages listed below. However, there are some concerns regarding the use of 
CAQDAS. The following paragraphs describe some of the advantages, followed by 
the concerns raised. The advantages of using CAQDAS include: 
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• an ability to deal with large amounts of qualitative data 
• a reduction in the amount of time needed for manual handling tasks 
• an increase in flexibility and thoroughness in handling data 
• the provision of more rigorous analysis of data 
• the provision of a more visible audit trail in data analyses (St John & 
Johnson, 2000, p. 394). 
 
The first two advantages are obvious, as the use of computers conveniently and 
effectively increases handling and processing speed when sorting and searching for 
pre-coded and categorised qualitative data. The use of software allows 
researchers/data analysts to spend more time completing high-level, creative and 
intellectual tasks, such as thinking about the ‘meaning of data’, rather than working 
through a large pile of photocopied papers with a range of different colours of 
highlighters and sticky notes (Seale, 2008, p. 235). In short, an aerial view of data is 
readily available to researchers/data analysts. 
 
CAQDAS greatly improves flexibility and thoroughness when handling qualitative 
data. As the data analysis progresses, researchers/data analysts have greater ability to 
add notes, in either textual or audio-visual forms, when defining and developing 
concepts and ideas (St John & Johnson, 2000). This is particularly important when 
several researchers/data analysts are working on a project from different geographical 
locations. Codes are developed as the data analysis progresses, and these codes and 
coding systems can easily be modified, merged, moved, replaced and deleted (St John 
& Johnson, 2000). In addition, graphical representation of models and ideas will 
provide greater insights into and understanding of the rich, and often complex, 
qualitative data (St John & Johnson, 2000). This will subsequently improve the 
thoroughness of the analysis when handling particularly large complex data. 
 
The use of CAQDAS helps researchers/data analysts demonstrate that their research 
findings and interpretations are based on rigorous analysis (Seale, 2008). This is 
achieved because CAQDAS examines entire data that relate to certain analytic 
questions, and will subsequently overcome certain assumptions and biases that 
qualitative researchers naturally bring into their research (St John & Johnson, 2000). 
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Consequently, the overall rigour and trustworthiness of research conclusions is 
improved by avoiding false or distorted accounts that are based on researchers’/data 
analysts’ assumptions and worldviews (Neuman, 2011).  
 
The final advantage of using CAQDAS in qualitative research is an improved visible 
audit trail in data analyses (St John & Johnson, 2000). Qualitative researchers are often 
accused of not being explicit in their analytical strategies when analysing qualitative 
data (St John & Johnson, 2000). This perceived limitation can be overcome with the 
use of CAQDAS because the entire dataset (e.g., interview transcription, interview 
notes, audio recording of interviews and memos) can be made available. More 
importantly, a clear audit trail is established when researchers vigorously document 
their enquiry process when analysing qualitative data with the use of CAQDAS 
‘through journaling and memoing, keeping a research log of all activities … and 
recoding data analysis procedures clearly’ (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 128). 
 
Despite the number of advantages described above, there are also concerns raised 
when using CAQDAS in qualitative research. The majority of concerns are associated 
with acceptance of the use of CAQDAS, without comprehensive appreciation of its 
potential shortcomings (St John & Johnson, 2000). These concerns may result in: 
 
• a focus on quantity, rather than meaning 
• homogenisation of qualitative data analysis approaches 
• pressures or expectations that all qualitative researchers will use them 
• a privileging of coding and retrieval methods 
• distancing of the researcher from the data 
• inappropriate use of technology 
• time consumed in learning to use computer packages (St John & Johnson, 
2000, p. 395). 
 
A major concern with the use of CAQDAS is the potential for qualitative researchers 
to feel obligated to obtain large amounts of data, which can result in focusing on 
breadth, instead of depth (St John & Johnson, 2000). Generally, the larger the 
qualitative data size, the more time is needed to explore these complex data for the 
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‘meanings, conceptual understanding, and discourses’ that shape research findings (St 
John & Johnson, 2000, p. 395). This may lead to unintended consequences, with not 
all qualitative data receiving the same level of attention when in-depth analyses are 
performed. One way to overcome this concern is to check data saturation while 
qualitative data are collected, so that no further collection of data reveals anything new. 
The current researcher transcribed each interview recording before conducting the 
next interview. In this way, the researcher gained a good understanding of when data 
saturation was reached; thus, the researcher was able to make an informed decision 
about whether further interviews were required. 
 
Another concern raised with the use of CAQDAS is the increased likelihood of 
homogenised qualitative data analysis approaches (St John & Johnson, 2000). Indeed, 
there is a definite trend that the majority of qualitative research uses such computer 
programs for data analyses, and the unintended consequences include findings 
‘becoming homogeneous, deterministic and limited’ (St John & Johnson, 2000, p. 
396). In general, CAQDAS is better suited to the research area of grounded theory, 
where coding and retrieval are conventional; however, this may not be the case for 
other domains of qualitative research, such as discourse analysis, when in-depth 
analysis of short data extracts and their meanings is conducted (Seale, 2008). Neuman 
(2011) asserted that data collection in qualitative research is ‘an interactive process in 
which particular researchers operate in an evolving setting’; thus, the findings from a 
similar research project by different researchers, or researchers using alternative 
measures, will vary from one another. Therefore, this concern relating to homogenised 
qualitative data analysis approaches may be minimised. 
 
The majority of CAQDAS is based on the assumption that qualitative data analysis 
mainly involves coding and retrieval, as many of these software packages are 
developed by researchers whose research background is in grounded theory, which 
uses coding and retrieval methods to engage in theory building (St John & Johnson, 
2000). However, other branches of qualitative research (e.g., phenomenology) do not 
necessarily focus on theory building. Therefore, excessive coding—which refers to 
the disintegration of data into many unnecessarily smaller pieces—may result in data 
being decontextualised, so that the essence of meanings may no longer be visible (St 
John & Johnson, 2000). This was carefully considered when the researcher analysed 
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and coded interview data using thematic analysis to ensure that each code contained 
its relevant context and meaning. 
 
Similarly, reduction of data through coding may separate researchers from the rich 
qualitative data, which may lead to ‘loss of meaning and context and creating sterile 
and dehumanised data’ (St John & Johnson, 2000, p. 396). This suboptimal outcome 
may be exacerbated if qualitative researchers/data analysts—particularly in a large 
project with multiple researchers/data analysts involved—merely focus on analysing 
pre-coded words and phrases, without underlying unspoken, yet critical, cues, such as 
facial expressions. In fact, St John and Johnson (2000) cautioned that ‘using 
technology in qualitative research may strip away the meanings with which inflection 
and body language imbue words’ (p. 396). Therefore, technology must be used 
appropriately and sensibly, with some parts of the recording and/or notes taken 
attached to certain pre-coded texts to minimise any possible uncertainties, while 
preserving the richness of the qualitative data as much as possible. As previously 
mentioned, the current researcher maintained a close distance to the interview data 
from the beginning of the study to the completion of writing the thesis so that rich 
information within the interview data was not lost. 
 
Another concern raised with the use of CAQDAS is the large investment of time and 
effort required to initially learn and keep up with updates for the particular software 
that researchers decide to use. However, this is not limited to qualitative research. 
Quantitative researchers also need to invest such time and effort to learn statistical 
programs, such as SPSS. This investment in time and effort to learn to use software 
can be a challenge, especially for early career researchers who need to learn particular 
software, in addition to the learning required to understand the procedures of research. 
Despite this, use of computer programs is advisable and beneficial, particularly, but 
not necessarily, when dealing with large databases (Creswell, 2013). It is noteworthy 
that there is no pressure and expectation that all qualitative researchers/data analysts 
need to use CAQDAS. The researcher considers himself an early career researcher 
who has a preference for mixed methods. Therefore, the investment in time and effort 
to learn CAQDAS, NVivo, was considered worthwhile because this is the platform to 
be used when analysing qualitative data for future research. 
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There are alternative options to CAQDAS, such as the Microsoft Word package. Seale 
(2008) explained that many features in the Microsoft Word package can perform 
similar functions to CAQDAS. For instance, a function called a ‘spike’ allows users 
to copy multiple words and/or paragraphs while examining a document, and paste all 
‘spiked’ words/paragraphs in a separate document, instead of copying and pasting 
each word/paragraph. However, in the long term, it is worth the effort to learn and 
become familiar with preferred computer software, particularly for those individuals 
who plan to become career researchers, as there are many more powerful functions—
such as visualisation of conceptual maps—that can be easily created with the use of 
CAQDAS. 
 
After carefully considering the advantages and concerns regarding the use of 
CAQDAS, it was decided to use CAQDAS for the qualitative data analysis for this 
part of the study because the benefits outweighed disadvantages. The question 
remaining was which particular CAQDAS would be used for this study. There were 
various qualitative analysis software packages available and after a period of 
competing, advancing and consolidating many different types of software programs, 
three major CAQDAS packages came to dominate: ATLAS.ti, MAXQDA and NVivo 
(Davidson & di Gregorio, 2011). There are some similarities and differences in terms 
of the functionalities, strengths and weaknesses each software package presents. Evers, 
Sliver, Mruck, and Peeters (2011) conducted an investigation comparing these three 
major software packages, and produced similar conclusions when the same dataset 
was independently analysed. Additionally, the interpretative process of qualitative 
data analysis remains with researchers/data analysts, regardless of which CAQDAS 
package is used. Therefore, the current study used NVivo (Version 11 for Apple 
Macintosh computers), as this was made available, free of charge, to the researcher by 
the university. 
 
5.3.3 Ethics.  
 
Ethics is defined as ‘moral principles that govern a person’s behaviour or the 
conducting of an activity’ (Oxford University Press, 2017) and the ethical conduct of 
research is a central part of the research process. Morris (2015, p. 19) provided six 
fundamental considerations when conducting research: 
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1. Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure integrity, 
quality and transparency. 
2. Research staff and participants must usually be fully informed of the 
purpose, methods and intended possible uses of the research; what their 
participation in the research entails; and what risks, if any, are involved. 
Some variation is allowed in very specific research contexts. 
3. The confidentiality of information supplied by research participants and 
the anonymity of respondents must be respected. 
4. Research participants must take part voluntarily, free from any coercion. 
5. Harm to research participants and researchers must be avoided in all 
instances. 
6. The independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest 
or partiality must be explicit. 
 
The above ethical principles were considered prior to and during the process of 
obtaining human ethics clearance from the university Human Research Ethics 
Committee, which was established and conducted in compliance with the current 
National Health and Medical Research Council National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research. The required ethical clearance was obtained on 10 
October 2016 (Appendix 8). 
 
5.4 Results and Interim Discussion 
 
This section describes the main themes under TEM implementation that arose from 
thematic analysis, followed by separately discussing each of the main themes with 
supporting quotations from the transcripts. The main themes identified were as follows: 
impracticality, lack of guidance and support, TEM implementation and TEM in 
practice. Although there were four separate themes, these themes were somewhat 
interwoven. For instance, one of the six key considerations for successful 
implementation of a policy initiative is ensuring the appropriate mix of required 
expertise and quantity of resources available (ANAO, 2016). However, because of 
insufficient resources from CASA, there was a lack of support and guidance provided 
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to Australian general aviation pilots. Before discussing the themes, it is appropriate to 
provide a brief historical background of CASA, given that CASA is responsible for 
the successful implementation of TEM in Australian general aviation. 
 
5.4.1 Brief historical background of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).  
 
CASA is a regulatory body for Australian civil aviation. The birth of CASA can be 
traced back to May 1921, when a civil aviation branch was established within the 
Defence Department to administer legislation through the Air Navigation Act 1920 
(Bartsch, 2013). The civil aviation branch evolved into the Department of Civil 
Aviation in 1938, when the regulation of civil aviation and military activities was 
separated (Bartsch, 2013). The department then transformed into the Civil Aviation 
Authority in 1988, and the authority was expected to handle both ‘commercial 
viability’ and the ‘enhancement of an air safety regulatory regime’ (Bartsch, 2013, p. 
100). However, these two competing expectations and a consequent series of 
unfortunate accidents led to the disestablishment of the authority, transferring the 
commercial and operational functions to Airservices Australia, and the establishment 
of CASA in 1995 as an independent statutory authority under the Civil Aviation Act 
1988 to constitutionally focus on the air safety regulatory regime (Bartsch, 2013; 
Colmar Brunton, 2016). Therefore, the primary function of CASA (2018) is to provide 
safety regulations to Australia’s civil air operations, nationally and internationally, as 
well as providing comprehensive safety education and training programs. 
 
5.4.2 Impracticality.  
 
Impracticality is the first theme that arose from this study’s thematic analysis. The 
Oxford Online Dictionary (2018) defined practicality as ‘an aspect of a situation that 
involves the actual doing or experience of something rather than theories or ideas’ 
(para. 2). General aviation is primarily a vocationally based industry; thus, it is 
important to consider practical aspects when new safety initiatives are proposed and 
introduced in general aviation, such as TEM implementation. However, all this study’s 
participants expressed concerns regarding a lack of practicality when it came to 
understanding the concept of TEM and implementing it in practice, whether in daily 
routine flying or flight training. Participant 3 stated that ‘CASA’s tried hard … they 
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did it very consciously, very formally and completely impractically’. Participant 4 
provided a similar observation: ‘Did we actually need to get someone to put together 
a paper 90% of aviation community could not understand because they don’t have 
degrees? … We probably should’ve put it on a practical level’. Participant 5 shared a 
similar observation regarding CASA’s theory examination on TEM: 
 
‘I got a sample … Is this a handling error or procedural error or 
operational decision error or intentional non-compliance error? So, to me, 
I thought, well, I’m not really worried if students couldn’t put a tag on 
what sort of error it is. I’m more concerned with, did he spot the error? 
Uh, I would prefer to see … questions on more scenario focused, you know. 
Put up a scenario. Is there a threat or error situation likely to be developed 
here? What would be the countermeasure or what could be the possible 
undesired aircraft state? That’s how I like to see it focused, not is this a 
thing?’ (Participant 5) 
 
This was consistent with a finding from a stakeholder survey (Comar Brunton, 2016). 
The online survey involved a total of 1,217 participant stakeholders in Australian 
aviation, and indicated that approximately 58% of the stakeholders expressed 
disagreement when asked whether CASA did a good job of translating participants’ 
legal obligations into practical guidance (Colmar Brunton, 2016).  
 
Possessing a thorough understanding of theory is important; however, because general 
aviation is a more vocationally oriented industry, it is also important to place an equal, 
if not greater, emphasis on practical aspects. Clearly, these two approaches to 
theoretical knowledge and practical skills are complementary to each other, yet create 
difficulties when they need to be integrated. Based on the comments from the 
participants, it could be well established that a lack of practicality was evident when 
TEM was mandated in Australian general aviation, and the probable reasons for this 
may be twofold. The first reason is likely a result of senior management and decision 
makers within CASA who may be inadequately familiar with the general aviation 
industry. Participant 2 stated, ‘You’ve got all these managers who do not understand 
their core business’. Participant 1 supported this view: 
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‘CASA particularly … but if you look at the profile of a lot of senior 
management within CASA, ones we got last probably 10 to 15 years has 
very little expertise in aviation there. So, they are driving the show and 
they are not too much focusing into the operational aspect, uh, what’s 
going on in the operational field, be it in airlines or be it in the training 
industry? They are not going to put their focus there because, by large, 
they don’t understand it.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Participant 1 further added that it is important to have a good understanding of the 
industry, so that effective communication methods can be established: 
 
‘I mean they did the usual thing of producing some CAAP information, 
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications or something, but that was just a 
document, which is then reliant on people getting hold of that document, 
reading it, understanding it, taking it apart, then setting up the 
implementation plan, and that really doesn’t fit the style of industry.’ 
(Participant1) 
 
Again, this was consistent with the findings from the stakeholder survey (Colman 
Brunton, 2016). The results indicated that almost 50% of the stakeholders were 
dissatisfied (28% very dissatisfied and 20% dissatisfied) with CASA’s ongoing 
dialogue with the industry. Again, almost 50% did not agree that CASA valued input 
from the industry (Colmar Brunton, 2016).  
 
The second probable reason for the lack of practicality when TEM was mandated 
seemed to occur more at the operational level. Participant 4 felt that CASA did not 
have the right people in teams responsible when the implementation of TEM was 
planned: 
 
‘I believe at that time, um, CASA had engaged in a consultant, um, who I 
don’t think was from an aviation background at that time, uh. A lot of what 
came out made no sense whatsoever, um, and it proved, at that time, quite 
difficult to find anything aviation specific with threat and error 
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management because it had only been introduced, um, for its integration 
into a training program.’ (Participant 4) 
 
This was similar when CRM was first introduced in the US in 1981. The criticisms of 
the first generation of CRM stated that it was largely psychological in nature, and that 
the associated games and exercises to illustrate concepts were unrelated to aviation, 
which negatively affected overall acceptance among pilots (Helmreich et al., 1999). 
Similarly, yet outside the aviation context, Zhang (2009) identified that the majority 
of teachers in vocational-technical schools come from other disciplines, with little 
practical experience and a consequent lack of disciplinary understanding, together 
with inadequate work experience, which contributed to a poorer learning experience. 
These highlighted the importance of having adequate industry understanding so that 
successful implementation of new initiatives is achieved as intended. 
 
The stakeholder survey also confirmed the current study’s findings. When asked to 
rate participants’ level of satisfaction with the ways that the CASA developed aviation 
safety regulations, over half of the participants (38% very dissatisfied and 20% 
dissatisfied) indicated dissatisfaction with the way the CASA developed aviation 
safety regulations (Colmar Brunton, 2016). 
 
Participant 4 further added that his experience of other CASA initiatives was that they 
were not aimed at the right level for the industry: 
 
‘I think it’s not just threat and error management, but, in a lot of ways, 
right down to, um, 1423 and you know, expositions and, um, training 
manuals, I think we are overcomplicating the delivery of training. I 
personally believe we’ll actually end up with worse outcomes. If you keep 
something simple, you have a much higher level of compliance than what 
you do when you are overcomplicating things.’ (Participant 4) 
 
 
                                               3	This refers to Part 142 integrated flight training in aeroplanes.	
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Participant 4 continued that ‘the more academic approach we have today, um, I don’t 
believe this is more effective’, and that the so-called academic approach and over-
complication has resulted in the following: ‘That’s what, how it got happened to TEM. 
It was overcomplicated to the point that some people just refuse to even look at it’ 
(Participant 4). This was consistent with a finding from the stakeholder survey, where 
only 28% of the stakeholders considered it ‘easy’ or ‘very easy’ to comply with their 
aviation safety regulations (Colmar Brunton, 2016). Outside aviation, Zhang (2009) 
observed a similar trend in vocational-technical schools in China, where theory was 
over-emphasised, while practical training was placed in a secondary position. This 
trend underestimated the added advantages of further enhancing students’ knowledge 
and appreciation (Zhang, 2009). 
 
It can be well established from the participants’ accounts that, when TEM was first 
implemented, it was not pitched at a level that was appropriate to the general aviation 
industry. Consequently, it was viewed by many stakeholders as an additional 
requirement with which they needed to comply, without them appreciating the value 
of TEM. In addition, the findings from the stakeholder survey were similar to the 
participants’ recounts. Thus, the lack of practicality was the first barrier identified as 
hindering the successful implementation of TEM in Australian general aviation. 
 
5.4.3 Lack of guidance and support.  
 
All participants were more in agreement that there was inadequate guidance and 
support provided by CASA when TEM was implemented in Australian general 
aviation. It was established in Study 1 that the participants’ responses were neutral (M 
= 3.44, SD = 1.25) when asked to rate whether the CASA produced adequate training 
and guidance materials for TEM training for general aviation. 
 
The Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators (GAPAN), now known as the Honourable 
Company of Air Pilots, in collaboration with Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
(ATSB), developed a ‘TEM train-the-trainer’ course for general aviation and low-
capacity air transport operations, and conducted the course in 10 different locations 
around Australia between August and October 2007 in preparation for the regulatory 
changes (Cheng et al, 2009). Participant 4 recalled: 
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‘The GAPAN material is actually quite good, arguably, um, miles ahead 
of what was actually produced by the regulator, but how many people 
actually attended that GAPAN roadshow? I guess that was the question—
what were their positions, were they actually syllabus designers or CFIs, 
um, or the ground school instructors or the flight instructors? There were, 
they did have good attendance, but I would probably say less than 20% of 
the industry.’ (Participant 4) 
 
According to Cheng et al. (2009), approximately 312 people attended the training. 
This was a significant under-representation, considering there were over 20,000 
licence holders (e.g., ATPL = 6,825, CPL = 4,189 and PPL = 10,563) in the aeroplane 
category alone during the 2009 to 2010 periods (CASA, 2010). In addition, the course 
was only conducted in major cities; thus, organisations in rural and remote areas would 
have encountered difficulty attending the courses. 
 
In addition to the GAPAN roadshow, CASA has been running a range of seminars and 
workshops, such as AvSafety seminars, to assist general aviation pilots to stay up to 
date and to promote aviation safety. Given that TEM was a new and important safety 
initiative, there should have been extensive coverage to promote TEM. Participant 4 
recalled that, ‘They have touched on TEM in seminars, yeah, um. Not recently, not for 
a very long time, um, but they have touched on them’. Participant 3 also shared his 
observation: 
 
‘so, was there any special training on it? No. CASA had run courses for 
private pilots where they could talk about those things, but I think I only 
attended one and mostly they were dealing with questions and they don’t—
there was no overall philosophy, except they’ve got to cover and 
demonstrate that you’re considering threats and how you manage them.’ 
(Participant 3) 
 
Further, Participant 1 added: 
 
‘Industry needed, certainly from the outset, an education roadshow to go 
around the regional centres, set up workshops and explain what it was, 
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what they wanted, what outcomes they wanted out of TEM implementation 
… It left the industry pretty much on their own devices.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Similar findings were noted in the stakeholder survey. The survey used a 10-point 
Likert scale, where 0 represented ‘very dissatisfied’ and 10 represented ‘very satisfied’. 
When stakeholders rated whether the CASA had clearly and succinctly explained the 
regulations and how they would affect industry stakeholders, the mean agreement was 
merely 2.9 out of 10 (Colmar Brunton, 2016). These results suggest that more 
thoughtful planning and provision of ongoing guidance are prerequisites for the 
successful implementation of any new initiative. 
 
All the participants had been actively involved in flight testing before and after TEM 
was implemented, and one of the requirements to maintain Flight Examiner (FE) 
rating4 was to attend a biennial professional development program (PDP). Participant 
1 described the PDP as follows: 
 
‘Those PDPs primarily focused on taking us through, during a two-day 
program, the elements of a flight test or a series of flight tests, looking at 
components and elements, making sure we met regulatory requirements, 
making sure we covered all aspects, discuss any grey areas about what 
was in the flight test requirements. That was primarily the focus.’ 
(Participant 1) 
 
Participant 4 shared his experience with scepticism when he attended PDPs: 
 
‘What we tended to get in, um, in PDPs was more discussion points. And 
it was open to the room and generally you would find that every PDP I 
remember up till, um, probably 2012 was just, um, examiners were left to 
deliberate and debate, um, and you would generally come away no wiser. 
I mean, it really depends on who was a more, greater influential speaker 
in the room as to which view people end up taking, but because examiners 
                                               
4 A Flight Examiner (FE) is defined as a person who holds a FE rating with associated FE 
endorsements, or a person approved to conduct flight tests and/or proficiency checks (CASA, 2017). 
 	 109	
in their egos naturally serves as pilots, um, has everybody generally 
thinking they know the best, the way they’ve done this, different or right 
way, you would usually arrive at these events, um, with your own opinions. 
You may have your eyes opened to opinions of others, but I think the 
majority of people still left with their own opinions.’ (Participant 4) 
 
The introduction of TEM would have affected FEs in terms of the way they examined 
flight test candidates and new TEM-related flight test items. However, despite its 
rightly deserved attention regarding how TEM items should be accurately and 
adequately examined, Participant 1’s recount was somewhat different: 
 
‘…it [PDP] didn’t focus on TEM. It didn’t mention it and there was no 
separate PDP program to cover it to say ‘this is a new thing we, CASA, 
have introduced to the industry … we really want to focus on it and we 
want you to focus on it and therefore we will give you separate training’. 
No, they didn’t do that.’ (Participant 1) 
 
A lack of guidance and education opportunities on TEM caused Participant 5 to have 
difficulty in terms of examining and completing TEM elements on a flight testing form: 
 
‘Especially on the test form for the flight tests. It’s just got three very basic 
items, uh, but, uh, like, when you are doing a flight test, they just say, 
‘recognise and manage threats’, ‘recognise and manage errors’, 
‘recognise and manage undesired aircraft state’. Now, that is probably 
too broad and too general, I think, to be even meaningful, unless you really 
had a thorough knowledge of what threat and error management is.’ 
(Participant 5) 
 
Participant 5 further added that: 
 
‘My main concern right from the outset is, as an examiner, um, checking 
that the students are managing threats and errors and getting back to, you 
know, having a test sheet that has a bit more, more prompts on it, rather 
than, you know, you can probably go back and say, well, refer to the 
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Manual of Standards5, but the Manual of Standards, while it elaborates a 
little bit more, it doesn’t elaborate a lot and, uh, I unfortunately don’t 
know what a quick fix would be to trying to fix that problem.’ (Participant 
5) 
 
A similar observation was made by Participant 4 when assessing TEM during a flight 
test: 
‘There was no ‘this is threat and error management. This is how to 
actually build it into flight tests and this is what you are looking for’, 
remembering the Day VFR [Visual Flight Rules] Syllabus didn’t have a 
section specifically for testing, nor it did actually provide any real clear 
guidance on performance criteria, what it was we were actually looking 
to see.’ (Participant 4) 
 
Participant 4 further added that: 
 
‘We were provided with no training ourselves, and so myself and the CFI 
at that time had never been trained threat and error management 
ourselves, and we were trying to read a highly technical, um, advice, 
materials from CASA, um, which, I guess, left all of us to probably feel 
dazed and confused.’ (Participant 4) 
 
The comments above shed some light on the finding from Study 1 that the trainer 
group did not strongly feel that TEM was appropriately assessed during flight tests (M 
= 3.67, SD = 1.2).  
 
Based on the participants’ recounts, there was a lack of adequate support and definitive 
guidance when TEM was first introduced. Three participants offered possible reasons 
regarding why there was a lack of guidance provided by CASA. Participant 4 stated: 
‘It was a lack of understanding due to a lack of education, lack of education because 
lack of understanding of threat and error management within the regulator 
                                               5	The Part 61 Manual of Standards (MOS) is a legislative document that provides information relating 
to flight crew licensing regulations (CASA, 2018f) 
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themselves’. Participant 4’s recount about the lack of understanding of TEM among 
the regulators themselves was supported by Participant 3: 
 
‘When they were introducing it, they were sort of saying things like ‘we’re 
only still trying to find out how to do it’. Even later, I spoke to a senior 
manager at CASA, and he said, ‘we have no idea what it’s about’, so we 
were enforcing something that we didn’t understand.’ (Participant 3) 
 
Consequently, it was regulated that TEM was required to be assessed during flight 
tests, yet there was no adequate guidance provided to FEs due to a lack of 
understanding of TEM within the CASA. Participant 5 recalled that: 
 
‘It may well be that CASA themselves might have been struggling, you 
know, ‘how the hell are we going to assess it?’, so I’ll just put the headings 
in there and leave it up to the examiner, let him work it out himself.’ 
(Participant 5) 
 
Participant 4 supported Participant 5’s observation: ‘To this day, I would be fairly 
confident in saying that you could ask 15 inspectors at CASA and you’ll have 15 
different opinions on threat and error management and their understanding’. The lack 
of support and guidance from CASA affected how successfully TEM was 
implemented in flight schools. Participant 1 described this as follows: 
 
‘Lower end of the scale to probably middle part of the scale probably 
didn’t implement it very well at all, mainly because of lack of 
understanding and, uh, the big end of town, who have got more resources 
and probably more expertise and so they probably did it reasonably well.’ 
(Participant 1) 
 
Participant 1 continued that: 
 
‘Places like Flight Training Adelaide, CAE Oxford get feedback from 
airline clients and/or their parent company. CAE Oxford down at 
Moorabbin—they used to be one of the QANTAS providers, previous 
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named General Flying Services … I used to go down there. They would’ve 
drawn a lot of their expertise on TEM down here from their parent 
company in UK and Europe because EASA [European Aviation Safety 
Agency] brought TEM in a number of years before we did, so, you are 
right. They had resources and they have contacts in the big end of town to 
bring the stuff in and probably did it quite well. The lower end, they don’t.’ 
(Participant 1) 
 
However, Participant 3 argued that large flight schools do not always do a good job, 
particularly in terms of mentoring junior Flight Instructors (FI). These junior FIs at 
large flight schools conduct the majority of flight training: 
 
‘The big schools, and, is in fact less likely to give that expertise because 
the only ones are—there are much fewer senior instructors who, because 
it’s a big school, you only get to see the others from time to time. The other 
thing is those big schools are so busy training that they don’t tend—they 
don’t mentor their junior instructors. They all tell you they do, but having 
observed them, um, they don’t mentor the junior instructors. All they do is 
if, if their instructors are continually having trouble producing students at 
standards, he will get criticised. He won’t get an assistance to do this. 
They’ll say ‘you’re not doing a good job’. They may lose their job and they 
might get another cheap instructor. So, I think they are less likely to, to 
give extra, they will have more resources, but spread thin, uh, but 
resources are being run by a much higher percentage of less experienced 
instructors. They are barely out of commercial licence.’ (Participant 3) 
 
Based on awareness of the different levels of TEM implementation and lack of 
mentoring opportunities for junior FIs, Participant 1 highlighted the importance of 
producing a FI manual: 
 
‘You can embed TEM in a comprehensive instructor manual covering 
teaching basic exercises, but also, as you work through the stages of 
training how to introduce TEM, the concepts of it, practical scenarios 
etcetera, and that would be the basis on which to say, ‘we train our 
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instructors, we standardise our instructors’. Things would flow from there 
… If you embed TEM in the instructor manual, it’s got all the details in 
there then you go—okay, we train to this, it is expected to be done like this 
at the flight schools.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Participants made a few suggestions that the lack of support and guidance from CASA 
could have been due to resource constraints and disproportionate budget allocations 
within the regulator, which would have affected adequate allocation of staff and their 
required initial and ongoing training. Participant 1 shared his experience in this regard: 
 
‘The industry grew too much. In fact, with a budget cut, uh, CASA 
expanded in all sorts of ways, but not with on-the-ground people. They’ve 
got fewer FOIs [Flying Operations Inspectors], much more management 
and their administrative staff, so they didn’t give resources to do it.’ 
(Participant 1) 
 
Participant 2 added that: ‘So someone upstairs and the standard’s been written all of 
these beautiful stuffs, right? But they really haven’t trained their staff. So, their staff 
can’t, don’t understand it, can’t deliver it … it’s across the board’. All participants 
shared very similar views that there was inadequate guidance provided by CASA when 
TEM was implemented in Australian general aviation. The findings from Study 1 also 
supported this view. Although the participants were very positive about GAPAN’s 
roadshow, the number of pilots who actually attended the roadshow was very low 
compared with the total number of licenced pilots in Australia at that time. In addition, 
the participants identified that there was no specific training provided to FEs regarding 
how TEM was required to be assessed. Further, based on participants’ observations, 
there were very limited educational opportunities for general aviation pilots to learn 
TEM principles and their proper application. This lack of adequate guidance and 
support from CASA was seemingly due to financial constraints and the consequent 
absence of adequately trained staff. Therefore, it was then a logical step to examine 
how TEM was implemented, which is discussed in the next section. 
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5.4.4 Threat and error management implementation.  
 
Oxford (2018) defined implementation as ‘the process of putting a decision or plan 
into effect’ (para. 2), and any implementation certainly requires a thoughtful process. 
The general consensus among all participants was that the implementation of TEM 
was problematic. Participant 1 recalled that: 
 
‘It was mandated by CASA to be inserted into the VFR syllabus and flight 
schools were then required to teach TEM as it was known, but 
implementation was the problem … Nobody really understood what it was 
CASA wanted and nobody really clearly defined it and it was not very well 
implemented.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Participant 2 added that: ‘I think that they’ve introduced threat and error management 
which’s a fantastic idea, but I don’t think it’s been … it’s been poorly introduced and 
therefore there’s no value, you know’. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 
(2014) provided a guide that identified six key considerations ‘when implementing a 
policy initiative—the act of translating policy into reality—so that intended benefits 
are realised’ (p. 3). These considerations were governance, managing risk, engaging 
stakeholders, planning, resources and monitoring, and review and evaluation (ANAO, 
2014). 
 
The first key consideration, governance, refers to the arrangements and practices that 
enable the achievement of expected outcomes (ANAO, 2014). Sound governance 
arrangements require a committed executive, supported by a senior responsible officer 
who is accountable for the success of policy implementation (ANAO, 2014). The 
senior responsible officer is required to either possess the appropriate skills or have 
access to such skills to oversee the implementation process, as well as organising a 
suitably skilled implementation team to assist him or her (ANAO, 2014). However, 
based on the participants’ recounts, as discussed below, it was evident that a sound 
governance arrangement was not well established: 
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‘CASA particularly … if you look at the profile of a lot of senior 
management within CASA, ones we got last probably 10 to 15 years has 
very little expertise in aviation there. So, they are driving the show and 
they are not … too much focusing into the operational aspect, uh, what’s 
going on in the operational field, be it in airlines or be it in the training 
industry. They are not going to put their focus there because, by large, 
they don’t understand it.’ (Participant 1) 
 
‘When they were introducing it, they were sort of saying things like ‘we’re 
only still trying to find out how to do it’. Even later, I spoke to a senior 
manager at CASA, and he said, ‘we have no idea what it’s about’, so we 
were enforcing something that we didn’t understand.’ (Participant 3) 
 
‘I believe at that time, um, CASA had engaged in a consultant, um, who I 
don’t think was from an aviation background at that time, uh. A lot of what 
came out made no sense whatsoever, um, and it proved, at that time, quite 
difficult to find anything aviation specific with threat and error 
management because it had only been introduced, um, for its integration 
into a training program … I’ll be brutally honest, during those PDPs and 
in that era, was, I think a lot of … there was no technical specialist actually 
employed by CASA and threat and error management.’ (Participant 4) 
 
The findings from a previous stakeholder survey suggested a similar view, in which 
the participants strongly believed that CASA was disconnected from the aviation 
industry, which resulted in a perceived lack of understanding of the operational effects 
that regulatory changes could bring (Colman Brunton, 2016). In addition, the survey 
indicated that only 26% of respondents were very satisfied (9%) or satisfied (17%) 
when asked whether CASA had provided competent and capable staff (Colman 
Brunton, 2016). 
 
The second key consideration for successful implementation is risk management 
(ANAO, 2014). Risk in this context refers to dispersion around the expected outcomes. 
CASA (2008) introduced TEM in response to the endorsement and recommendation 
to include TEM training in all pilot training by ICAO, with a view to further improve 
 	 116	
flight safety in general aviation. As such, the risk management aspect of successful 
TEM implementation was to ensure that TEM was properly introduced, taught, 
practised and assessed to achieve the intended outcome of further improving flight 
safety in general aviation. However, as established in the previous sections and in the 
participants’ accounts below, poor teaching and inconsistent assessment of TEM 
among FEs were evident. Therefore, successful implementation of TEM was hindered 
because of inadequate risk management by CASA: 
 
‘It was mandated by CASA to be inserted into the VFR syllabus and flight 
schools were then required to teach TEM as it was known but … Nobody 
really understood what it was CASA wanted and nobody really clearly 
defined it … There was not an education roadshow set up by the regulator, 
which should have happened to go around and do workshops with flight 
schools.’ (Participant 1) 
 
‘There was no ‘this is threat and error management. This is how to 
actually build it into flight tests and this is what you are looking for’, 
remembering the Day VFR Syllabus didn’t have a section specifically for 
testing, nor it did actually provide any real clear guidance on performance 
criteria, what it was we were actually looking to see.’ (Participant 4) 
 
Similar observations were made in the stakeholder survey, where only 14% of 
respondents strongly agreed (4%) or agreed (10%) when asked whether CASA clearly 
and succinctly explained the regulations and how they would affect industry 
stakeholders (Colman Brunton, 2016). 
 
The third key consideration for successful implementation is engaging stakeholders 
(ANAO, 2014). Figure 5.6 below depicts the importance of establishing a high level 
of engagement with relevant stakeholders. The ANAO (2014) asserted that effective 
stakeholder engagement requires a clear objective for consultation and the 
identification of key stakeholders, while maintaining clear and timely communication 
to wider communities. 
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Figure 5.6. Reasons for engaging with stakeholders. Source: adapted from ANAO 
(2014, p. 38). 
 
However, the observations by participants were divergent regarding the establishment 
of effective stakeholder engagement. Participant 1 recalled: 
 
‘As I already said, TEM was a buzzword. It was pushed out there and it 
was required by CASA to be introduced to flight schools, and nobody 
really had a clear understanding of what it was, its components or 
elements.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Participant 1 further added that: 
 
‘Industry needed, certainly from the outset, an education roadshow to go 
around the regional centres, set up workshops and explain what it was, 
what they wanted, what outcomes they wanted out of TEM implementation 
… It left the industry pretty much on their own devices.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Participant 4 shared a similar view that, before TEM was formally introduced, a 
practical and thoughtful approach was required, offering a series of: 
 
‘Practically focused training session first and then providing the guidance 
materials on how to actually roll it out into a school environment. If you 
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did it that way, you probably would’ve had a greater pick up and a greater 
success.’ (Participant 4) 
 
Participant 4 also highlighted a lack of close engagement between the CASA and the 
industry: 
 
‘If they actually came in and lived, like walked into flight training 
organisations and actually saw what happens in a day-to-day basis and 
saw how flying schools operated, how long briefs and short briefs are 
conducted and how flight lessons were conducted today, what was actually 
going on, that probably would’ve been better, uh, prepared or better 
armed, uh, for the development of training materials for the industry and 
to have a better roll-out plan.’ (Participant 4) 
 
This suboptimal level of effective stakeholder engagement was also identified in the 
stakeholder survey. A finding from the survey indicated that almost half of the survey 
participants were very dissatisfied (28%) or dissatisfied (20%) with the CASA’s 
ongoing dialogue with the industry (Colmar Brunton, 2016). Another finding from the 
survey suggested that only 11% of participants strongly agreed (4%) or agreed (7%) 
when asked whether CASA always consulted with the most appropriate people in the 
industry when developing and reforming aviation safety regulations (Colmar Brunton, 
2016). Almost half of the survey participants either strongly disagreed (31%) or 
disagreed (18%) that CASA would value input from industry. The participants 
indicated their disconnect from participating in consultation, and the survey indicated 
that the top two reasons for this disconnect were as follows: ‘was not aware I could’ 
(36%) and ‘won’t make a difference/waste of time’ (28%) (Colmar Brunton, 2016). 
Participant 4 concurred that: ‘They might call for, uh, you know, they might put out, 
um, a Notice of Proposed Rule Making, [and] people may respond, but their response 
rate is about 1% in the community’. 
 
Participant 1 observed varying degrees in the ways TEM was implemented in different 
flight training organisations, citing a combination of low attendance at the GAPAN 
roadshow, lack of a separate roadshow for flight schools, unclear conduct of the 
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AvSafety seminar, and lack of clear and timely communications and support to the 
wider general aviation community: 
 
‘So, I guess implementation in the flight schools sort of varied from small 
ones—small country ones, who probably didn’t have and still haven’t got 
a clue about TEM, probably didn’t even believe in it and therefore really 
did not implement it at all—to the major flying schools, like Flight 
Training Adelaide—an organisation that, yeah, would’ve embraced TEM. 
They would’ve had a clear understanding about what it was and, uh, 
would’ve implemented it into their procedures. So, clearly it depends on 
which part of the industry you are looking at.’ (Participant 1) 
 
It was interesting to note that, despite the varying degrees in the ways TEM was 
implemented, Participant 4 recalled only very small differences when assessing 
candidates from different flight schools: 
 
‘From an organisation that understands academics of it and does the 
ground work, um, put some show on the ground, um, work through threat 
and error management. There’re massive differences what you see there, 
but there’s very little difference between what I have experienced in flight 
with applicants from both ends of spectrum. I think everybody has always 
done a fairly good job of in-flight training students to identify threats and 
errors.’ (Participant 4) 
 
The fourth key consideration for successful implementation is planning, which ANAO 
(2014) described as providing ‘a map of how an initiative will be implemented, 
addressing matters such as timeframe, dependencies with other policies or activities, 
program logic, phases of implementation, roles and responsibilities, resourcing, and 
compliance with legal and policy requirements’ (p. 43). A number of participant 
comments above suggested that more thorough planning would have led to more 
successful implementation of TEM. A comment from Participant 4 also highlighted 
the importance of in-depth planning before TEM was implemented: 
 
 	 120	
‘I think, the first question should’ve been asked is: What is this? Is this 
actually something new or is this something we’re already doing and 
we’ve just really created, um, a new term for it because all of a sudden, 
we’ve got academics to do, uh, come up with something new? Um, have 
we just created something for the sake of creating something? I think it 
already exists. If it did already exist, what was actually wrong with the 
way it’s been, what was it actually problem here? Did we actually need to 
get someone to put together a paper 90% of aviation community could not 
understand because they don’t have degrees, um, or interest, perhaps? 
Um, we probably should’ve put it on a practical level, so the first thing we 
should’ve done would’ve been to actually run a series of training sessions, 
practically focused training session, showing threat and error 
management in practice, um, teaching CFIs syllabus design, how and 
examiners, um, how—what is actually a threat, what is actually an error, 
what are plausible management strategies, um, help them to actually 
understand the system first of all, and then providing the guidance 
materials on how to actually roll it out into a school environment. If you 
did that way, you probably would’ve had a greater pick up and a greater 
success.’ (Participant 4) 
 
Participant 1 shared his recent experience with CASA that highlights poor planning 
when Part 616 was introduced: 
 
‘What happened was they introduced Part 61, and the PDP programs had 
not been developed. As one of three guinea pigs CASA used to train their 
licencing staff, I move across from ATO [Approved Testing Officer] to 
flight examiner in September ‘14. It was to see what the transition process 
was like. CASA needed a couple of guinea pigs, so from September ‘14, 
my proficiency check—i.e., my renewal as a flight examiner qualification, 
if you like—was due up in two years—i.e., was due at the end of August, 
thirty-first of August that year. When I applied for that proficiency check 
                                               
6 Part 61 refers to a section in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 that prescribes the 
requirements and standards for the issue of flight crew licences (CASA, 2017). 
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to be done back in June, just before I was going on leave, I didn’t get an 
answer. I still didn’t get an answer when I returned from leave because, 
one, Part 61 said that you had to do a PDP before you could do your 
proficiency check. They didn’t have a PDP … CASA hasn’t developed one 
and when I asked about my proficiency check, they said, ‘well, we don’t 
know what we are going to do with proficiency checks because we haven’t 
worked it out yet’. So, on the thirty-first August, the day my examiner 
rating technically ran out, there was an exemption that was mailed to me 
that said examiner proficiency checks were delayed for 18 months, until 
CASA sort the whole thing out because we don’t know what we are going 
to do yet.’ (Participant 1) 
 
These two comments, as well as other previous comments, highlighted the importance 
of thorough planning well before any initiative was going to be implemented. 
 
The fifth key consideration for successful implementation is ensuring an appropriate 
mix of required expertise and quantity of resources available (ANAO, 2014). As 
aforementioned, assessment of the required skills and resources is carefully considered 
during the planning stage; however, ANAO (2014) equally identified that the 
unavailability of personnel with required expertise to implement a planned initiative 
is one of the most common implementation problems. This was observed by 
Participant 4, who did not believe the CASA had an appropriate consultant when TEM 
was implemented: 
 
‘I believe at that time, um, CASA had engaged in a consultant, um, who I 
don’t think was from an aviation background at that time, uh. A lot of what 
came out made no sense whatsoever, um, and it proved, at that time, quite 
difficult to find anything aviation specific with threat and error 
management because it had only been introduced, um, for its integration 
into a training program.’ (Participant 4) 
 
The sixth key consideration for successful implementation is the establishment of 
ongoing active management that comprises well-coordinated monitoring, review and 
evaluation processes (ANAO, 2014). Ongoing active management aims to 
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appropriately inform and facilitate other relevant key building blocks for decision-
making and to support activities for successful implementation of an initiative (ANAO, 
2014). According to Participant 3, this active management did not seem to have been 
well established within CASA: 
 
‘When they were introducing it, they were sort of saying things like ‘we’re 
only still trying to find out how to do it’. Even later, I spoke to a senior 
manager at CASA, and he said, ‘we have no idea what it’s about’, so we 
were enforcing something that we didn’t understand.’ (Participant 3) 
 
Participant 1 offered one of the ways to establish ongoing active management. 
 
‘Well, when we … the first part of our conversation … implementation, 
they had, you know, safety education section in there for since forever 
because one of the mandated CASA functions … is educating. So, there 
should’ve been an opening roadshow to roll out TEM to those regional 
centres to for them to implement first of all. Then they can reinforce that 
every 12 to 18 months or whatever. If you embed TEM in the instructor 
manual, it’s got all the details in there, then you go—okay, we train to this, 
it is expected to be done like this at the flight schools. Their annual or 18-
month roadshow would go around and saying, ‘we’ve done some 
appropriate sampling around the industry and the feedback is that there 
were still some weak areas—this, this, this and this … this is how we 
recommend to fix them’. It is the normal close loop.’ (Participant 1) 
 
This review of the six key considerations for successful implementation of an initiative, 
alongside the relevant recounts from the participants, suggests that TEM 
implementation in Australian general aviation was perceived by many as laissez-faire. 
This could also be identified from a finding in the stakeholder survey that Colmar 
Brunton (2016) conducted. When asked how satisfied participants felt with the 
CASA’s development of aviation safety regulations, over half of the participants were 
very dissatisfied (38%) or dissatisfied (20%) with the CASA’s development of 
aviation safety regulations (Colmar Brunton, 2016). 
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As a summary of this section, the following paragraphs discuss research comparing 
hospitals that displayed varying degrees of implementation of the World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) surgical safety checklist. This checklist incorporated a CRM-
style briefing and debriefing with a surgical pause (Wakeman & Langham, 2018). 
Conley, Singer, Edmondson, Berry, and Gawande (2011) conducted qualitative 
research examining implementation of the WHO surgical safety checklist in five 
Washington State hospitals to identify certain characteristics that led to effective 
implementation. The study suggested that certain factors led to highly efficient and 
successful implementation of the surgical safety checklist use, such as ‘active 
leadership … extensive discussion and training, piloting, multidisciplinary 
communications, real time coaching, and ongoing feedback’ (Conley et al., 2011, p. 
877).  
 
A hospital with highly effective implementation of the surgical safety checklist 
exhibited thorough preparation prior to implementation, promoted open and regular 
dialogue between the implementation team and stakeholders (e.g., surgeons and nurse 
managers), provided extensive discipline-specific training and ongoing real-time 
coaching and feedback throughout the implementation period, and closely monitored 
progress (Conley et al., 2011). In short, the implementation was highly successful. 
 
In contrast, a hospital that experienced less effective implementation of the surgical 
safety checklist exhibited largely opposite characteristics to the hospital with highly 
effective implementation (Conley et al., 2011). The hospital with less effective 
implementation did not provide dedicated education or training before implementation, 
and did not establish real-time coaching, feedback or an ongoing monitoring 
mechanism (Conley et al., 2011). Consequently, the frequency and quality of checklist 
use were poor. One of the participants remarked, ‘different people do it in different 
ways’ (Conley et al., 2011, p. 877), thereby suggesting there was no standardised 
approach in terms of the use of the surgical safety checklist, as a result of poor 
implementation. 
 
The above two cases of the hospitals highlight the importance of a thoughtful process 
to enable the successful implementation of an initiative, and it was unfortunate that 
CASA’s TEM implementation more closely resembled the hospital that experienced 
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less effective implementation of the checklist. Despite the poor implementation of 
TEM, it became a mandatory licence issue flight test item in 2009; thus, it was required 
to be taught, assessed and practised, as discussed in the following section. 
 
5.4.5 Threat and Error Management in practice.  
 
This section discusses how TEM has been taught and practised in Australia since its 
implementation in 2009. One of the findings from Study 1 indicated that TEM was 
incorporated in ground schools, pre-/post-flight briefings and instructional flights. 
Ground school7 refers to a theory delivery course. The syllabus for the ground school 
is based on Part 61 of MOS (CASA, 2018f). This manual comprises eight schedules, 
and Schedule 3 prescribes the aeronautical knowledge standards for all Part 61 
licences (e.g., PPL and CPL), as well as ratings and endorsements. Table 5.6 provides 
a list of TEM-specific items that are required to be covered during the ground school. 
It is evident that almost all items are identical between the PPL syllabus and CPL 
syllabus. 
 
Table 5.6 Syllabus Items for TEM from Part 61 of the Manual of Standards: adapted 
from CASA (2018e). 
PPL CPL 
• Describe the basic principles of 
TEM 
 
• Explain the principles of TEM 
and detail a process to identify 
and manage threats and errors 
during single-pilot operations 
• Explain the principles of TEM and 
detail a process to identify and 
manage threats and errors during 
single-pilot operations 
• Define ‘threat’ and give examples 
of threats 
• Explain the meaning of ‘threat’ 
and give examples of threats 
• Give an example of a committed 
error and how action could be 
taken to ensure safe flight 
• Give an example of a committed 
error and how action could be 
taken to ensure safe flight 
• Explain how the use of checklists 
and SOPs can prevent errors 
• Explain how the use of checklists 
and SOPs can prevent errors 
• Give examples of how a UAS can 
develop from an unmanaged 
threat or error 
• Describe how a UAS can develop 
from an unmanaged threat or error 
• Explain what resources a pilot 
could identify and use to avoid or 
• Explain what resources a pilot 
could identify and use to avoid or 
                                               7	Ground school is similar to scheduled lectures/classes where theoretical contents for relevant 
licences (e.g., PPL and CPL) are taught.	
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manage a UAS, such as being lost 
or entering adverse weather 
manage a UAS, such as being lost 
or entering adverse weather 
• Explain the importance of 
ensuring that tasks are prioritised 
to manage a UAS 
• Explain the importance of 
ensuring that tasks are prioritised 
to manage a UAS 
• Give examples of how 
establishing and maintaining 
interpersonal relationships can 
promote safe flight 
• Describe how establishing and 
maintaining interpersonal 
relationships can promote safe 
flight 
 
TEM is also covered in pre-/post-flight briefings. The pre-flight briefing is an 
abbreviated version of a long briefing, and typically takes around 15 minutes. 
Although TEM can be discussed during a long briefing, it is more appropriate to be 
covered as part of a pre-flight briefing prior to flight because: 
 
‘Threat and error management better lives in a pre-flight briefing where 
we are able to actually consider environmental factors of the day and the 
two organic beings on board the aircraft and the actual condition of the 
aircraft in which we are flying on that day—none of which is known at a 
long briefing stage. So I prefer that it will create a discussion threat and 
error management in a pre-flight briefing stage, despite the fact that, um, 
you know, in our long briefing format, there is a requirement for TEM.’ 
(Participant 4) 
 
During the pre-flight briefing, a FI and trainee pilot usually go through the flight 
sequences. According to Participant 5, the pre-flight briefing concludes with a TEM 
consideration:  
 
‘We modified all our briefings and, um, we just put TEM as an addition to 
the briefings. Okay, so the actual pre-flight briefing didn’t change, but we 
incorporated TEM at the end of the briefings … Now, the last thing before 
you walk out the door, let’s see what can turn to worms.’ 
 
There are other forms of briefings immediately before or during flight, such as before-
take-off briefings, emergency briefings and approach briefings. These briefings are 
typically verbalised at the appropriate phase of flight. For example, a typical 
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emergency briefing for a single-engine aeroplane occurs before lining up on an active 
runway, and proceeds as follows: 
 
‘Any malfunctions before airborne, close the throttle, keep the aeroplane 
straight and stop within the remaining runway. Engine failure after 
airborne with sufficient runway remaining, check forward and re-land. 
Engine failure after airborne without sufficient runway remaining, check 
forward, look for a suitable paddock within 30 degrees8 either side of the 
nose and glide to the paddock.’ (Provided by the researcher) 
 
Verbalising the emergency briefing serves as a clear action plan in the unlikely event 
of engine failure occurring, so that pilots are better prepared and can react immediately. 
However, Participant 3 described these briefings as ‘the ritual chant to please the 
gods’, and pointed out that these briefings are not completed in the way they are 
intended to be: 
 
‘The other ritual chant to please the gods was the before-take-off and 
emergency briefs … So we’re sitting, at a run-up point, and they say, ‘okay, 
I’m taking off from Runway 10, left or right, and I’m going to, my, abort 
speed is whatever it was and then once I’m, if I’m short of that, then I’m 
going to stop on the runway’, and if it’s passed that point, and again, 
everybody uses exactly the same practised spiels, and said, ‘after that, I’m 
going to lower the nose, look 30 degrees either side of the nose for a 
suitable place to land and I’ll land on that suitable point’. And so, at the 
end of that … I would say—I don’t know how many times I said this—so, 
‘okay, we’re taking off on 10 Archerfield, off the end of the runway, there 
is a whole industrial area, full of factories.’ (Participant 3) 
 
Participant 3 continued that: 
 
‘Instead of repeating the datum, actions after take-off, let’s consider what 
your options are after take-off because what you say, the briefing, is 
                                               
8 The actual angle varies depending on surroundings from the runway end of departure. 
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completely ineffectual [fictitious], as soon as you have an engine failure 
and you point it to the factories, you’re going to do something else anyway 
… so now you’re making a decision under pressure at the wrong time, 
you’re very likely to make a wrong decision … that’s an example I had 
given it to the students and said, ‘don’t do it that way.’ (Participant 3) 
 
The above comment illustrates that the briefings were not given the deserved attention 
and consideration, and were not what they were intended to be. Participant 5 added 
that: 
 
‘Just the old parrot fashion, you know, pre-take-off checks, you know, 
some of them just rote, just rattle it off and, uh, I absolutely hate that, you 
know, it’s rehearsed … Um, when things become rote, unfortunately, they 
are not practised conscientiously … they’re not actually sitting there, 
scratching their head: ‘now, what could go wrong, you know, in the next 
five minutes when I was going to take off? What could possibly go wrong?’ 
That’s what we’re trying to do with this one.’ (Participant 5) 
 
After TEM demonstration became a flight test requirement, TEM briefings were 
incorporated into the relevant briefings. For instance, the approach briefing involves 
verbalising a rejoining procedure based on an active runway and TEM considerations, 
such as a large number of traffic departing, arriving and operating in a circuit pattern. 
Participant 1 described a good example of TEM demonstration in this phase of flight: 
 
‘A classic example is coming into one of, say, one of the VFR entry points 
back to Archerfield here, which is, you know, notoriously busy around 
those locations … You have traffic coming outbound, you are coming 
inbound and you get a lot of traffic, uh … chopper, helicopter at low level, 
helicopter traffic around there, so naturally it is a quite busy area and 
everything. A good student will prepare himself to get his ATIS 9 
information well out of the way and all copied up and everything well in 
                                               
9 Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) is a continuous broadcast of relevant operational 
information, such as a runway in use and meteorological conditions for a specific aerodrome. 
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advance, so when actually hitting the hot spot, if you like, he will get 
whatever checklist is done out of the way, make broadcast calls early to 
alert people that he is in the area and everything. He makes sure he is on 
the right frequency so he is able to listen out and deal with those potential 
threats, having recognised in the first place the threats in the area, error 
management is covered by good focus on SOPs, say, getting his calls out 
the way, getting his checklist done, those sorts of things, so, yeah, that’s 
what the good student does.’ (Participant 1) 
 
In contrast, Participant 2 described TEM demonstration as: ‘They mouth this off, but 
they don’t really understand what they are actually telling you’. Participant 3 provided 
the following example of a poor TEM demonstration: 
 
‘… to demonstrate it that they were using threat and error management, 
you’re coming in from a training area, uh, at Archerfield, and, at some 
stage, they’ve got to show that they are aware of threats and how they 
need to be managed, so I would get this ritual chant—it was all learnt off 
by heart and that was, that was practically the same, everybody from a 
school would say virtually exactly the same words. That is, ‘I’m coming 
into Park Ridge … it’s going to be traffic likely from the area converging 
here … so I’ll have to keep my eyes on that traffic and be aware of what 
they’re doing, and so they’re letting me know that they’re aware and 
thinking about it … Once we passed here, I will make a call, I will be given 
rejoin instruction. I’m expecting to land on Runway 10 or 28 and so I will 
go to this point and then I will come down and then I’ll come around to 
land on the left or right runway and then I’ll turn off at a taxi-way’, 
whatever, because … [indiscernible] … taxi via, taxi to this and that and 
this comes back to my whole point. So, they’ve given me whole this spiel 
and I’m sitting there and I’m watching this aircraft, converging on us from 
my right … But he was so busy with saying his spiels, you know, he wasn’t 
actually doing threat and error management by keeping his eyes open … 
So the whole briefing meant nothing, which means they were wasting their 
time, trying to impress me with their threat and error management, and 
the whole thing was pointless because, concentrating on that, they didn’t 
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see the aeroplane and telling me what they were going to do after they 
land and the runway was changed and everything is out the window.’ 
(Participant 3) 
 
Participant 3 explained that flight test candidates had to verbalise these briefings 
because: 
 
‘… the way of doing all that was, unless I can hear you say something that 
shows me that you are doing it, I can’t tick that box. Whereas I used to say, 
I can see whether you are managing or not, you know.’ (Participant 3) 
 
Participant 3 expressed concern with the prevalence of this practice: 
 
‘They were told to give this spiel and this happened in Archerfield at 
different schools, uh, Townsville, Rockhampton, at Toowoomba and the 
similar process for whole time because they felt that they had to produce 
by telling me all about it.’ (Participant 3) 
 
As Participants 3 and 5 stated, these briefings were rote learnt, and usually derived 
from FIs who provided written scripts for their students to learn. Participant 4’s 
comment highlighted the inappropriateness of completely artificial written scripts for 
students to verbalise: 
 
‘Which is rubbish. It’s a completely waste of time. The issue with scripting 
anything, particularly if that particular scenario or external factor does 
not actually present themselves on that day, is that now you’ve got a 
student trying to assess simulated conditions, taking them away from 
actually using their brains and assessing real conditions. Um, in fact, they 
may think that by working through their scenario or the script, that their 
job is actually done, and make you have no further thought to actually 
considering threats and errors for the day.’ (Participant 4) 
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Participant 4 offered a better way to use a script to prompt which actions need to be 
completed: 
 
‘… we are simply providing them with place holders to identify for 
themselves threats and errors and put them into the script, so if you had a 
script that sort of said, you know, the fact that’s affecting today’s flying 
are: blank, blank and blank, and the wind is blank, and therefore it is or 
it is not, you know, blank, um, I think that encourages students to think 
and it directs their thought process to consideration of threats and errors.’ 
(Participant 4) 
 
Based on the participants’ comments, it was evident that poor TEM implementation 
has negatively affected the way TEM is taught and practised in Australian general 
aviation. The participants’ main criticism involved individuals verbalising a series of 
briefings without conscientiously thinking about the real-life situation. Use of 
completely written scripts that may not resemble conditions on a particular day was 
another area that needs immediate attention.  
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the qualitative phase of sequential mixed methods research, 
with the central focus of better understanding how TEM was implemented in 
Australian general aviation through interviewing five highly experienced FEs. All 
participants shared the same view that TEM was not implemented well, and four 
themes arose from the analysis: impracticality, lack of support and guidance, TEM 
implementation and TEM in practice. Based on the findings, a further study was 
designed to verify and generalise the findings from the present study. The third study 
(quantitative study) is presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Study 3 (Quantitative Study) 
 
6.1 Purpose 
 
This study involved a quantitative (second) phase of sequential mixed methods 
research approach using an exploratory sequential design (Figure 3.6), and its central 
purpose was to verify and generalise the findings from the previous study (Study 2). 
To fulfil this purpose, an online survey was devised based on the four themes that 
arose from the thematic analysis in Study 2 (qualitative study): impracticality, lack of 
guidance and support, TEM implementation and TEM in practice. The combined 
findings from studies 2 and 3 are expected to provide a better understanding of how 
TEM was implemented and this implementation’s effects on the way TEM has been 
viewed and practised in Australian general aviation. 
 
6.2 Methods 
 
6.2.1 Design overview.  
 
The primary purpose of this study was to collect information to verify and generalise 
the findings from Study 2 (qualitative study). To collect the required data, an online 
survey was devised and administered. The survey contained six questions for each 
theme, as well as group-specific questions for FIs and FEs, based on comments made 
by the participants in Study 2. The survey also collected demographic data, such as 
the highest CASA-issued licence each participant either held or had held, and whether 
the participants were actively flying, either commercially or privately, before TEM 
training became mandated. The entire survey is presented in Appendix 9 so that 
readers have a better understanding of the contents and structure of the survey. 
 
6.2.2 Trustworthiness in research.  
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed that trustworthiness is one of the ways to persuade 
the intended audiences that the findings are ‘worth paying attention to’ (p. 290). 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), there are four assessment criteria used to 
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achieve trustworthiness: truth value, applicability, consistency and neutrality. It was 
established in Section 5.2.3 that these four assessment criteria appear differently in 
quantitative and qualitative research. In Section 5.2.3.1, trustworthiness in qualitative 
research was described in detail. In this section, a brief description of the four 
assessment criteria applicable to quantitative research (Table 6.1) is provided, 
followed by more detailed descriptions in Section 6.2.2.1. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Comparison of Assessment Criteria for Trustworthiness in Quantitative 
Research. 
Criterion Quantitative approach 
Truth value Internal validity 
Applicability External validity 
Consistency Reliability 
Neutrality Objectivity 
Source: adapted from Krefting (1991, p. 217). 
 
 
Truth value refers to researchers’ confidence in the truth of the findings, based on the 
research design, participants and context (Krefting, 1991). In quantitative research, 
internal validity is the alternative criterion for truth value, and is supported when the 
controlled variation in an independent (cause) variable accounts for changes in a 
dependent (effect) variable (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
 
Applicability refers to how well findings can be generalised to alternative contexts, 
settings or groups (Krefting, 1991). In quantitative research, applicability is termed 
external validity, and refers to generalisation of research findings from small samples 
to a larger population. 
 
Consistency is the third criterion of trustworthiness, and considers how consistent the 
findings of research are if repeated involving the same samples of participants or in a 
similar context (Krefting, 1991). In quantitative research, reliability is deemed to be 
equivalent to consistency, which emphasises ‘the value of repeatability’, whereby 
replication of the same study would produce the same or very similar findings 
(Krefting, 1991, p. 216), even if the methods of study were altered (e.g., different 
groups of participants). 
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Neutrality is the fourth and final criterion of trustworthiness, and determines the 
legitimacy of findings without the ‘biases, motivation, interests or perspectives’ of 
researchers (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 290). In quantitative research, neutrality is 
termed objectivity, and is generally achieved through a high level of intersubjective 
agreements and the use of appropriate methodology that minimises such violations 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To this end, quantitative researchers are encouraged to 
maintain appropriate distance from their subjects to avoid unintended influences, such 
as biases. The following subsection further discusses in-depth the four assessment 
criteria to achieve trustworthiness in quantitative research. 
 
6.2.2.1 Trustworthiness in quantitative research.  
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested four questions that researchers should ask 
themselves to ensure the trustworthiness of their research and its findings and 
interpretations. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the first question that 
researchers can pose to ensure ‘truth value’ is: ‘How can one establish confidence in 
the “truth” of the findings of a particular inquiry for the subjects (respondents) with 
which and the context in which the inquiry was carried out?’ (p. 290). This assessment 
criterion for trustworthiness is more commonly known as internal validity in 
quantitative research, which refers to the best approximation of ‘validity of the cause-
and-effect inference linking the independent variable and the dependent variable’ 
(Wiersma & Jurs, 2009, p. 139). This is achieved by a robust research design that 
minimises false conclusions (Neuman, 2011). However, it is worth noting that this is 
an approximation, rather than an absolute truth, because the ultimate test of internal 
validity for quantitative researchers is to show ‘an isomorphism (a one-to-one 
relationship) with that reality’ that cannot be proved (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 294). 
For quantitative researchers to achieve the best approximation, eight threats to internal 
validity, summarised by Campbell and Stanley (1963), should be considered, managed 
and mitigated. These eight threats are presented in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Threats to Internal Validity. 
Threat Example 
1. History—unanticipated events 
occurring while the experiment is in 
progress that affect the dependent 
variable 
During a relatively short instructional 
experiment, one group of subjects 
misses instruction because of a power 
failure at the school 
2. Maturation—processes operating 
within the subject as a function of 
time 
In a learning experiment, subject 
performance begins decreasing after 
about 50 minutes because of fatigue 
3. Testing—the effect of taking one test 
on the scores of a subsequent test 
In an experiment with the dependent 
variable of performance on a logical 
reasoning test, a pre-test cues the 
subjects about the post-test 
4. Instrumentation—an effect because 
of inconsistent use of the measuring 
instruments 
Two examiners in an instructional 
experiment administer the post-test 
with different instructions and 
procedures 
5. Statistical regression—an effect 
caused by a tendency for subjects 
selected based on extreme scores to 
regress towards an average 
performance on a subsequent test 
In an experiment involving reading 
instruction, subjects grouped because 
of poor pre-test reading scores show 
considerably greater gains than the 
average and high readers 
6. Selection—an effect because of the 
groups of subjects not being 
randomly assigned to groups; a 
selection factor is operating such that 
the groups are not equivalent 
The experimental group in an 
instructional experiment consists of a 
high-ability class, while the control 
group is an average-ability class 
7. Mortality—an effect because of 
subjects dropping out of the 
experiment on a non-random basis 
In a health experiment designed to 
determine the effects of various 
exercises, those subjects finding 
exercise most difficult stop 
participating 
8. Selection–maturation interaction—an 
effect of maturation not being 
consistent across the groups because 
of some selection factor 
In a problem-solving experiment, 
intact groups of junior and senior high 
school students are involved, and the 
junior students tire of the task sooner 
than the older students 
Source: adapted from Wiersma and Jurs (2009, p. 141). 
 
 
The present study used a short online survey to gather the required data. When the 
survey was designed and reviewed careful consideration was given to ensure that no 
threat listed in Table 6.2 adversely influenced the survey findings. For instance, all 
participants were presented with the same survey questions (to satisfy 
‘instrumentation’ in table 6.2) and the participants in the survey varied in terms of 
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their involvement in general aviation (to satisfy ‘selection’ in table 6.2). Further, the 
online survey was relatively short (maturation) and participants were able to save parts 
of their responses and complete the rest later (history).  
 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the second question that quantitative 
researchers should ask themselves to satisfy the assessment criterion for 
trustworthiness and to ensure ‘applicability’ is: ‘How can one determine the extent to 
which the findings of a particular inquiry have applicability in other contexts or with 
other subjects (respondents)?’ (p. 290). This assessment criterion for trustworthiness 
is more commonly known as external validity in quantitative research, and refers to 
generalisation of the research findings to a large population (Neuman, 2011). It is 
noteworthy that there is an inverse relationship between internal validity and external 
validity. If a study is designed for stronger internal validity, then external validity 
would be weaker, and vice versa. Therefore, there should be an optimum balance 
between these two types of validity. Quantitative researchers aim for their findings to 
be comparable and transferable (Wiersma & Jurs, 2009). To achieve this, four threats 
should be considered, managed and mitigated, as summarised by Campbell and 
Stanley (1963). These four threats are presented in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3 Threats to External Validity. 
Threat Example 
1. Interaction effect of testing—
pretesting interacts with the 
experimental treatment and causes 
some effect, such that the results will 
not generalise to an un-pretested 
population 
In a physical performance experiment, 
the pre-test cues the subjects to 
respond in a certain way to the 
experimental treatment that would not 
be the case if there were no pre-test 
2. Interaction effects of selection biases 
and the experimental treatment—an 
effect of some selection factor of 
intact groups interacting with the 
experimental treatment that would 
not be the case if the groups were 
formed randomly 
The results of an experiment in which 
teaching method is the experimental 
treatment is effective with low 
achievers, yet not as effective with 
high achievers 
3. Reactive effects of experimental 
arrangements—an effect that is due 
to the artificial or novel experimental 
settings (note that this can also 
threaten internal validity) 
An experiment in remedial reading 
instruction has an effect that does not 
occur when the remedial reading 
program is implemented in the regular 
classroom 
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4. Multiple-treatment interference—
when the same subjects receive two 
or more treatments (as in a repeated 
measure design), there may be a 
carryover effect between treatments, 
such that the results cannot be 
generalised to single treatments 
In a drug experiment, the same animals 
are administered four different drug 
doses in some sequence; the effects of 
the second and fourth doses cannot be 
separated from possible (delayed) 
effects of the preceding doses 
Source: Adapted from Wiersma and Jurs (2009, p. 141). 
 
Again, this study used an online survey and carefully examined each threat to ensure 
they did not appear to adversely affect the external validity of the findings from the 
online survey. For instance, a closer examination of the survey response data showed 
no multiple attempts (satisfying multiple-treatment interface in table 6.3). Further, the 
participants in the survey varied in terms of their involvement in general aviation 
(interaction effects of selection biases and the experimental treatment). 
 
The third question that Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested for quantitative researchers 
to consider to ensure consistent research and findings is: ‘How can one determine 
whether the findings of an inquiry would be repeated if the inquiry were replicated 
with the same (or similar) subjects (respondents) in the same (or similar) context?’ (p. 
290). This assessment criterion for trustworthiness refers to reliability in quantitative 
research. It suggests that, if an experiment is repeated over and over under the same 
(or very similar) conditions, the results will be the same (or very similar). Neuman 
(2011) offered four ways to improve reliability: clearly conceptualise constructs, use 
a precise level of measurement, use multiple indicators and use pilot tests. 
 
The first way to improve reliability—clearly conceptualise constructs—refers to 
developing clear and specific theoretical definitions, so that each measure indicates 
one concept (Neuman, 2011). For instance, measuring a quantity of red paint in a glass 
beaker is more reliable than attempting to measure a quantity of red paint that is mixed 
with blue paint in the same glass beaker. The current study’s survey questions were 
based on the themes identified in the previous study, and each question was worded 
in a way that specifically addressed one particular theme only. The appropriateness of 
the survey questions was reviewed by two of the researcher’s supervisors. In addition, 
the questions were peer-reviewed by a PhD candidate who was independent from this 
study. 
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The second way to increase reliability—use of a precise level of measurement—refers 
to an idea that the higher the level of measurement, the more accurate and reliable the 
measurement will be (Neuman, 2011). Using the glass beaker example again, a glass 
beaker with 10 mm increments will measure a quantity of red paint more accurately, 
and so the measures will be more reliable, than a glass beaker with 10 cm increments. 
Surveys typically collect ordinal data using Likert scales with various numerical scales 
(e.g., five- and seven-point scales). The online survey used in this study adopted a 
five-point Likert scale because Dawes (2008) found that there were no significant 
variances in data characteristics from five-, seven- or 10-point scaled surveys, yet five-
point scales provided better quality data than did seven-point scales (Revilla, Saris, & 
Krosnick, 2013). 
 
The third way to enhance the level of reliability—using multiple indicators—
encourages researchers to collect several measures for a construct under investigation, 
so that hypothesis testing and its interpretations are more dependable and consistent 
through triangulation of measures (Newman, 2011). For instance, Koglbauer, Kallus, 
Braunstingl and Boucsein (2011) measured several dependent measures such as 
instructor ratings of participant’s performance, subjective workload using a German 
version of the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) and physiological measures (e.g., 
chest electrocardiogram [ECG] and electrodermal activity [EDA]) to test training 
effects of anticipation-based training in real and simulated flight. The present study is 
a quantitative (second) phase of sequential mixed methods research (exploratory 
sequential design) that collects responses from the survey questions based on findings 
from a qualitative (first) phase of research. Therefore, this research design is expected 
to further enhance the level of reliability of the findings by analysing both quantitative 
and qualitative data. 
 
The fourth way to increase the level of reliability—use of pilot tests—involves 
developing one or more preliminary versions and testing these before applying the 
final version for data collection and analysis (Neuman, 2011). This process is time 
consuming, yet can save time and effort in the long term, as the final version is more 
reliable and researchers can have more confidence in their findings. In the current 
research, the use of an exploratory study (Study 1) and the qualitative (first) phase of 
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sequential research design (Study 2) were deemed to satisfy the increased level of 
reliability. 
 
The final question that Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested when considering 
assessment criteria is: ‘How can one establish the degree to which the findings of an 
inquiry are determined by the subjects (respondents) and conditions of the inquiry and 
not by the biases, motivations, interests, or perspectives of the inquirer?’ (p. 290). This 
assessment criterion for ‘trustworthiness’ refers to objectivity in quantitative research. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) offered two criteria to ensure objectivity: establishing 
intersubjective agreement and adopting appropriate methodology and methods. The 
former is based on the notion that, if multiple observers agree on a certain phenomenon, 
their shared view will be claimed to be objective (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In the case 
of the latter, the objectivity of the research may be compromised if inappropriate or 
lax methodology and methods are used that may introduce unplanned bias and 
preconceived results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). It is generally accepted that, if the first 
three criteria (internal and external validity and reliability) are appropriately addressed, 
then objectivity is naturally ensured. 
 
6.2.3 Participants.  
 
A total of 102 participants completed this study’s online survey. However, five 
participants indicated that they did not primarily fly VH-registered aircraft10, which 
suggested that their involvement in general aviation was in recreational aviation. 
Given that TEM was not formally introduced by CASA in the recreational aviation 
sector, these five responses were excluded from analysis. Therefore, a total of 97 
responses were analysed for this study. Table 6.4 presents a summary of the 
participants’ demographic information. 
 
 
  
                                               10	Aircraft registered in Australia start with ‘VH’ which is the nationality mark allocated to Australia. 
However, aircraft registered under Recreational Aviation Australia (RA-Aus) do not have ‘VH’ in 
their registration number. 
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Table 6.4 Demographic Information of Participants. 
Demographic features Frequency Per cent 
Involvement in general aviation   
• Private operation 14 14.4 
• Flight training 39 40.2 
• Agricultural 9 9.3 
• Small charter operation 13 13.4 
• Other11 22 22.7 
Actively flying before TEM was mandated in July 2009?   
• Yes 79 81.4 
• No 18 18.6 
Average flying hours per month   
• Less than 10 hours 23 23.7 
• 10~50 hours 49 50.5 
• 51~100 hours 20 20.6 
• More than 100 hours 5 5.2 
Highest CASA licence hold/have held   
• No licence (student pilot) 2 2.1 
• PPL 11 11.3 
• CPL 52 53.6 
• ATPL 32 33 
Holder of a FI rating?   
• Yes 46 47.4 
• No 51 52.6 
Holder of a FE rating?   
• Yes 30 30.9 
• No 67 69.1 
 
 
6.2.4 Materials.  
 
The main part of the survey contained a number of questions based on the four themes 
identified in Study 2. Impracticality was the first theme that arose from the thematic 
analysis in Study 2. General aviation is primarily a vocationally based industry; thus, 
it is important to consider practical aspects when new initiatives are proposed and 
implemented in general aviation, such as mandating TEM. However, all participants 
from Study 2 expressed concerns about a lack of practicality in terms of understanding 
the concept of TEM and implementing TEM in practice, whether in daily routine 
                                               
11 The majority of others encompassed Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS)pilots, mustering pilots, 
rescue pilots and firefighting pilots. 
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flying or flight training. The six questions in Table 6.5 were formulated to verify and 
generalise the first theme. 
 
Table 6.5 Six Questions on Impracticality. 
Themes Questions 
Impracticality 
1. CASA has appropriately translated TEM concepts into practical 
guidance to general aviation. 
2. There are adequate practical examples relating to TEM 
principles and concepts for general aviation. 
3. When it comes to flying operations within general aviation, 
CASA places greater emphasis on the theoretical aspects of 
flying than the practical aspects. 
4. Senior executives and decision makers within CASA have a 
good understanding of how general aviation operates. 
5. I find it easy to keep up to date with changes to aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. 
6. I am satisfied with the way CASA develops aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. 
 
 
Lack of guidance and support was the second theme that arose from the thematic 
analysis in Study 2. All participants in Study 2 agreed that there was inadequate 
guidance provided by CASA when TEM was implemented in Australian general 
aviation. The six questions in Table 6.6 were formulated to verify and generalise the 
second theme. 
 
Table 6.6 Six Questions on Lack of Guidance and Support. 
Themes Questions 
Lack of support 
and guidance 
1. CASA provides adequate training and guidance material on 
TEM training for general aviation. 
2. The concept of TEM is easy to understand. 
3. CASA explains TEM and how it affects my role and/or 
activities in a clear and succinct manner. 
4. I regularly attend CASA-organised safety seminars (e.g., 
AvSafety) to keep up to date with the latest aviation safety 
initiatives. 
5. I find it useful to attend seminars, such as AvSafety and/or 
others organised by CASA. 
6. I find the number of safety-related publications and 
resources from CASA useful. 
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TEM implementation was the third theme that arose from the thematic analysis in 
Study 2. All participants in Study 2 shared their observations and experience that TEM 
implementation in general aviation was poor. The six questions in Table 6.7 were 
formulated to verify and generalise the third theme. 
 
Table 6.7 Six Questions on TEM Implementation. 
Themes Questions 
Poor 
implementation 
1. CASA consults with all relevant stakeholders when 
developing and/or reforming aviation safety initiatives, such 
as TEM. 
2. CASA aviation safety advisors have a consistent 
understanding of TEM principles. 
3. I am satisfied with the way CASA implements new aviation 
safety regulations/initiatives. 
4. The number of CASA staff with appropriate expertise in TEM 
is adequate. 
5. CASA maintains an effective ongoing dialogue with the 
general aviation industry. 
6. CASA explains new safety regulations/initiatives and how 
they affect the general aviation industry in a clear and succinct 
manner. 
 
TEM in practice was the fourth theme that arose from the thematic analysis in Study 
2. The findings from Study 2 suggested that poor TEM implementation, as well as 
impracticality and lack of guidance and support, had adversely affected the way TEM 
was taught and practised in Australian general aviation. The six questions in Table 6.8 
were formulated to verify and generalise the fourth theme. 
 
Table 6.8 Six Questions on TEM in Practice. 
Themes Questions 
TEM in 
practice 
1. I use TEM principles when I am undertaking flying activities. 
2. I have a clear understanding of what I need to do when applying TEM 
principles. 
3. Consideration of TEM is an important part of my flight preparation. 
4. I always perform a series of briefings (e.g., emergency and take-off 
briefings), taking into account the prevailing conditions and 
situations. 
5. I find TEM briefings an unnecessary additional task. 
6. I can see the value in TEM when I am undertaking flying activities. 
 
In addition to the questions for the main themes, there were two additional questions, 
as well as group-specific questions, based on various comments from the participants 
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in Study 2. The list of these additional questions is presented in Table 6.9. The group-
specific questions were for current or former FEs and FIs. 
 
Table 6.9 Additional and Group-specific Questions. 
Category Questions 
Additional 
questions 
1. The benefits of TEM training are overrated. 
2. The use of TEM training/principles should be expanded to other 
sectors, such as recreational aviation and RPAS sectors. 
FEs 
1. CASA provided adequate guidance to examiners before TEM 
became a mandatory flight test item. 
2. During flight tests, assessment of TEM is standardised among 
FEs. 
3. During flight tests, candidates verbalise their briefings (e.g., 
emergency briefing) without implementing conscientious 
thought. 
FIs 
1. During instructional flights, my students verbalise their 
briefings (e.g., emergency briefing) without implementing 
conscientious thought. 
2. I find the CASA’s FI manual useful. 
3. I have a clear understanding of what I need to do when teaching 
TEM principles to my students. 
4. My organisation provides adequate mentoring opportunities for 
junior FIs. 
 
All the above survey questions had five response options: strongly disagree, disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree, agree and strongly agree. For the purpose of statistical 
analysis, numerical values were assigned to each of the potential responses as follows: 
‘strongly disagree’ = 1, ‘disagree’ = 2, ‘neither agree nor disagree’ = 3, ‘agree’ = 4 
and ‘strongly agree’ = 5. 
 
6.2.5 Procedure.  
 
An email invitation with a web link for the online survey was sent to organisations 
that were listed on the Aeroclub directory website 
(www.aeroclub.com.au/directory/flying-clubs), where directory tags contained 
‘Aeroclub’ and ‘aeroplane’ and/or ‘helicopter’. In addition, the same email invitation 
was sent to CASA-approved FEs found on the CASA website. Personal contacts on 
Facebook and LinkedIn were also used to increase the number of participations. 
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The front page of the survey contained participant information, and stated the purpose 
of the survey, expected benefits of the survey, risk of involvement in the survey, and 
privacy and confidentiality issues (Appendix 9). The survey used an implied consent 
method to obtain consent from the participants, whereby submission of the completed 
survey was an indication of consent to participate in the study. No remuneration was 
offered as an incentive to participate in the survey. Given that this study was 
considered to involve the minimal level of risk and ethical issues, in accordance with 
the National Statement of Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans, the online 
Expedited Ethical Review Checklist was completed when applying for ethics approval. 
Acknowledgement of ethics approval is presented in Appendix 10. 
 
6.2.6 Hypotheses.  
 
Based on the findings from Studies 1 and 2, the following hypotheses were tested in 
this study: 
 
H1:  Survey participants were more in agreement that TEM lacks practicality. 
H2:  Survey participants were more in agreement that there was a lack of   support 
and guidance from CASA. 
H3:  Survey participants were more in agreement that TEM implementation in 
Australian general aviation was poor. 
H4:  Survey participants were more in agreement that TEM was poorly practised in 
Australian general aviation. 
H5:  Impracticality negatively affected the way TEM was viewed and practised. 
H6:  Impracticality resulted in survey participants’ view of poor TEM 
implementation. 
H7:  Lack of guidance and support from CASA negatively affected the way TEM 
was viewed and practised. 
H8:  Lack of guidance and support from CASA resulted in participants’ view of poor 
TEM implementation. 
H9:  Poor TEM implementation mediated the effect of impracticality on the way 
TEM was viewed and practised. 
H10:  Poor TEM implementation mediated the effect of lack of guidance and support 
from CASA on the way TEM was viewed and practised. 
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6.3 Results 
 
Statistical analyses in this section were performed in two phases. The first phase was 
a basic level statistical analysis to give the researcher a high-level overview of the 
survey data. The second phase was a more advanced level to provide a holistic view 
of the data and the effects of themes and their interrelationships on the way TEM was 
viewed, taught and practised. 
 
6.3.1 Results (first phase).  
 
SPSS (Version 25 for Apple Macintosh computers) was used with the level of 
significance, alpha, set to be p < .05 for all statistical analyses. The results were 
presented in a combination of descriptive and inferential statistics.  
 
6.3.1.1 Theme 1: Impracticality.  
 
All five participants from Study 2 expressed concerns of a lack of practicality in terms 
of understanding the concept of TEM and implementing it in practice, whether in daily 
routine flying or flight training. To test whether this view was supported by the survey 
participants in this study, both descriptive and inferential statistics are provided below. 
For inferential statistics, a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test with a hypothesised 
median of 3 (neither agree nor disagree) was performed for each of the six questions 
for the first theme—impracticality. This was undertaken to compare the mean score 
for each of the six questions with the mean score of the scale of 3. In addition, a Mann-
Whitney test was performed for each of the six questions to determine whether there 
were statistical differences in responses between: (i) the survey participants who were 
actively flying before TEM was introduced in 2009 and the survey participants who 
were not; (ii) the survey participants who held or had held a FI rating and the non-FI 
rating holders; and (iii) the survey participants who held or had held a FE rating and 
the non-FE rating holders. A Kruskal-Wallis test was also performed for each of the 
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six questions to determine whether there were statistical differences in the responses 
among survey participants with different flying licences12 (PPL, CPL and ATPL). 
 
For the first question on impracticality, a total of 63 (64.9%) survey participants 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that CASA had appropriately translated TEM concepts 
into practical guidance for general aviation (Figure 6.1). The result from the one-
sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was statistically significant (p < .001), thereby 
suggesting that a statistically significant number of survey participants disagreed that 
CASA had appropriately translated TEM concepts into practical guidance for general 
aviation. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Responses to the first question to test impracticality. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between survey participants who were actively flying before 
TEM was formally introduced in 2009 (pre-TEM) and those who were not (post-TEM). 
The result showed that the pre-TEM group did not significantly differ from the post-
TEM group in their responses (U = 885.5, z = 1.7, p = .09, r = .17), thereby suggesting 
that both groups shared a similar view that CASA did not appropriately translate TEM 
concepts into practical guidance for general aviation. 
 
                                               
12 Student pilots were excluded from the analysis because there were only two students involved, and 
their level and length of involvement in general aviation may not have been sufficiently lengthy to 
gauge meaningful insights. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the survey participants who held or had held 
a FI rating (FI) and those who did not (non-FI). The result again showed that the FI 
group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their responses (U = 1,098, 
z = ˗.57, p = .57, r = ˗.02), thereby suggesting that both groups shared similar opinions 
that CASA did not appropriately translate TEM concepts into practical guidance for 
general aviation. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the survey participants who held or had held 
a FE rating (FE) and those who did not (non-FE). The result again showed that the FE 
group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their responses (U = 991, 
z = ˗.12, p = .91, r = ˗.01), thereby suggesting that both groups were more in 
disagreement that CASA had appropriately translated TEM concepts into practical 
guidance for general aviation. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the survey participants with different flying licences 
(PPL, CPL and ATPL). The result from the test suggested that the overall responses 
for Question 1 varied according to groups: H(2) = 7.94, p = .02. A post hoc pairwise 
comparison with adjusted p-values showed no significant differences between CPL 
and ATPL holders (p = 1.00, r = ˗.05) and between PPL and ATPL holders (p = .06, r 
=. 24). However, there was a significant difference in the overall responses between 
PPL and CPL holders (p = .02, r = ˗.29), thereby suggesting that a relatively greater 
number of CPL holders did not agree that CASA had appropriately translated TEM 
concepts into practical guidance for general aviation. 
 
For the second question on impracticality, a total of 52 (53.6%) participants strongly 
disagreed or disagreed that there were adequate practical examples relating to TEM 
principles and concepts for general aviation (Figure 6.2). The result from the one-
sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was again statistically significant (p < .001), thereby 
suggesting that relatively more participants disagreed that there were adequate 
practical examples relating to TEM principles and concepts for general aviation. 
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Figure 6.2. Responses to the second question to test impracticality. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
indicated that the pre-TEM group did not significantly differ from the post-TEM group 
in their responses (U = 712.5, z = .02, p = .99, r = .00), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared a similar view that there were not adequate practical examples relating 
to TEM principles and concepts for general aviation. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,039.5, z = ˗1.01, p = .32, r = ˗.10), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared similar opinions that there were not adequate practical examples 
relating to TEM principles and concepts for general aviation. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 908, z = ˗.79, p = .43, r = ˗.08), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that there were not adequate practical examples relating to 
TEM principles and concepts for general aviation. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 2 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 2.78, p = .25), thereby suggesting that all three groups shared a similar 
view that there were not adequate practical examples relating to TEM principles and 
concepts for general aviation. 
 
For the third question on impracticality, a total of 71 (73.2%) survey participants 
agreed or strongly agreed that CASA placed greater emphasis on the theoretical 
aspects of flying than the practical aspects (Figure 6.3). The result from the one-
sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was again statistically significant (p < .001), thereby 
suggesting that the participants were more in disagreement that CASA placed greater 
emphasis on the practical aspects of flying in terms of flying operations in general 
aviation. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Responses to the third question to test impracticality. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group did not significantly differ from the post-TEM group 
in their responses (U = 746.5, z = .35, p = .73, r = .04), thereby suggesting that both 
groups were more in agreement that, instead of practical aspects, CASA placed greater 
emphasis on the theoretical aspects of flying in terms of flying operations in general 
aviation. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,359.5, z = 1.42, p = .16, r = .14), thereby suggesting that both groups 
shared a similar view that CASA placed greater emphasis on the theoretical aspects of 
flying in terms of flying operations in general aviation. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 1,120, z = .95, p = .34, r = .10), thereby suggesting that both groups 
shared similar opinions that CASA placed greater emphasis on the theoretical aspects 
of flying in terms of flying operations in general aviation. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 3 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 4.65, p = .10), thereby suggesting that all three groups were more in 
agreement that CASA placed greater emphasis on the theoretical aspects of flying in 
terms of flying operations in general aviation. 
 
For the fourth question on impracticality, a total of 86 (88.7%) survey participants 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that senior executives and decision makers in the 
CASA had a good understanding of how general aviation operated (Figure 6.4). The 
result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was again statistically 
significant (p < .001), thereby suggesting that participants were more in disagreement 
that senior executives and decision makers within CASA had a good understanding of 
how general aviation operated. 
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Figure 6.4. Responses to the fourth question to test impracticality. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group did not significantly differ from the post-TEM group 
in their responses (U = 854, z = 1.48, p = .14, r = .15), thereby suggesting that both 
groups were more in agreement that senior executives and decision makers in CASA 
had a poor understanding of how general aviation operated. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,172, z = ˗.01, p = .99, r = .00), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that senior executives and decision makers in CASA had a 
poor understanding of how general aviation operated. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 937, z = ˗.59, p = .56, r = ˗.06), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that senior executives and decision makers in CASA had a 
poor understanding of how general aviation operated. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 4 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 2.13, p = .35), thereby suggesting that all three groups were more in 
agreement that senior executives and decision makers within CASA had a poor 
understanding of how general aviation operated. 
 
For the fifth question on impracticality, a total of 65 (67%) survey participants 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that they found it easy to keep up to date with changes 
to aviation safety regulations/initiatives (Figure 6.5). The result from the one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed rank test was again statistically significant (p < .001), thereby 
suggesting that participants were more in agreement that it was difficult to keep up to 
date with changes to aviation safety regulations/initiatives. 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Responses to the fifth question to test impracticality. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group were significantly different from the post-TEM group 
in their responses (U = 963, z = 2.45, p = .01, r = .25), thereby suggesting that the pre-
TEM group had relatively more difficulty in keeping up to date with the changes to 
aviation safety regulations/initiatives than the post-TEM group. The majority of the 
pre-TEM group either held or had held CPL (n = 39) or ATPL (n = 32). 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,123.5, z = .38, p = .71, r = .04), thereby suggesting that both groups 
similarly had difficulties keeping up to date with the changes to aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 842.5, z = ˗1.33, p = .18, r = ˗.14), thereby suggesting that both groups 
similarly had difficulties keeping up to date with the changes to aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that overall responses for Question 5 did not vary according to groups 
(H(2) = 3.36, p = .19), thereby suggesting that all three groups were more in agreement 
that keeping up to date with the changes to aviation safety regulations/initiatives was 
difficult. 
 
For the sixth question on impracticality, a total of 74 (76.3%) survey participants 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that they were satisfied with the way CASA developed 
aviation safety regulations/initiatives (Figure 6.6). The result from the one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed rank test was again statistically significant (p < .001), thereby 
suggesting that relatively more participants were dissatisfied with the way CASA 
developed aviation safety regulations/initiatives. 
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Figure 6.6. Responses to the sixth question to test impracticality. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group were significantly different from the post-TEM group 
in their responses (U = 962, z = 2.48, p = .01, r = .25), suggesting that the pre-TEM 
group were more dissatisfied with the way CASA developed aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives than the post-TEM group.  
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,105, z = ˗.52, p = .60, r = ˗.05), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more dissatisfied with the way CASA developed aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 874.5, z = ˗1.08, p = .28, r = ˗.11), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more dissatisfied with the way CASA developed aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 6 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 5.28, p = .07), thereby suggesting that all three groups were more 
dissatisfied with the way CASA developed aviation safety regulations/initiatives. 
 
Statistical analysis of the six questions on impracticality was performed using both 
descriptive and inferential statistics. The overall results supported the findings from 
Study 2, where all five participants expressed concerns regarding a lack of practicality 
in terms of understanding the concept of TEM and implementing TEM in practice, 
whether in daily routine flying or flight training. The results also supported the first 
hypothesis, with survey participants more in agreement that TEM lacked practicality. 
Impracticality would have high correlation with the way the survey participants 
viewed the level of guidance and support provided by CASA before and after TEM 
was implemented. Its analysis and results are presented in the next section.  
 
6.3.1.2 Theme 2: Lack of guidance and support.  
 
All participants from Study 2 were in agreement that there was not adequate guidance 
and support provided by CASA when TEM was implemented in Australian general 
aviation. Similarly, a finding from Study 1 indicated that participants’ response was 
neutral (M = 3.44, SD = 1.25) when asked to rate whether CASA produced adequate 
training and guidance materials on TEM training for general aviation. To test whether 
these findings were supported by the survey participants in this study, both descriptive 
and inferential statistics were generated for each survey question, and the results are 
presented below. 
 
For the first question on the lack of guidance and support, a total of 62 (63.9%) survey 
participants disagreed or strongly disagreed that CASA provided adequate training 
and guidance material on TEM training for general aviation (Figure 6.7). The result 
from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was statistically significant (p < .001), 
thereby suggesting that a large number of participants disagreed that CASA provided 
adequate training and guidance material on TEM training for general aviation. 
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Figure 6.7. Responses to the first question to test lack of guidance and support. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group did not significantly differ from the post-TEM group 
in their responses (U = 863, z = 1.49, p = .14, r = .15), thereby suggesting that both 
groups were more in agreement that CASA did not provide adequate training and 
guidance material on TEM training for general aviation. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,114, z = ˗.45, p = .65, r = ˗.05), thereby suggesting that both groups 
shared a similar view that CASA did not provide adequate training and guidance 
material on TEM training for general aviation. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 944, z = ˗.50, p = .62, r = ˗.05), thereby suggesting that both groups 
had similar opinions that CASA did not provide adequate training and guidance 
material on TEM training for general aviation. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that overall responses for Question 1 did not vary according to groups 
(H(2) = .52, p = .77), thereby suggesting that all three groups shared a similar view 
that CASA did not provide adequate training and guidance material on TEM training 
for general aviation. 
 
For the second question on the lack of guidance and support, a total of 51 (52.6%) 
survey participants disagreed or strongly disagreed that the concept of TEM was easy 
to understand (Figure 6.8). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test 
was again statistically significant (p < .001), thereby suggesting that a large number 
of participants disagreed that the concept of TEM was easy to understand, and this 
would have been contributed to by the lack of guidance and support from CASA. 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Responses to the second question to test lack of guidance and support. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group did not significantly differ from the post-TEM group 
in their responses (U = 729, z = .17, p = .86, r = .02), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared a similar view that the concept of TEM was not easy to understand. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
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showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,061, z = ˗.83, p = .40, r = ˗.08), thereby suggesting that both groups 
had similar opinions that the concept of TEM was difficult to understand. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 1,022.5, z = .14, p = .88, r = .01), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that the concept of TEM was not easy to understand. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that overall responses for Question 2 did not vary according to groups 
(H(2) = 2.16, p = .34), thereby suggesting that all three groups shared a similar view 
that the concept of TEM was difficult to understand. 
 
For the third question on the lack of guidance and support, a total of 71 (73.2%) survey 
participants disagreed or strongly disagreed that CASA explained TEM and the ways 
it affected participants’ role and/or activities in a clear and succinct manner (Figure 
6.9). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was again statistically 
significant (p < .001), thereby suggesting that a large number of participants disagreed 
that CASA explained TEM and the way it affected participants’ role and/or activities 
in a clear and succinct manner. 
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Figure 6.9. Responses to the third question to test lack of guidance and support. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 905, z = .1.96, p = .05, r = .20), thereby suggesting that 
both groups shared a similar view regarding whether CASA explained TEM and the 
way it affected their role and/or activities in a clear and succinct manner. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,108, z = ˗.51, p = .61, r = ˗.05), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that CASA did not explain TEM and the way it affected their 
role and/or activities in a clear and succinct manner. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group did not significantly differ from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 1,088.5, z = .71, p = .48, r = .07), thereby suggesting that both groups 
had similar opinions that CASA did not explain TEM and the way it affected their role 
and/or activities in a clear and succinct manner. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 3 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 1.13, p = .57), thereby suggesting that all three groups shared a similar 
view that CASA did not explain TEM and the way it affected their role and/or 
activities in a clear and succinct manner. 
 
For the fourth question on lack of guidance and support, less than half of the survey 
participants (40.2%) did not regularly attend CASA-organised safety seminars (e.g., 
AvSafety) to keep up to date with the latest aviation safety initiatives (Figure 6.10). 
The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was not statistically 
significant (p = .535), thereby suggesting mixed views among the survey participants 
on regular attendance at CASA-organised safety seminars (e.g., AvSafety) to keep up 
to date with the latest aviation safety initiatives. 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Responses to the fourth question to test lack of guidance and support. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 669.5, z = ˗.40, p = .69, r = ˗.04), thereby suggesting that 
both groups shared mixed views on attendance at CASA-organised safety seminars 
(e.g., AvSafety) to keep up to date with the latest aviation safety initiatives. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 971, z = ˗.1.5, p = .13, r = ˗.15), thereby suggesting that both groups 
had mixed opinions on attendance at CASA-organised safety seminars (e.g., AvSafety) 
to keep up to date with the latest aviation safety initiatives. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result 
showed that the FE group was significantly different from the non-FE group in their 
responses (U = 667.5, z = ˗2.71, p = .007, r = ˗.28), thereby suggesting that a 
statistically significant number of participants from the non-FE group did not regularly 
attend CASA-organised safety seminars (e.g., AvSafety) to keep up to date with the 
latest aviation safety initiatives. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 4 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 1.55, p = .46), thereby suggesting that all three groups shared mixed 
views on attendance at CASA-organised safety seminars (e.g., AvSafety) to keep up 
to date with the latest aviation safety initiatives. 
 
For the fifth question on the lack of guidance and support, less than half of the survey 
participants (23.7%) did not consider it useful to attend seminars, such as AvSafety 
and/or others, organised by CASA, while 32% of participants answered the question 
with neutral responses (Figure 6.11). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed 
rank test was again not statistically significant (p = .098), showing mixed views on the 
usefulness of CASA-organised seminars, such as AvSafety. 
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Figure 6.11. Responses to the fifth question to test the lack of guidance and support. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 774.5, z = .62, p = .54, r = .06), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly shared mixed views on the usefulness of attendance at CASA-
organised seminars, such as AvSafety. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,118.5, z = ˗.41, p = .68, r = .06), thereby suggesting that both groups 
again shared varied views on the usefulness of attendance at CASA-organised 
seminars, such as AvSafety. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 1,022, z = .14, p = .89, r = .01), thereby suggesting that both 
groups again similarly shared mixed views on the usefulness of attendance at CASA-
organised seminars, such as AvSafety. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 5 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 3.4, p = .14), thereby suggesting that all three groups similarly shared 
mixed views on the usefulness of attendance at CASA-organised seminars, such as 
AvSafety. 
 
For the sixth question on lack of guidance and support, less than half of the survey 
participants (32%) did not consider the number of safety-related publications and 
resources from CASA useful, and a similar number of participants were neutral about 
this question, while a slightly greater number of participants indicated agreement 
(Figure 6.12). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was again 
not statistically significant (p = .523), showing mixed views on the usefulness of 
safety-related publications and resources from CASA. 
 
 
Figure 6.12. Responses to the sixth question to test the lack of guidance and support. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 832.5, z = 1.18, p = .24, r = .12), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly shared mixed views on the usefulness of safety-related 
publications and resources from CASA. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,127.5, z = ˗ .34, p = .73, r = ˗.03), thereby suggesting that both groups 
had mixed opinions on the usefulness of safety-related publications and resources 
from CASA. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 933, z = ˗.59, p = .56, r = ˗.06), thereby suggesting that both 
groups similarly shared mixed views on the usefulness of safety-related publications 
and resources from CASA. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 6 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 1.09, p = .58), thereby suggesting that all three groups had mixed 
opinions on the usefulness of safety-related publications and resources from the CASA. 
 
Analyses of six questions on the lack of guidance and support were undertaken using 
both descriptive and inferential statistics. The overall results partially supported the 
findings from Study 2, where all five participants were more in agreement that there 
was not adequate guidance provided by CASA when TEM was implemented in 
Australian general aviation. While the results from the first three questions supported 
the hypothesis, the other three questions did not support the hypothesis. Therefore, the 
results partially supported the second hypothesis, with survey participants more in 
agreement that there was a lack of guidance and support provided by CASA.  
 
Impracticality and the lack of support and guidance from CASA would have high 
correlation with the way the survey participants viewed TEM implementation. The 
TEM implementation analyses and results are presented in the next section. 
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6.3.1.3 Theme 3: Threat and error management implementation.  
 
All participants from Study 2 shared similar views that TEM implementation was poor. 
To verify whether this was supported by the survey participants in this study, both 
descriptive and inferential statistics were generated for each survey question, and the 
results are presented below. 
 
For the first question on TEM implementation, a total of 79 (81.4%) survey 
participants disagreed or strongly disagreed that CASA consulted with all relevant 
stakeholders when developing and/or reforming aviation safety initiatives, such as 
TEM (Figure 6.13). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was 
statistically significant (p < .001), suggesting that the majority of survey participants 
did not agree that CASA consulted with all relevant stakeholders when developing 
and/or reforming aviation safety initiatives, such as TEM. 
 
 
Figure 6.13. Responses to the first question on TEM implementation. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was significantly different from the post-TEM group 
in their responses (U = 1,001, z = 2.9, p = .004, r = .29), thereby suggesting that 
relatively more participants in the pre-TEM group disagreed that CASA consulted 
with all relevant stakeholders when developing and/or reforming aviation safety 
initiatives, such as TEM. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,104.5, z = ˗.53, p = .59, r = ˗.05), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that CASA did not consult with all relevant stakeholders 
when developing and/or reforming aviation safety initiatives, such as TEM. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 974.5, z = ˗.26, p = .80, r = ˗.03), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared a similar view that CASA did not consult with all relevant stakeholders 
when developing and/or reforming aviation safety initiatives, such as TEM. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 1 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 2.14, p = .34), thereby suggesting that all three groups had similar 
opinions that CASA did not consult with all relevant stakeholders when developing 
and/or reforming aviation safety initiatives, such as TEM. 
 
For the second question on TEM implementation, a total of 49 (50.5%) survey 
participants disagreed or strongly disagreed that CASA Aviation Safety Advisors 
(ASAs) had a consistent understanding of TEM principles (Figure 6.14). The result 
from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was again statistically significant 
(p < .001), suggesting that only a small number of survey participants agreed that 
CASA ASAs had a consistent understanding of TEM principles. 
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Figure 6.14. Responses to the second question on TEM implementation. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 829, z = 1.14, p = .25, r = .12), thereby suggesting that 
both groups shared a similar view on the inconsistent understanding of TEM principles 
among CASA ASAs. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 995, z = ˗1.34, p = .18, r = ˗.14), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that CASA ASAs did not have a consistent understanding of 
TEM principles. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 864.4, z = ˗1.14, p = .25, r = ˗.12), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared similar opinions on a consistent understanding of TEM principles 
among CASA ASAs. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 2 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 2.64, p = .27), thereby suggesting that all three groups were more in 
agreement that CASA ASAs did not have a consistent understanding of TEM 
principles. 
 
For the third question on TEM implementation, a total of 78 (80.4%) survey 
participants were not satisfied with the way CASA implemented new aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives (Figure 6.15). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed 
rank test was again statistically significant (p < .001), thereby supporting most survey 
participants’ dissatisfaction with the way CASA implemented new aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. 
 
 
Figure 6.15. Responses to the third question on TEM implementation. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 893.5, z = 1.82, p = .07, r = .18), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly shared dissatisfaction with the way CASA implemented new 
aviation safety regulations/initiatives. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,098, z = ˗.58, p = .56, r = ˗.06), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were similarly dissatisfied with the way CASA implemented new aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 928.5, z = ˗.64, p = .52, r = ˗.06), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared similar dissatisfaction with the way CASA implemented new aviation 
safety regulations/initiatives. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 3 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 4.01, p = .14), thereby suggesting that all three groups were more in 
agreement that the CASA’s approach to implementing new aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives was not satisfactory. 
 
For the fourth question on TEM implementation, only seven (7.2%) survey 
participants agreed that the number of CASA staff with appropriate expertise in TEM 
was adequate (Figure 6.16). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test 
was again statistically significant (p < .001), thereby supporting a large number of 
survey participants’ responses regarding the inadequate number of CASA staff with 
appropriate expertise in TEM. 
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Figure 6.16. Responses to the fourth question on poor TEM implementation. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 799.5, z = .87, p = .38, r = .09), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly considered that the number of CASA staff with appropriate 
expertise in TEM was inadequate. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,255, z = .63, p = .53, r = .06), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that there were inadequate numbers of CASA staff with 
appropriate expertise in TEM.  
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 1,182, z = 1.47, p = .14, r = .15), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared a similar view that the number of CASA staff with appropriate expertise 
in TEM was inadequate. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 4 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 4.29, p = .12), thereby suggesting that all three groups similarly 
considered that greater numbers of CASA staff with appropriate expertise in TEM 
were required. 
 
For the fifth question on TEM implementation, only eight (8.2%) survey participants 
agreed that CASA maintained an effective ongoing dialogue with the general aviation 
industry (Figure 6.17). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was 
again statistically significant (p < .001), thereby suggesting that the majority of survey 
participants disagreed that CASA maintained an effective ongoing dialogue with the 
general aviation industry. 
 
 
Figure 6.17. Responses to the fifth question on TEM implementation. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 835.5, z = 1.25, p = .21, r = .13), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly showed dissatisfaction with CASA not maintaining an effective 
ongoing dialogue with the general aviation industry. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 979.5, z = ˗1.51, p = .13, r = ˗.15), thereby suggesting that both groups 
were more in agreement that CASA did not maintain an effective ongoing dialogue 
with the general aviation industry. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 872, z = ˗1.12, p = .26, r = ˗.11), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared a similar view that CASA did not maintain an effective ongoing 
dialogue with the general aviation industry. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 5 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = .78, p = .68), thereby suggesting that all three groups had similar 
opinions that CASA did not maintain an effective ongoing dialogue with the general 
aviation industry. 
 
For the sixth question on TEM implementation, only five (5.2%) survey participants 
agreed that CASA clearly and succinctly explained new safety regulations/initiatives 
and the way they would affect the general aviation industry (Figure 6.18). The result 
from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was again statistically significant (p 
< .001), suggesting that CASA did not clearly and succinctly explain new safety 
regulations/initiatives and their effects on the general aviation industry. 
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Figure 6.18. Responses to the sixth question on TEM implementation. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 815.5, z = 1.04, p = .30, r = .11), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly disagreed that CASA clearly and succinctly explained new 
safety regulations/initiatives and the way they would affect the general aviation 
industry. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result again 
showed that the FI group did not significantly differ from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,123, z = ˗.39, p = .70, r = ˗.04), thereby suggesting that both groups 
shared a similar view that CASA did not clearly and succinctly explain new safety 
regulations/initiatives and their effects on the general aviation industry. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 966.5, z = ˗.32, p = .75, r = ˗.03), thereby suggesting that both 
groups similarly disagreed that CASA clearly and succinctly explained new safety 
regulations/initiatives and how they affected the general aviation industry. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 6 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 1.39, p = .50), thereby suggesting that all three groups had similar 
opinions regarding whether CASA clearly and succinctly explained new safety 
regulations/initiatives and their effects on the general aviation industry. 
 
Analyses of the six questions on poor implementation were presented using both 
descriptive and inferential statistics. The overall results supported the findings from 
Study 2, where all five participants shared a similar view that the implementation of 
TEM was poor. The result supported the third hypothesis, with survey participants 
more in agreement that TEM implementation in Australian general aviation was poor. 
 
Analyses of the survey questions thus far have suggested that the approach to TEM 
was impractical and there was a lack of guidance and support from CASA. These 
findings, together with the other factors identified, led the survey participants to hold 
negative opinions on TEM implementation, which would likely have negatively 
affected the way TEM was taught and practised. Its analyses and results are presented 
in the next section. 
 
6.3.1.4 Theme 4: Threat and error management in practice.  
 
All participants from Study 2 shared similar views that poor TEM implementation had 
negatively affected the way TEM was taught and practised in Australian general 
aviation. To verify this, both descriptive and inferential statistics were generated for 
each survey question, and the results are presented below. 
 
For the first question on TEM in practice, a total of 57 (58.7%) survey participants 
agreed or strongly agreed that they used TEM principles when they were undertaking 
flying activities (Figure 6.19). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank 
test was statistically significant (p < .001), suggesting that the majority of survey 
participants used TEM principles when undertaking flying activities. This is an 
encouraging finding, despite the consensus among the survey participants about TEM 
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being impractical, lacking guidance and support from CASA, and being poorly 
implemented. 
 
 
Figure 6.19. Responses to the first question on TEM in practice. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 744, z = .33, p = .75, r = .03), thereby suggesting that 
both groups were more in agreement that they used TEM principles when undertaking 
flying activities. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the non-FI group was significantly different from the FI group in their 
responses (U = 884, z = ˗2.22, p = .03, r = ˗.23), thereby suggesting that relatively 
more survey participants from the non-FI group did not use TEM principles when 
undertaking flying activities. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the non-FE group was significantly different from the FE group in their 
responses (U = 755, z = ˗2.08, p = .04, r = ˗.21), thereby suggesting that relatively 
more survey participants from the non-FE group did not use TEM principles when 
undertaking flying activities. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 1 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 1.09, p = .58), thereby suggesting that all three groups were more in 
agreement that they used TEM principles when undertaking flying activities. 
 
For the second question on TEM in practice, a total of 47 (48.4%) survey participants 
agreed or strongly agreed that they had a clear understanding of what they needed to 
do when applying TEM principles (Figure 6.20). The result from the one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed rank test was not statistically significant (p = .249), thereby 
suggesting that there were mixed views on whether the survey participants had a clear 
understanding of what was needed when applying TEM principles. 
 
 
Figure 6.20. Responses to the second question on TEM in practice. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 688, z = ˗.22, p = .82, r = ˗.02), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly had a clear understanding of what was required when applying 
TEM principles. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the non-FI group was significantly different from the FI group in their 
responses (U = 748.5, z = ˗3.19, p = .001, r = ˗.32), thereby suggesting that the non-
FI group was less clear about what was required when applying TEM principles. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the non-FE group was significantly different from the FE group in their 
responses (U = 712, z = ˗2.38, p = .02, r = ˗.24), thereby suggesting that the non-FE 
group was less clear about what was required when applying TEM principles. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 2 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 2.87, p = .24), thereby suggesting that all three groups had a similar 
level of understanding about what was required when applying TEM principles. 
 
For the third question on TEM in practice, a total of 58 (59.8%) survey participants 
agreed or strongly agreed that consideration of TEM was an important part of their 
flight preparation (Figure 6.21). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank 
test was statistically significant (p = .002), suggesting that the majority of survey 
participants considered TEM an important part of their flight preparation. 
 
 
Figure 6.21. Responses to the third question on TEM in practice. 
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The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 771.5, z = .58, p = .56, r = .06), thereby suggesting that 
both groups were more in agreement that consideration of TEM was an important part 
of their flight preparation. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the non-FI group was significantly different from the FI group in their 
responses (U = 862, z = ˗ 2.34, p = .002, r = ˗ .24), thereby suggesting that consideration 
of TEM was a less important part of the non-FI group’s flight preparation. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 815.5, z = ˗1.54, p = .12, r = ˗.16), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared a similar view that consideration of TEM was an important part of their 
flight preparation. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 3 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 3.15, p = .21), thereby suggesting that all three groups were more in 
agreement that an important part of flight preparation was consideration of TEM. 
 
For the fourth question on TEM in practice, a total of 79 (81.5%) survey participants 
agreed or strongly agreed that they always performed a series of briefings (e.g., 
emergency and take-off briefings), taking into account the prevailing conditions and 
situations (Figure 6.22). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test 
supported this (p < .001). 
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Figure 6.22. Responses to the fourth question on TEM in practice. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 601.5, z = ˗1.10, p = .27, r = ˗.11), thereby suggesting 
that both groups similarly considered the prevailing conditions and situations prior to 
performing a series of briefings (e.g., emergency and take-off briefings).  
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the non-FI group was significantly different from the FI group in their 
responses (U = 811.5, z = ˗2.82, p = .005, r = ˗.29), thereby suggesting that the survey 
participants from the non-FI group did not always perform a series of briefings (e.g., 
emergency and take-off briefings) considering the prevailing conditions and situations. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the non-FE group was significantly different from the FE group in their 
responses (U = 653, z = ˗2.97, p = .003, r = ˗.30), thereby suggesting that the non-FE 
group did not always consider the prevailing conditions and situations prior to 
performing a series of briefings (e.g., emergency and take-off briefings). 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 4 varied according to groups 
(H(2) = 10.14, p = .006). A post hoc pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values 
showed that there were no significant differences between the PPL and CPL holders 
(p = 1.00, r = .03) and between the PPL and ATPL holders (p = .23, r =. 18). However, 
there was a significant difference in the overall responses between the CPL and ATPL 
holders (p = .005, r = ˗.32), thereby suggesting that a relatively greater number of CPL 
holders did not always consider the prevailing conditions and situations prior to 
performing a series of briefings (e.g., emergency and take-off briefings). 
 
For the fifth question on TEM in practice, less than half of the survey participants 
(30.9%) strongly agreed or agreed that TEM briefing was an unnecessary additional 
task (Figure 6.23). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test was not 
statistically significant (p = .181), suggesting mixed views on this question among the 
survey participants. 
 
 
Figure 6.23. Responses to the fifth question on TEM in practice. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 660, z = ˗.49, p = .63, r = ˗.05), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly considered TEM briefing an unnecessary additional task. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the FI group was not significantly different from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,396.5, z = 1.66, p = .10, r = ˗ .05), thereby suggesting that both groups 
did not consider TEM briefing an unnecessary additional task. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result again 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 1,217, z = 1.70, p = .09, r = .17), thereby suggesting that both 
groups did not consider TEM briefing an unnecessary additional task. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 5 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 2.31, p = .31), thereby suggesting that all three groups similarly agreed 
that TEM briefing was not considered an unnecessary additional task. 
 
For the sixth question on TEM in practice, a total of 61 (62.9%) survey participants 
saw value in TEM (Figure 6.24) when undertaking flying activities. The result from 
the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test supported this (p < .001). 
 
 
Figure 6.24. Responses to the sixth question on TEM in practice. 
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The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 852.5, z = 1.39, p = .16, r = .14), thereby suggesting that 
both groups similarly saw value in TEM when undertaking flying activities. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the FI group was not significantly different from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 945, z = ˗1.75, p = .08, r = ˗.18), thereby suggesting that both groups 
shared a similar view that TEM was valuable when undertaking flying activities. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result 
showed that the non-FE group was significantly different from the FE group in their 
responses (U = 745.5, z = ˗2.15, p = .03, r = ˗.22), thereby suggesting that the non-FE 
group saw less value in TEM when undertaking flying activities. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 6 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = 2.22, p = .33), thereby suggesting that all three groups shared similar 
views on the value of TEM when undertaking flying activities. 
 
Analyses of six questions on TEM in practice were presented using both descriptive 
and inferential statistics. The overall results partially supported the findings from 
Study 2, where all five participants were more in agreement that there was not 
adequate guidance provided by CASA when TEM was implemented in Australian 
general aviation. The result also partially supported the second hypothesis, with survey 
participants more in agreement that there was a lack of guidance and support provided 
by CASA. While the results from the first three questions supported the hypothesis, 
the other three questions did not support the hypothesis. 
 
 	 182	
A total of 24 questions on the four main themes were analysed. In addition to these 
questions, there were further questions included in the survey. The first two additional 
questions were for all the survey participants, while the remaining questions were 
group specific (three questions for current or former FEs, and four questions for 
current or former FIs). The following two subsections present the results of these 
questions. 
 
6.3.1.5 Additional questions.  
 
The first additional question examined whether the benefits of TEM training were 
overrated, and was included because, when this particular question was asked in Study 
1, the result showed the highest Kruskal-Wallis value by licence type, and mixed 
views on the perceived benefit of TEM training (Lee et al., 2016). The responses from 
the survey participants again indicated mixed views on the benefits of TEM training 
(Figure 6.25), and the result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test supported 
this (p = .702). 
 
 
Figure 6.25. First additional question on the benefits of TEM. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 588, z = ˗1.17, p = .24, r = ˗.12), thereby suggesting that 
both groups shared similar views on the benefits of TEM. 
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Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the non-FI group was significantly different from the FI group in their 
responses (U = 1,453, z = 2.07, p = .04, r = 21), thereby suggesting that the non-FI 
group was more in agreement that the benefits of TEM were overrated. 
 
Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result 
showed that the FE group was not significantly different from the non-FE group in 
their responses (U = 1,139, z = 1.07, p = .29, r = .11), thereby suggesting that both 
groups shared similar views on the benefits of TEM. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for this question did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = .64, p = .73), thereby suggesting that all three groups shared similar 
views on the benefits of TEM. 
 
The second additional question considered whether the use of TEM training/principles 
should be expanded to other sectors, such as recreational aviation and RPAS sectors. 
This question was included because there were mixed comments from the participants 
in Study 2, as follows: 
 
‘Well, my immediate reaction to that would be: why they would be any 
different? I mean, they are operating in the same environment, uh, 
essentially general aviation, the threats are by and large the same, errors 
that people are going to make and management of those … same principles 
are applied.’ (Participant 1) 
 
‘I would … my reaction would be to say, yes, it would be helpful 
everywhere, but I would say the caution to that is, if it’s done the way it’s 
been done under my observation in aviation, general aviation, it would 
just be a distraction.’ (Participant 3) 
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Almost half of the survey participants (49.5%) strongly agreed or agreed that the use 
of TEM training/principles should be expanded to other sectors, such as recreational 
aviation and RPAS sectors (Figure 6.26). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon 
signed rank test indicated mixed views as to whether TEM training/principles should 
be expanded to other sectors, such as recreational aviation and RPAS sectors (p = .110). 
 
 
Figure 6.26. Second additional question on the expansion of TEM to other sectors. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses between the pre-TEM and post-TEM groups. The result 
showed that the pre-TEM group was not significantly different from the post-TEM 
group in their responses (U = 833, z = 1.17, p = .24, r = .12), thereby suggesting that 
both groups shared similar views on the expansion of TEM training/principles to other 
general aviation sectors, such as recreational aviation and RPAS. 
 
Another Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FI and non-FI groups. The result 
showed that the FI group was not significantly different from the non-FI group in their 
responses (U = 914, z = ˗1.92, p = .06, r = ˗.19), thereby suggesting that both groups 
shared similar views on the expansion of TEM training/principles to other general 
aviation sectors. 
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Similarly, the Mann-Whitney test was performed to determine whether there was a 
statistical difference in responses between the FE and non-FE groups. The result 
showed that the non-FE group was significantly different from the FE group in their 
responses (U = 748, z = ˗2.06, p = .04, r = ˗.21), thereby suggesting that relatively 
fewer survey participants in the non-FE group were more in agreement about 
expanding TEM training/principles to other general aviation sectors (e.g., recreation 
and RPAS). 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to determine whether there was a statistical 
difference in responses among the PPL, CPL and ATPL groups. The result from the 
test suggested that the overall responses for Question 2 did not vary according to 
groups (H(2) = .2.22, p = .33), thereby suggesting that all three groups shared similar 
views on the expansion of TEM training/principles to other general aviation sectors. 
 
6.3.1.6 Specific questions for flight examiners.  
 
There were three specific questions, based on comments from Study 2, for survey 
participants who held or had held FE ratings to determine their experience with 
CASA’s support and guidance for FEs prior to TEM implementation, and the level of 
standardisation on TEM assessment after TEM implementation among FEs during 
flight tests. In addition, a question was included to gauge whether a series of briefings 
were completed without involving conscientious thought, which was one of main 
criticisms from participants in Study 2.  
 
The first question asked whether ‘CASA provided adequate guidance to examiners 
before TEM became a mandatory flight test item’. The majority (83.4%) of 
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that survey participants received adequate 
guidance from CASA before TEM became a mandatory flight test item (Figure 6.27). 
The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test supported this strong 
disagreement (p < .001). 
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Figure 6.27. First specific question for FEs. 
 
The second question asked whether ‘during flight tests, assessment of TEM is 
standardised among FEs’. More than half (56.7%) of the FEs disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that there was standardisation among FEs with regard to TEM assessment 
(Figure 6.28). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test again 
supported this strong disagreement (p = .002). 
 
 
Figure 6.28. Second specific question for FEs. 
 
The third question asked whether ‘during flight tests, candidates verbalise their 
briefings (e.g., emergency briefing) without putting conscientious thought into them’. 
More than half (54.3%) of the FEs agreed or strongly agreed with this question (Figure 
6.29). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test again supported this 
strong disagreement (p = .026). 
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Figure 6.29. Third specific question for FEs. 
 
The findings clearly suggested that there was a lack of support and guidance from 
CASA to FEs before TEM was implemented as an assessment item for licence issue 
flight tests. This has likely led to a lack of standardisation among FEs regarding 
assessment of TEM during flight tests. In addition, the FEs were more in agreement 
that flight test candidates were observed to artificially complete a series of safety 
briefings without conscientiously considering the prevailing conditions and situations. 
 
6.3.1.7 Specific questions for flight instructors.  
 
There were four specific questions, based on comments from Study 2, for those survey 
participants who held or had held a FI rating to gauge whether a series of briefings 
were completed without using conscientious thought, which was one of main criticism 
from participants in Study 2. Other questions were asked to determine the survey 
participants’ understanding of TEM, as well as organisational supports to improve 
their instructing performance.  
 
The first question asked whether ‘during instructional flights, my students verbalise 
their briefings (e.g., emergency briefing) without putting conscientious thought into 
them’. There were mixed views on this question (Figure 6.30). The result from the 
one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test supported this mixed view (p = .99). 
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Figure 6.30. First FI-specific question. 
 
The second question asked whether ‘I find CASA’s FI manual useful’. Again, there 
were mixed views on this question, with 10 survey participants indicating 
disagreement, while over 40% (n = 19) of survey participants recorded neutral 
responses (Figure 6.31). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test 
also supported this mixed view (p = .888). 
 
 
Figure 6.31. Second FI-specific question. 
 
The third question asked whether ‘I have a clear understanding of what I need to do 
when teaching TEM principles to my students’. More than half of the survey 
participants (60.9%) agreed or strongly agreed that they clearly understood what 
needed to be done when TEM principles were taught (Figure 6.32). The result from 
the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test supported this (p = .003). 
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Figure 6.32. Third FI-specific question. 
 
The fourth question asked whether ‘my organisation provides adequate mentoring 
opportunities for junior FIs’. More than half of the survey participants (67.4%) agreed 
or strongly agreed that there were adequate mentoring opportunities for junior FIs 
within their organisations (Figure 6.33). The result from the one-sample Wilcoxon 
signed rank test supported this (p < .001). 
 
 
Figure 6.33. Fourth FI-specific question. 
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6.3.2 Results (second phase).  
 
This section presents the second phase of the data analysis to create a model that 
displays the interrelationships among the four themes from Study 2 to test the 
hypotheses listed in Section 6.2.6. To achieve this, SPSS Amos (Version 25 for 
Windows) was used to perform Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). 
 
6.3.2.1 Brief description of statistical procedures used.  
 
SEM is a statistical modelling technique that takes a confirmatory (hypothesis-testing) 
approach to help researchers conceptualise a theoretical model (Byrne, 2016; Hox & 
Bechger, 1998). SEM has two parts: the first part is Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA) and the second part is path analysis (Hox & Bechger, 1998). CFA is used when 
a researcher has some knowledge of the underlying structure (Byrne, 2016). The 
current study was primarily based on the findings from Study 2, and the researcher 
had several a priori hypotheses: impracticality (first theme), lack of guidance and 
support (second theme) and TEM implementation (third theme). These themes were 
correlated and each affected the way TEM was taught and exercised (fourth theme). 
The second part involved pictorially indicating theoretical structural inter-relationship 
between the variables (themes and survey questions) in a model via path analysis, 
which is described as a statistical approach to estimate relationships and determine the 
strength of the paths in a SEM model (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
 
6.3.2.2 Data screening processes.  
 
Prior to examining the suitability of data for SEM, two data screening processes were 
completed. The first process aimed to ensure there were no missing responses. In this 
analysis, only completed survey responses were used; thus, there were no missing 
responses. The second process involved identifying any unengaged responses. 
Unengaged responses refer to the same responses for every survey question. These 
unengaged responses do not provide additional useful information about the variation 
within survey data; thus, they need to be deleted. The standard deviation calculation 
for each participant’s responses was performed. The standard deviations for each 
 	 191	
participant’s responses were above zero, which suggested that there were no 
unengaged responses from this survey dataset. 
 
6.3.2.3 Sample validation processes.  
 
Prior to performing SEM, there are several sample validation processes to be 
completed. The first step is to check multivariate normality within the dataset. 
Multivariate normality refers to a normal distribution to multiple variables (Field, 
2013). A linear regression model was created based on 24 survey questions (six 
questions per theme), and any p-values less than 0.01 indicated multivariate outliers. 
Three participants’ responses fell in this case and were removed from analysis. 
 
The second step is to check homoscedasticity. Field (2013) described 
homoscedasticity as ‘an assumption in regression analysis that the residuals at each 
level of the predictor variable(s) have similar variances’ (p. 876). The scatter plot 
(Figure 6.34) below indicated that residuals were reasonably spread around the central 
zero line, thereby suggesting that homoscedasticity was adequately met. 
 
 
Figure 6.34. Scatter plot to check homoscedasticity. 
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The third step is to check for multicollinearity for each survey question. Field (2013) 
described multicollinearity as ‘a situation in which two or more variables are very 
closely linearly related’ (p. 879). Grewal, Cote, and Baumgartner (2004) cautioned 
that high multicollinearity, together with low measure reliability and small sample 
size, can lead to a high incidence of Type II errors; thus, survey questions with high 
multicollinearity should be removed from analysis. Linear regression with collinearity 
statistics indicated there was no high multicollinearity present in any of the current 
survey questions. 
 
The fourth step is to determine the required sample size. Prior to calculating the sample 
size, it is necessary to determine how many latent variables (i.e., four themes) and 
observed variables (i.e., 19 survey questions from four themes) along with other 
values, as shown in Figure 6.35. The latent variables refer to the four themes identified 
in Study 2. The observed variables refer to the number of survey question for each 
them (six survey questions per theme). To finalise the total number of questions (i.e., 
observed variables) to determine the required sample size, Cronbach’s alpha was used 
to check the reliability of questions for each theme, and, if required, remove questions 
from a respective theme so that the Cronbach’s alpha was at least 0.7 (Hair et al., 
2006).  
 
 
Figure 6.35. Estimation of sample size Source: accessed 
https://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc/calculator.aspx?id=89 on 2 August 2018. 
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The first reliability test on six survey questions on the first theme—impracticality—
resulted in an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .577. Closer inspection of the tabled item-
total statistics showed that the value in the column labelled ‘Cronbach’s alpha if item 
deleted’ for Question 3 was greater than the overall alpha; hence, the question was 
deleted to improve reliability. After removing the question ‘when it comes to flying 
operations in general aviation, CASA places greater emphasis on the theoretical 
aspects of flying than the practical aspects’, the overall Cronbach’s alpha was 
increased to .797. Further inspection of the table showed that the value in the column 
labelled ‘Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted’ for Question 2 was very slightly greater, 
yet very similar (i.e., .799). The researcher decided not to remove Question 2 because 
it would not affect the overall Cronbach’s alpha. Therefore, based on the reliability 
test, five questions from the first theme were retained for later analyses. 
 
The first reliability test on six survey questions on the second theme—lack of guidance 
and support—resulted in an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .736. Although this satisfied 
the minimum Cronbach’s value of 0.7, it was decided to remove the fourth question: 
‘I regularly attend CASA-organised safety seminars (e.g., AvSafety) to keep up to date 
with the latest aviation safety initiatives’. This question was removed because it had 
the value of .751 in the column labelled ‘Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted’. After 
removing the question, the overall Cronbach’s alpha slightly increased to .751. Closer 
inspection of the column indicated that the value for the fifth question was still greater 
than the overall Cronbach’s alpha. Consequently, the fifth question was removed: ‘I 
find it useful to attend seminars, such as AvSafety and/or others organised by CASA’. 
After re-running the reliability test, the overall Cronbach’s alpha was further increased 
to .791 and the values in the column (Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted) were lower 
than this. Therefore, it was decided to use four questions from the second theme. 
 
The first reliability test on six survey questions on the third theme—TEM 
implementation—resulted in an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .875, and all the values 
in the column ‘Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted’ were lower than the overall alpha. 
Therefore, it was decided to use all six questions from the third theme. 
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The first reliability test on six survey questions on the fourth theme—TEM in 
practice—resulted in an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .581. Closer inspection of the 
tabled item-total statistics showed that the value in the column labelled ‘Cronbach’s 
alpha if item deleted’ for the fifth question was .877. The question ‘I find TEM briefing 
an unnecessary additional task’ was removed, and a second reliability test was 
performed. Overall, the Cronbach’s alpha increased to .877, but the value of the 
column (Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted) for the fourth question was .905. The 
question ‘I always perform a series of briefings (e.g., emergency and take-off 
briefings), taking into account the prevailing conditions and situations’ was removed, 
and another reliability test was performed. Overall, the Cronbach’s alpha further 
increased to .905, and all the values in the column (Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted) 
were lower than the overall alpha. Therefore, it was decided to use four questions from 
the fourth theme. 
 
After checking the overall Cronbach’s alpha for each theme and its associated survey 
questions, a total of 19 survey questions from four themes (minimum four to maximum 
six questions per theme) were used in the following analyses, which satisfied the 
minimum of three, preferably four, survey questions per theme (Hair et al., 2006). In 
terms of sample size, an online a priori sample size calculator for SEM 
(https://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc/calculator.aspx?id=89) with 19 survey 
questions and other values (Figure 6.35) suggested the recommended minimum 
sample size of 91. Given that there were 94 completed survey responses, this satisfied 
the recommended minimum sample size required to analyse data using SEM. 
 
6.3.2.4 Factor analysis.  
 
Factor analysis is a class of statistical techniques to define the underlying structure 
among variables (Hair et al., 2006). The three main uses of factor analysis are as 
follows: (i) to understand the structure of a set of variables, (ii) to construct a 
questionnaire to measure an underlying variable and (iii) to reduce a dataset to a 
smaller manageable size without losing the key original information (Field, 2014). 
Broadly, there are two types of factor analysis: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and 
CFA. 
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As the name suggests, EFA is used in situations where links between the observed and 
latent variables are unknown or uncertain (Byrne, 2016). This is a hypothesis-
generating process that does not have a priori assumptions about the variables, factors 
and their interrelationships. The questions used in this study were based on the 
previous study (Study 2) to verify and generalise the findings from Study 2. In this 
study, there were several hypotheses already established; thus, EFA was not 
considered necessary. 
 
6.3.2.5 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).  
 
Bryne (2016) described CFA as a statistical technique used when a researcher has 
some a priori knowledge of the interrelationships between the observed variables and 
underlying factors. Performing CFA is the first of two steps involved in SEM (Hox & 
Bechger, 1998). In this study, after completing the sample validation process, an 
individual model for each theme was developed and checked using CFA to determine 
whether it was a good fit to the data, based on the following criteria (Table 6.10). 
 
Table 6.10 SEM Fit Indices. 
Fit measures Full name Acceptable scale Note 
CMIN/DF 
Minimum discrepancy 
and its degree of 
freedom 
< 2  
RMSEA Root mean square error of approximation < .08 
Range between .08 and 
.10 is acceptable 
(mediocre fit) 
IFI Incremental fit index > .90 > .95 is a good fit 
NFI Normed fit index > .90 > .95 is a good fit 
CFI Comparative fit index > .90 > .95 is a good fit 
Source: adapted from Byrne (2016) and Hox and Bechger (1998). 
 
For a model with inadequate fit, Modification Indices (MI) values are examined to 
obtain guidance regarding how the model needs to be modified (Hox & Bechger, 
1998). For example, the model fit can be improved by identifying a pair of survey 
questions with the highest MI value and pairing the two using a double-headed arrow 
in the model. 
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The first theme—impracticality—was measured using five questions (Table 6.11). 
The initial standardised loadings were well above the minimum of .5 (Hair et al., 
2006), thereby suggesting that all questions were highly correlated with each other. 
 
 
Table 6.11 Summary of Initial Findings (CFA) on the First Theme (Impracticality). 
Survey questions Initial loadings 
Final 
loadings 
Q1. The CASA has appropriately translated TEM concepts 
into practical guidance for general aviation. .83 .69 
Q2. There are adequate practical examples relating to TEM 
principles and concepts for general aviation. .66 Deleted 
Q4. Senior executives and decision makers within the CASA 
have a good understanding of how general aviation operates. .65 .71 
Q5. I find it easy to keep up to date with changes to aviation 
safety regulations/initiatives. .63 .72 
Q6. I am satisfied with the way the CASA develops aviation 
safety regulations/initiatives. .72 .79 
 
The questions were subjected to CFA to check whether the model was a good fit to 
the data. The initial CFA analysis indicated that all the fit measures in Table 6.11 were 
outside the acceptable level of model fit statistics above (Table 6.10), thereby 
suggesting that the model was not a good fit. Therefore, modification of the model 
was required. 
 
Table 6.12 Achieved Fit Indices for First Theme (Impracticality). 
 
CMIN/DF RMSEA IFI 
Tucker-
Lewis 
index (TLI) 
CFI 
Initial 6.726 .248 .844 .679 .840 
Final 1.681 .086 .989 .966 .989 
 
Upon inspection of the MI values, it was identified that e1 and e2 had the highest MI 
value (17.908). Therefore, an ad hoc attempt was made to retest the model after pairing 
the errors (Figure 6.36). This modification improved all the fit measures to the 
acceptable scales: CMIN/DF = 1.194, RMSEA = .046, IFI = .996, TLI = .989 and CFI 
= .996.  
 
 	 197	
 
Figure 6.36. Five-item single model on impracticality. 
 
However, the standardised loading for the second question was reduced to .45 (Figure 
6.36), which suggested that it poorly correlated with all other questions in the model. 
Consequently, another ad hoc attempt was made to retest the model after deleting the 
second question (Figure 6.37). Deletion of the second question improved all fit 
measures to the acceptable scales (Table 6.12), as well as high standardised loadings. 
 
 
Figure 6.37. Revised four-item single model on impracticality. 
 
Based on the findings generated with an online calculator 
(http://www.thestatisticalmind.com/calculators/comprel/composite_reliability.htm), 
the composite reliability for these four survey questions was .818. This was well above 
the acceptable level of .7 to indicate adequate internal consistency (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
The second theme—lack of guidance and support—was measured using four 
questions (Table 6.13). The initial standardised loadings suggested that all the 
questions were highly correlated with each other (all above .50).  
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Table 6.13 Summary of Initial Findings (CFA) on Second Theme (Lack of Guidance 
and Support). 
Survey questions Initial loadings 
Q1. The CASA provides adequate training and guidance material 
on TEM for general aviation. .76 
Q2. The concept of TEM is easy to understand. .71 
Q3. The CASA explains TEM and how it affects my role and/or 
activities in a clear and succinct manner. .75 
Q6. I find the number of safety-related publications and resources 
from the CASA useful. .55 
 
The questions were subjected to a CFA to check whether the model was a good fit to 
the data. The initial CFA analysis showed that all the fit measures in Table 6.14 were 
within the acceptable level of model fit statistics above (Table 6.10), thereby 
suggesting that the model was a good fit. Therefore, no modification to the model was 
required. Figure 6.38 displays the model for the second theme. The composite 
reliability for the four questions was .789, which was again above the acceptable level 
of .7 to indicate adequate internal consistency (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
Table 6.14 Achieved Fit Indices for Second Theme (Lack of Guidance and Support). 
 CMIN/DF RMSEA IFI TLI CFI 
Final .569 .000 1.008 1.026 1.000 
 
 
 
Figure 6.38. Four-item single model on lack of guidance and support. 
 
The third theme—poor implementation—was measured using six questions (Table 
6.15). The initial standardised loadings suggested that all the questions were highly 
correlated with each other (all above .50).  
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Table 6.15 Summary of Initial Findings (CFA) on Third Theme (Poor Implementation). 
Survey questions Initial loadings 
Final 
loadings 
CASA consults with all relevant stakeholders when 
developing and/or reforming aviation safety initiatives, 
such as TEM. 
.81 
 .83 
CASA ASAs have a consistent understanding of TEM 
principles. .79 .79 
I am satisfied with the way CASA implements new 
aviation safety regulations/initiatives. .70 .66 
The number of CASA staff with appropriate expertise in 
TEM is adequate. .59 .58 
CASA maintains an effective ongoing dialogue with the 
general aviation industry. .78 .79 
CASA explains new safety regulations/initiatives and how 
they affect the general aviation industry in a clear and 
succinct manner. 
.77 .74 
 
The questions were subjected to CFA to check whether the model was a good fit to 
the data. The initial CFA analysis showed that two fit measures in Table 6.16 were 
slightly outside the acceptable level of model fit statistics (Table 6.10), suggesting that 
the model was not a good fit. Therefore, modification of the model was required. 
 
Table 6.16 Achieved Fit Indices for Third Theme (Poor Implementation). 
 CMIN/DF RMSEA IFI TLI CFI 
Initial 2.067 .107 .964 .939 .964 
Final 1.685 .086 .980 .961 .979 
 
Upon inspection of the MI values, it was identified that e3 and e6 was the only 
covariance listed with the MI value of 4.412. Therefore, an ad hoc attempt was made 
to retest the model after pairing the errors (Figure 6.39), which improved all the fit 
measures to an acceptable level of model fit statistics (Table 6.16). The composite 
reliability for the four questions was .875, which was again well above the acceptable 
level of .7. 
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Figure 6.39. Six-item single model on poor implementation. 
 
The fourth theme—TEM in practice—was measured using four questions (Table 
6.17). The initial standardised loadings suggested that all questions were highly 
correlated with each other (all above .50).  
 
Table 6.17 Summary of Initial Findings (CFA) on Fourth Theme (TEM in Practice). 
Survey questions Initial loadings 
Final 
loadings 
I use TEM principles when I am undertaking flying 
activities. .92 .96 
I have a clear understanding of what I need to do when 
applying TEM principles. .85 .85 
Consideration of TEM is an important part of my flight 
preparation. .84 .79 
I can see value in TEM when I am undertaking flying 
activities. .84 .79 
 
The questions were subjected to CFA to check whether the model was a good fit to 
the data. The initial CFA analysis showed that three fit measures in Table 6.18 were 
outside the acceptable level of model fit statistics (Table 6.10), suggesting that the 
model was not a good fit. Therefore, modification of the model was required. 
 
Table 6.18 Achieved Fit Indices for Fourth Theme (TEM in Practice). 
 CMIN/DF RMSEA IFI TLI CFI 
Initial 6.578 .245 .961 .882 .961 
Final .362 .000 1.002 1.013 1.000 
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Upon inspection of the MI values, it was identified that e3 and e4 was the covariance 
with the highest MI value of 9.261. Therefore, an ad hoc attempt was made to retest 
the model after pairing the errors (Figure 6.40), which improved all the fit measures 
to an acceptable level of model fit statistics (Table 6.18). The composite reliability for 
the four questions was .912, which was again well above the acceptable level of .7. 
 
 
Figure 6.40. Revised four-item single model on TEM in practice. 
 
A series of CFAs was performed to examine whether each individual measurement 
model had a good fit to the data, and the final fit indices for each theme confirmed that 
the models were a good fit. Therefore, it was appropriate to move onto the next step 
to test the structural relationship among the themes and their responses, as well as 
testing the hypotheses (H5 to H10). 
 
Prior to testing the structural relationship among the themes, it was necessary to 
determine which dependence relationships existed in these themes. The central focus 
of this thesis was exploring the effect of TEM in Australian general aviation. Based 
on the findings from Studies 1 and 2, it was hypothesised that impracticality and lack 
of guidance and support from CASA were correlated, and each negatively affected the 
way TEM was viewed, taught and practised in general aviation. Therefore, 
impracticality and lack of guidance and support from the CASA were considered 
exogenous variables (independent variables) and TEM in practice was considered an 
endogenous variable (dependent variable). In addition, it was hypothesised that both 
impracticality and a lack of guidance and support from CASA affected the survey 
participants’ views on poor TEM implementation, and this mediated the effect of 
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impracticality and lack of guidance and support on the way TEM was viewed and 
practised. Based on these notions, six hypotheses were proposed, which formed 
hypothesised structural relationships (Figure 6.41). For instance, a single-headed 
arrow from impracticality to TEM in practice (H5) shows that TEM in practice is 
dependent on impracticality—that is, the higher the impracticality, the less 
successfully TEM is practised. The hypotheses were as follows: 
 
H5: Impracticality negatively affected the way TEM was viewed and practised. 
H6: Impracticality resulted in survey participants’ view of poor TEM 
implementation 
H7: Lack of guidance and support from CASA negatively affected the way TEM was 
viewed and practised. 
H8: Lack of guidance and support from CASA resulted in participants’ view of poor 
TEM implementation 
H9: Poor TEM implementation mediated the effect of impracticality on the way 
TEM was viewed and practised. 
H10: Poor TEM implementation mediated the effect of lack of guidance and support 
from CASA on the way TEM was viewed and practised. 
 
 
Figure 6.41. Simplified path diagram showing the hypothesised structural 
relationships. 
 
 
 
H5 
H7 
H6 
H8 
H9 
H10 
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To estimate and assess how well the SEM model fit, a complete model with themes 
and survey questions for each theme was required, as presented in Figure 6.42. 
 
 
Figure 6.42. Complete path diagram showing specified hypothesised structural 
relationships. 
 
The complete path diagram was subjected to CFA to check whether the model was a 
good fit to the data. The initial CFA analysis showed that one of the fit measures (i.e., 
RMSEA) in Table 6.19 needed to be improved in accordance with the SEM fit indices 
(Table 6.10). Therefore, modification of the model was required. 
 
Table 6.19 Achieved Fit Indices for Complete Path Diagram Showing Specified 
Hypothesised Structural Relationships. 
 CMIN/DF RMSEA IFI TLI CFI 
Initial 1.657 .083 .922 .903 .920 
Final 1.554 .076 .934 .918 .933 
 
Upon inspection of the MI values, it was identified that the pair (e7 and e14) was the 
covariance with the highest MI value of 13.034. Therefore, an ad hoc attempt was 
made to retest the model after pairing the errors, which improved the fit measures to 
an acceptable level (Table 6.19). Figure 6.43 displays a revised complete path diagram 
showing the specified hypothesised structural relationships. The revised model with 
the standardised regression weights is presented in Appendix 11. 
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Figure 6.43. Revised path diagram showing specified hypothesised structural 
relationships. 
 
Having determined the model as a good fit, path analysis was performed to determine 
the correlation between the themes (impracticality and lack of guidance and support), 
as presented in Table 6.20. 
 
Table 6.20 Correlation Coefficient between a Pair of Themes. 
Correlation path Estimate 
Impracticality ↔ Lack of guidance and support .836 
 
The pair was found to be highly and positively correlated, thereby suggesting that any 
changes in one theme significantly and positively affected the other. For instance, if 
more survey participants agreed that TEM lacked practicality, then more survey 
participants would agree that there was a lack of guidance and support from CASA. 
The final step was to test the hypotheses to determine each theme’s effect on the other 
themes. The results of the path analysis are presented in Table 6.21. 
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Table 6.21 Hypotheses Testing Results. 
Hypothesis Hypothesised path Estimates p-value 
Is 
hypothesis 
supported? 
H5 
Impracticality → TEM in 
practice .002 .998 NO 
H6 
Impracticality → Poor TEM 
implementation .541 < .001 YES 
H7 
Lack of guidance and support → 
TEM in practice 1.219 .046 YES 
H8 
Lack of guidance and support → 
Poor TEM implementation .355 .019 YES 
 
To test Hypotheses 9 and 10, the figures in Table 6.22 were used to initially calculate 
the test statistic (z-score), which was then converted to respective p-values. 
 
Table 6.22 Regression Weights for Impracticality and Lack of Guidance and Support 
in Relation to Poor TEM Implementation and TEM in Practice. 
Construct Path Construct Estimate Standard error 
Impracticality → Poor TEM implementation .541 .160 
Lack of guidance 
and support → 
Poor TEM 
implementation .355 .151 
Poor TEM 
implementation → TEM in practice ˗.365 1.257 
 
The calculation with poor TEM implementation as a mediating variable indicated that 
poor TEM implementation did not mediate the effect of impracticality (p = .77) on 
TEM in practice. The calculation also indicated that poor TEM implementation did 
not mediate the effect of lack of guidance and support (p = .77) on TEM in practice. 
Therefore, Hypotheses 9 and 10 were not supported. The following section provides 
interim discussions based on the findings from this study. 
 
6.3.3 Interim discussion.  
 
The main findings from this study are briefly discussed in the following subsections. 
More thorough discussions are provided in Chapter 7: Overall Discussion. 
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6.3.3.1 Impracticality.  
 
The survey findings suggested that a statistically significant number of survey 
participants were more in agreement that TEM principles and concepts lacked 
practicality when they were introduced and implemented in Australian general 
aviation. The findings on the lack of practicality were found to not align with one of 
the expectations of the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport that CASA’s 
regulatory approach would be pragmatic, practical and proportionate as it applied to 
different industry sectors (CASA, 2018). 
 
The general consensus was that CASA failed to provide practical guidance and 
examples about how and when TEM principles and concepts should be adopted in 
daily operations. This view was primarily based on the notion that senior executives 
and decision makers within CASA did not have a good understanding of how general 
aviation operated. This also negatively affected the survey participants’ strong 
dissatisfaction with the way CASA developed aviation safety regulations and 
initiatives, with a statistically significant number of participants in the pre-TEM group 
displaying greater dissatisfaction. Greater emphasis on the theoretical aspect of flying, 
as well as difficulty encountered by the majority of survey participants in keeping up 
to date with changes to aviation safety regulations and initiatives, further aggravated 
the view that the TEM principles and concepts lacked practicality.  
 
Mearns and Reader (2008) found that stronger health support from an organisation 
predicted more safety citizenship behaviours from its employees, such as assisting 
colleagues with safety-related matters and reporting hazards at work. Mearns and 
Reader (2008) explained that employees might perceive organisational investment in 
their health as being indicative of the organisation’s strong commitment to health and 
safety, which led to employees placing higher priorities on safe conduct in the 
workplace. Indeed, this type of work environment will more likely enhance the overall 
safety climate and outcomes, which is also the highest priority of CASA (2018b)—to 
focus on aviation safety. Thus, the findings supported the first hypothesis. 
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In terms of impracticality and its effect on TEM in practice, impracticality was not 
found to have a significant effect on how TEM was viewed and practised. This was an 
interesting and perhaps counterintuitive finding, as the logical assumption was that, if 
the survey participants did not view TEM as practical, they would be less likely to use 
TEM in their daily flying. There were mixed views among survey participants about 
whether they had a clear understanding of what was required when applying TEM 
principles while undertaking their flying activities. This was partly caused by CASA 
failing to translate TEM concepts into practical guidance for general aviation. 
However, a statistically significant number of survey participants—particularly ones 
with FI and FE ratings—agreed that they used TEM principles when undertaking 
flying activities, and that consideration of TEM was an important part of their flight 
preparation. Thus, the findings did not support the fifth hypothesis. 
 
When examining the inter-relationship between impracticality and poor TEM 
implementation, it was found that the relationship was positively correlated and 
statistically significant, thereby suggesting that the more survey participants felt TEM 
was impractical, the more participants would agree that TEM was poorly implemented. 
This is an important aspect because general aviation is vocationally oriented. 
Consequently, providing practical examples relating to TEM principles and concepts 
and placing greater emphasis on the practical aspects of flying operations would 
enhance the view that TEM was implemented well. Thus, the findings supported the 
sixth hypothesis. 
 
Poor TEM implementation was a mediating variable, and it was hypothesised that poor 
TEM implementation mediated the effect of impracticality in terms of the way TEM 
was viewed and practised. This hypothesis was not supported. It was established 
earlier that, although the inter-relationship between practicality and poor TEM 
implementation was statistically significant, impracticality was not found to have a 
significant effect on how TEM was viewed and practised.  
 
In summary, a statistically significant number of survey participants agreed that TEM 
lacked practicality, and this would likely have caused the survey participants to agree 
that TEM was poorly implemented in Australian general aviation. However, the notion 
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of impracticality negatively affecting the way TEM was viewed and practised was not 
supported. 
 
6.3.3.2 Lack of guidance and support.  
 
The findings on lack of guidance and support from CASA suggested mixed views 
among the survey participants. A statistically significant number of participants were 
more in agreement that CASA did not provide adequate training and guidance material 
on TEM. Similarly, the majority of participants did not agree that CASA clearly and 
succinctly explained TEM and the way it would affect their role and activities. These 
views may have contributed to the result that the majority of participants did not find 
TEM easy to understand. Based on these findings, the second hypothesis was 
supported. 
 
In contrast, there were mixed views among the survey participants on the usefulness 
of CASA-organised seminars (e.g., AvSafety) and CASA’s safety-related publications 
and resources. Similarly, there were mixed views regarding regular attendance at 
CASA-organised seminars (e.g., AvSafety) for the participants to keep up to date with 
the latest aviation safety initiatives. It was found that the non-FE group, in particular, 
did not regularly attend the safety seminars. Based on these findings, the second 
hypothesis was not supported. Overall, the second hypothesis was partially supported 
as the survey participants were in agreement for the first three survey questions of the 
second theme but not the remaining three survey questions. 
 
Numerous previous research findings have suggested that adequate guidance and 
support are one of the key aspects leading to successful implementation of new 
initiatives. For instance, according to McFadden, Stock, and Gowen (2006), lack of 
top management support, lack of resources and fewer educational opportunities were 
found to have a significantly negative effect on the implementation of patient safety 
initiatives in US hospitals. Similarly, Wilcock, Ball, and Fajumo (2011) found that 
provision of government resources and effective communication among all personnel 
within the company and with industry and government officials regarding 
specifications and guidelines were critical factors for the successful implementation 
of food safety initiatives. Likewise, Alderson’s (2009) study on the language 
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proficiency requirements proposed by ICAO highlighted that, even with a detailed 
document (a manual on the implementation of ICAO language proficiency 
requirements) to assist each contracting state with developing suitable and appropriate 
testing methods, there were serious inadequacies in the state of preparedness of 
national civil aviation authorities to comply with this ICAO initiative. 
 
Based on the survey findings for Study 3, CASA failed to provide adequate training, 
guidance materials or explanation about how TEM affected the survey participants’ 
role and activities in a clear and succinct manner, which led to the general consensus 
that the TEM concept was not easy to understand. These factors negatively affected 
the way TEM was viewed and practised. In addition, this negatively resulted in the 
participants’ views of poor TEM implementation. Based on these results, both the 
seventh and eighth hypotheses were supported.  
 
Poor TEM implementation was a mediating variable, and it was hypothesised that poor 
TEM implementation mediated the effect of lack of guidance and support from CASA 
on how TEM was viewed and practised. It was already established that the lack of 
guidance and support from CASA negatively affected the way TEM was viewed and 
practised, which resulted in participants’ views of the poor TEM implementation. 
However, the poor TEM implementation did not mediate the effect of lack of guidance 
and support from CASA. Thus, the tenth hypothesis was not supported. 
 
In summary, a statistically significant number of survey participants agreed that CASA 
failed to provide adequate training and guidance material on TEM, which would likely 
have caused the suboptimal level of understanding of TEM concepts and principles. 
However, it was found that there were mixed views among the survey participants on 
the usefulness of CASA-organised seminars, such as AvSafety, and the CASA’s 
safety-related publications and resources on TEM. Lack of guidance and support from 
CASA had a strong and direct effect on the way TEM was implemented, viewed and 
practised in Australian general aviation. 
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6.3.3.3 Threat and error management implementation.  
 
The survey findings suggested that a statistically significant number of survey 
participants were more in agreement that TEM was poorly implemented in Australian 
general aviation. The majority of survey participants found that CASA did not consult 
with all relevant stakeholders when developing or reforming aviation safety initiatives. 
In addition, CASA was found not to maintain an effective ongoing dialogue with the 
general aviation industry. 
 
According to a guide provided by ANAO (2014), one of the key considerations when 
planning to implement a policy initiative is to establish a high level of stakeholder 
engagement with the policy initiative. This requires a clear objective for consultation 
and the identification of key stakeholders, while maintaining clear and timely 
communications with wider communities. This was closely aligned with CASA’s 
(2018d) regulatory philosophy, where CASA aimed to develop and implement 
appropriate policies consultatively and collaboratively. However, this was not 
supported by the findings in this study, or the findings of another online survey with 
1,217 stakeholder participants, where almost half of the survey participants indicated 
dissatisfaction with CASA’s ongoing dialogue with industry, and only 11% agreed 
that CASA always consulted with the most appropriate people in the industry when 
developing and reforming aviation safety regulations (Colmar Brunton, 2016). 
 
The findings from the present study also highlighted the inadequate number of CASA 
staff with appropriate expertise in TEM, and the inconsistent understanding of TEM 
principles among CASA ASAs. The importance of ensuring the appropriate mix of 
required expertise and quantity of resources is another key factor for the successful 
implementation of a policy initiative. In the current study, it was acknowledged that 
the unavailability of personnel with the required expertise to implement the planned 
initiative was one of the most common implementation problems (ANAO, 2016). 
These findings and the survey participants’ collective view on TEM lacking 
practicality and the lack of guidance and support from CASA most likely led to the 
strong dissatisfaction among the survey participants with the way CASA implements 
new aviation safety initiatives, such as TEM. Thus, the third hypothesis was supported, 
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suggesting that the survey participants were more in agreement that TEM 
implementation in Australian general aviation was poor. 
 
6.3.3.4 Threat and error management in use.  
 
The majority of findings thus far have suggested that TEM was poorly implemented 
in Australian general aviation, and the lack of guidance and support from CASA 
particularly contributed to this collective view among the survey participants. It was 
assumed that these views would lead to further negative outcomes in terms of the ways 
TEM was considered and practised. For example, a previous study by Conley et al. 
(2011) suggested that a hospital with less effective implementation of a surgical safety 
checklist had not been provided with dedicated education or training, which led to 
poor frequency and quality of checklist use. However, in the current study, the 
responses to questions on the way TEM was viewed and practised were somewhat 
contrasting. Generally, the survey participants highly valued TEM when undertaking 
flying activities. As such, they considered TEM an important part of their flight 
preparations, and used TEM principles when undertaking flying activities. Therefore, 
this finding did not support the fourth hypothesis—that survey participants were more 
in agreement that TEM was poorly practised in Australian general aviation. 
 
There were mixed views regarding whether the participants held a clear understanding 
of what needed to be done when applying TEM principles and whether TEM briefings 
were an unnecessary additional task. A closer examination of the responses indicated 
that the non-FI and non-FE groups were less clear about what needed to be completed 
when applying TEM principles. This may be the reason that the non-FI group 
considered the benefits of TEM training to be overrated, and the non-FE group more 
disagreed with the idea of TEM training and principles being expanded to other 
general aviation segments, such as the recreational aviation and RPAS sectors. 
 
6.3.3.5 Group-specific questions.  
 
Based on various comments from the interview participants in Study 2, there were 
three additional questions for survey participants with FE ratings, and four additional 
questions for those with FI ratings.  
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A statistically significant number of FEs disagreed that CASA provided adequate 
guidance to examiners before TEM became a mandatory flight test item. This may be 
the reason why assessment of TEM during flight tests was not standardised among 
FEs. Another observation was that flight test candidates were verbalising their safety 
briefings (e.g., emergency briefing) without considering the prevailing conditions and 
situations. 
 
In terms of the responses to questions for the FIs, a statistically significant number of 
FIs had a clear understanding of what was required when teaching TEM principles to 
their students, and their organisations provided adequate mentoring opportunities for 
junior instructors. These were very encouraging findings. However, there were mixed 
views on the usefulness of the CASA’s FI manual and students verbalising their safety 
briefings (e.g., emergency briefings) without putting conscientious thought into them. 
 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the quantitative (second) phase of the sequential mixed 
methods research to verify and generalise the findings from the qualitative (first) phase 
of the study. The primary purpose of this study was to collect information, so that the 
findings from Study 2 (qualitative study) could be verified and generalised. The 
findings suggested that TEM implementation in Australian general aviation was 
problematic, and this view was due to impracticality and a lack of guidance and 
support from the CASA. An interesting and perhaps counterintuitive finding was that, 
despite poor TEM implementation and the lack of guidance and support from CASA, 
a statistically significant number of survey participants highly valued TEM when 
undertaking flying activities, which led them to view TEM as an important part of 
their flight preparations and use TEM principles when undertaking flying activities. 
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Chapter 7: Overall Discussion 
 
The findings from the three studies in this thesis suggested that TEM was poorly 
implemented in Australian general aviation. The findings also indicated that the two 
major causes for this—impracticality and a lack of guidance and support from 
CASA—were the main contributors to the collective views among the study 
participants regarding poor TEM implementation. Therefore, it was reasonable to 
assume that this would lead to negative views about the use of TEM in Australian 
general aviation. However, the collective responses from Study 3 suggested that the 
survey participants highly valued and applied TEM principles when undertaking 
flying activities, and consequently considered TEM an important part of flight 
preparations. This chapter provides an overall discussion of the key findings from the 
three studies. 
 
7.1 Poor Threat and Error Management Implementation 
 
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO, 2014) provided guidance that 
identified key considerations ‘when implementing a policy initiative—the act of 
translating policy into reality—so that intended benefits are realised’ (p. 3). The six 
key considerations are governance, managing risk, engaging stakeholders, planning, 
resources and monitoring, and review and evaluation (ANAO, 2014). The ANAO 
(2014) described governance as establishing the arrangements and practices that 
enable the achievement of the expected outcome. Sound governance arrangements and 
practices require a strong commitment from executives who have a good 
understanding of the industry (e.g., general aviation) so that the appropriate resources 
can be allocated. However, an observation from Participant 1 noted a different 
situation in Australian general aviation: 
 
‘CASA particularly, it means you will have to put some resources on the 
ground out there and … but if you look at the profile of a lot of senior 
management within CASA, ones we got last probably 10 to 15 years, has 
very little expertise in aviation there. So, they are driving the show and, 
they are not too much focusing into the operational aspect, uh, what’s 
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going on in the operational field, be it in airlines or be it in the training 
industry. They are not going to put their focus there because, by large, 
they don’t understand it.’ (Participant 1) 
 
This observation was supported by the majority of survey participants (88.7%) in 
Study 3, who disagreed that senior executives and decision makers within CASA had 
a good understanding of how general aviation operated. 
 
A strong commitment from executives is often supplemented by a senior responsible 
officer, whose accountability includes successful policy implementation (ANAO, 
2014). If the officer does not possess the appropriate skills to ensure successful policy 
implementation, she or he must access an appropriately skilled implementation team 
to assist her or him. However, the findings from the current research suggested that 
the concept of TEM and the ways to implement it were not well established within 
CASA from the beginning. Participant 3 recounted that: 
 
‘… when they were introducing it, they were sort of saying things like 
‘we’re only still trying to find out how to do it’. Even later, I spoke to a 
senior manager at CASA, and he said, ‘we have no idea what it’s about’, 
so we were enforcing something that we didn’t understand.’ (Participant 
3) 
 
The perceived lack of relevance of new safety initiatives, such as CRM and TEM, 
when first introduced, adversely affects the facilitation of sufficient understanding of 
the topics among the intended recipients. Entwistle (1992, as cited in Rudland & 
Rennie, 2003) identified that the degree of learning is highly correlated with the 
perceived relevance of subject materials, whereby a high level of perceived relevance 
promotes a deep approach to learning, while a lack of perceived relevance is associated 
with a superficial approach. Rudland and Rennie (2003) added that integration of 
theory and practical relevance could be enhanced by using clinical problems so that 
students were able to identify and apply relevant gained knowledge to core clinical 
problems which in turn improves learning experience and outcomes. These findings 
highlight the need to ensure that new safety initiatives, such as TEM, accompany a 
clear statement about their relevance to the individuals and industry, supported by 
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examples, so that greater buy-in can be obtained. However, the findings from Study 3 
suggested that a statistically significant number of survey participants did not agree 
that CASA had clearly and succinctly explained TEM and how it would affect their 
role and/or activities. In addition, the majority of participants (81.4%) did not agree 
that CASA consulted with all relevant stakeholders when developing and/or reforming 
aviation safety initiatives, such as TEM. 
 
In terms of establishing an appropriately qualified and skilled implementation team 
with expertise in TEM, Participant 4 commented that: 
 
‘I believe at that time, um, CASA had engaged in a consultant, um, who I 
don’t think was from an aviation background at that time, uh. A lot of what 
came out made no sense whatsoever, um, and it proved, at that time, quite 
difficult to find anything aviation specific with threat and error 
management because it had only been introduced, um, for its integration 
into a training program … there was no technical specialist actually 
employed by CASA.’ (Participant 4) 
 
This was supported by a finding from Study 3 in which only seven out of 97 (7.2%) 
survey participants agreed that the number of CASA staff with appropriate expertise 
in TEM was adequate. A similar finding was obtained from a previous study’s 
stakeholder survey, in which only 26% of survey participants agreed that CASA 
provided competent and capable staff (Colman Brunton, 2016). Participant 2 in Study 
2 added: 
 
‘CASA does not … it is a worst government department in the world, right? 
It does not train its staff … So, someone’s upstairs and the standard’s been 
written all of these beautiful stuffs, right? But they really haven’t trained 
their staff. So, their staff can’t, don’t understand it, can’t deliver it, and 
that’s a history of CASA.’ (Participant 2) 
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These findings expand on the collective responses from Study 3, in which a 
statistically significant number of survey participants did not agree that CASA 
provided adequate training and guidance materials on TEM training for general 
aviation. 
 
A similar situation arose when CRM was first introduced in the US. Helmreich et al. 
(1999) described that the first generation of CRM involved conducting intensive 
training sessions, with a heavy focus on psychological testing. The exercises used in 
the training sessions were unrelated to aviation to illustrate the relevant concepts. As 
a result, this training led to resistance from some pilots (Helmreich et al., 1999). In the 
current study, it appeared that the lack of adequate understanding of TEM concepts 
and seemingly inadequate expertise available within CASA likely led to the 
manifestation of poor TEM implementation in Australian general aviation. 
 
The second key consideration for successful implementation of a new policy is risk 
management (ANAO, 2014). In this context, risk refers to a deviation from and failure 
to achieve the intended outcomes. CASA (2008) introduced TEM in response to 
ICAO’s endorsement and recommendation to include TEM training in all pilot 
training, with a view to further improve flight safety in general aviation. Therefore, 
adequate risk management aimed to ensure that TEM was properly introduced, taught, 
practised and assessed in general aviation to achieve the intended outcome of further 
improving flight safety in general aviation. More than half of the participants (56.4%) 
from Study 1 agreed or strongly agreed that TEM training had improved overall safety 
in general aviation. In addition, almost half of participants (48.7%) did not feel that 
the benefit of TEM training was overrated. Further, less than half of survey 
participants (41.2%) from Study 3 felt that the benefit of TEM training was overrated. 
However, the participants in Study 2 had a different view of the effect of TEM on 
general aviation safety: ‘My observation is that this has no effect on safety, I don’t 
think the statistics has changed. The things that would’ve changed statistics were 
probably the technology improvement on the aeroplane’ (Participant 3). Other 
participants in Study 2 shared a similar view. Participant 2 stated: ‘Go and have a look 
at statistics. I dare to say the rate in GA [General Aviation] hasn’t moved in 50 years’ 
(Participant 2). Participant 4 stated: 
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‘I don’t think you will actually find a significant change … In fact, you will 
find, unfortunately, during that period, there’s actually been a decrease in 
general aviation movements, um, and therefore a decrease in movement, 
you’ve got to have a decrease in incidents, but proportionally I actually 
doubt you will see much of a change.’ (Participant 4) 
 
According to ATSB (2018), the number of departures involving all aircraft in 
Australian general aviation has fluctuated over the last 10 years. The number of 
departures 13  was 1,985,000 in 2010, which decreased to 1,853,000 in 2011 and 
1,760,000 in 2012, before starting to increase again from 2013 (ATSB, 2018). This 
trend supported Participant 4’s comment on aircraft movement in general aviation. 
When examining the data on all general aviation occurrences between 2007 and 2016, 
it was noted that the number of accidents per million departures was 64 in 2010, which 
decreased to 61.5 in 2011, 58.5 in 2012 and 49.7 in 2013, but increased to 67.7 in 2014. 
Overall, there were no definitive downward trends noted in the number of accidents 
per million departures over the 2007 and 2015 period, while the private/business and 
sports sectors in Australian general aviation experienced the highest average rate of 
reported accidents during the same period (ATSB, 2018). 
 
Another way to evaluate an appropriate level of risk management is to determine how 
TEM is assessed. The current research’s findings suggested that risk was not 
adequately managed. For instance, the majority of participants from the trainee and 
trainer groups in Study 1 did not believe that TEM was appropriately assessed during 
flight tests. Participant 5 shared his experience with regard to encountering difficulties 
when assessing TEM during a flight test: 
 
‘… it is a very difficult one to assess from an examiner’s point of view. It’s 
almost a bit like trying to assess common sense. You know, no one can 
write a sheet to actually assess common sense, and I found threat and 
error management falls somewhat into that category.’ (Participant 5) 
                                               
13 The ATSB’s (2018) report on the aviation occurrence statistics used departure data when 
calculating accident and fatal accident rates because departures were a more appropriate measure than 
hours flown, as most accidents occur either during the approach and landing or departure phases of 
flight. 
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These difficulties were due to CASA not delivering required training for FEs. 
Participant 1 recalled that: 
 
‘PDP every two years … it didn’t focus on TEM, it didn’t mention it and 
there was no separate PDP program to cover it to say, ‘this is a new thing, 
we, CASA, have introduced to the industry … we really want to focus on 
it and we now want you to focus on it and therefore we will give you 
separate training’. No, they didn’t do that.’ (Participant 1) 
 
The findings from Study 3 supported Participant 1’s experience. The majority (83.4%) 
of FEs in Study 3 did not receive adequate guidance from CASA before TEM became 
a mandatory flight test item. This led to participants’ observation in Study 2 that 
assessment of TEM demonstration was not standardised among FEs. A finding from 
Study 3 indicated that only 16.7% of FEs agreed that assessment of TEM during a 
flight test was standardised among FEs. These findings again highlighted the 
importance of pre-training and education roadshows before new safety initiatives are 
introduced. 
 
The third key consideration for successful implementation of new policy is engaging 
stakeholders (ANAO, 2014). Hartzler et al. (2013) described stakeholder engagement 
as activities to involve, consult and partner with key stakeholders throughout the 
implementation phases. However, the findings from Studies 2 and 3 did not suggest 
that an appropriate level of stakeholder engagement was ensured before TEM was 
implemented. Participant 4 shared his experience in this regard: 
 
‘A regulator that is quite removed from industry, so if you look at the 
majority of people making the rules or publishing the guidance material, 
they are many, many, many, many years from removed from the cold face 
and things are quite often done reactively, rather than proactively, and 
without a huge amount of engagement.’ (Participant 4) 
 
Participant 4 continued: ‘They might call for, uh, you know, they might put out, um, a 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, [and] people may respond, but their response rate 
is about 1% in the community’. A closer inspection of the consultation and project 
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history on the CASA website suggested that there was no industry-wide consultation 
completed on TEM before it was implemented. A finding from Study 3 supported that 
a statistically significant number of survey participants (73.2%) disagreed that CASA 
had explained TEM and how it would affect their role and/or activities in a clear and 
succinct manner. Another finding from Study 3 indicated that a statistically significant 
number of survey participants (81.4%) disagreed that CASA consulted with all 
relevant stakeholders when developing and/or reforming aviation safety initiatives, 
such as TEM. The survey participants who were actively flying before TEM was 
implemented showed stronger disagreement. Another finding regarding this lack of 
stakeholder engagement indicated that only eight survey participants (8.2%) agreed 
that CASA maintained an effective ongoing dialogue with the general aviation 
industry. However, these findings did not suggest that there was no attempt to engage 
stakeholders before TEM was implemented. A closer inspection of the website 
indicated that a Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP)—titled ‘Teaching and 
Assessing Single Pilot Human Factors and Threat and Error Management’—was 
released on 21 October 2008. However, Participant 1 commented that: 
 
‘I mean, they did the usual thing of producing some CAAP information … 
but that was just a document, which is then reliant on people getting hold 
of that document, reading it, understanding it, taking it apart, then setting 
up the implementation plan, and that really doesn’t fit the style of industry.’ 
(Participant 1) 
 
A finding from Study 3 indicated that a statistically significant number of survey 
participants (67%) found it difficult to keep up to date with changes to aviation safety 
regulations/initiatives. A lack of guidance and support from CASA, and seemingly 
ineffectively maintained dialogue with stakeholders, were highlighted in Participant 
5’s comment: 
 
‘… there was no ongoing support material come from CASA and, um, 
whether there’s been something done with threat and error management, 
I don’t know. I have to go—and I wasn’t even aware of it ‘til you 
mentioned it that there is an updated one. So, I might have to jump online, 
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see if I can find it, go through it to see what they’ve published on threat 
and error management.’ (Participant 5) 
 
Conley et al. (2011) emphasised the importance of clearly communicating to relevant 
stakeholders why a certain safety initiative needs to be implemented, so that stronger 
enthusiasm and a high level of buy-in can be built and achieved. However, Participant 
4’s experience was somewhat different: 
 
‘… if we had actually said, ‘guys, we’ve been actually doing this … what 
we actually want to do is to formalise this little bit’ … Um, but it’s, it was 
still marketed as something different and I think that immediately got 
people’s back side because we’ve been flying already, best part of 100 
years. Um, what are we doing today that we didn’t used to do and who 
actually says there’s a problem? … Otherwise a lot more of us would’ve 
been dead if we hadn’t been applying threat and error management.’ 
(Participant 4) 
 
This comment suggested that the elements of TEM were already present and practised, 
well before TEM was officially implemented. Participant 1 in Study 2 commented that: 
 
‘… if you ask me my version of what TEM is, it would probably be pretty 
much the same as some other people, probably experienced people. I am 
a great believer in it, but I am going back to some basics, which is, I think 
it’s been around for a long time, we just call it differently these days. The 
industry generally would probably be sort of aware of it.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Other participants in Study 2 shared a similar view: 
 
‘I would go as far as saying, whilst we didn’t have a name for this in the 
past, before every flight, we still always did this. You still try to identify 
any possible hazards that—it was hazard back then—it might have been 
associated with flight from organic hazards, um, to, you know, machine to 
environment. We did this anyway, we didn’t have a name for it. We didn’t 
 	 221	
know we were actually doing it … Just didn’t have a name for it.’ 
(Participant 4) 
 
‘Threat and error management really … I didn’t think it was a new thing, 
it’s been around years, for years rather, ever since I’ve been involved in 
aviation. I think it was just that [with] TEM, someone finally defined it and 
put a name to it.’ (Participant 5) 
 
These comments highlight the importance of maintaining an effective ongoing 
dialogue with the general aviation industry, so that these views can be considered 
while planning and allocating the appropriate mix of required expertise and quantity 
of resources, which are the fourth and fifth, respectively, key considerations for 
successful implementation of a new policy (ANAO, 2014). Planning can be 
considered a map that describes certain features of an initiative, such as the reasons 
for the new initiative and the ways it will be resourced (ANAO, 2014). Participant 4 
made the comment that: 
 
‘I think the first question should’ve been asked is: What is this? Is this 
actually something new or is this something we’re already doing? … if it 
did already exist, what was actually wrong with the way it’s been, what 
was it actual problem here?’ (Participant 4) 
 
If TEM had been clearly planned and communicated with the general aviation industry, 
it would have built stronger enthusiasm and support from the industry, which would 
have allowed CASA to achieve a high level of buy-in from Australian general aviation. 
Participant 4 further added that: 
 
‘… so the first thing we should’ve done would’ve been to have actually 
run a series of training sessions, practically focused training session, 
showing threat and error management in practice, um, teaching CFIs 
syllabus designs, how, and examiners, um, how, what is actually a threat, 
what is actually an error, what are plausible management strategies, um, 
help them to actually understand the system first of all, and then providing 
the guidance materials on how to actually roll it out into a school 
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environment. If you did it that way, you probably would’ve had a greater 
pick up and a greater success.’ (Participant 4) 
 
The comments from the participants in Study 2 indicated that the implementation that 
occurred was different from what should ideally have been considered, planned and 
actioned. Participant 1 stated: ‘TEM was a buzzword, it was pushed out there and it 
was required by CASA to be introduced to flight schools and nobody really had a clear 
understanding of what it was, its components or elements’. Participant 4 stated: 
‘There’s a lot of psychology involved in threat and error management and that’s not 
something that a lot of people, um, find it easy to understanding’. The findings from 
Study 3 supported these participants’ comments. A statistically significant number of 
survey participants (63.9%) disagreed that CASA had provided adequate training and 
guidance material on TEM training for general aviation. In addition, a statistically 
significant number of survey participants (52.6%) disagreed that the concept of TEM 
was easy to understand. Further, a statistically significant number of survey 
participants (73.2%) disagreed that CASA had explained TEM and how it would affect 
their role and/or activities in a clear and succinct manner. This lack of guidance and 
support from CASA likely had a negative effect on how TEM was perceived to be 
implemented in Australian general aviation. 
 
The findings above highlight the importance of establishing in-house expertise in 
TEM within CASA. However, as discussed earlier, participant 3 in study 2 recalled 
that even a senior manager in CASA did not have a clear understanding of TEM. 
Laszlo (1998) emphasised the need for adequate allocation of resources, with a top 
priority being training key personnel on the project to be implemented, followed by 
cascading training down, based on organisational structure. In general aviation, these 
key personnel include, yet are not limited to, FOIs and ASAs. Participant 4’s comment 
did not support the idea of key personnel receiving adequate training: ‘To this day, I 
would be fairly confident in saying that you could ask 15 inspectors at CASA and 
you’ll have 15 different opinions on threat and error management and their 
understanding’. If this is deemed to be an accurate assessment, it is very likely that 
the ASAs who typically conducted AvSafety seminars would not have been suitably 
trained. A finding from Study 3 supported this notion, with only 17 survey participants 
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(17.5%) agreeing that the CASA’s ASAs had a consistent understanding of TEM 
principles. 
 
With regard to CASA-organised seminars, such as AvSafety, Participant 3 shared his 
experience with the seminar on TEM: 
 
‘CASA had run courses for private pilots where they could talk about those 
things, but I think I only attended one and mostly they were dealing with 
questions and they don’t—there was no overall philosophy, except they’ve 
got to cover and demonstrate that you’re considering threats and how you 
manage them.’ (Participant 3) 
 
Participant 4 explained that: 
 
‘They have touched on TEM in seminars … but again they were done by 
aviation safety advisors who are not threat and error management 
specialists. They are safety specialists. Um, they’re from all walks from 
life, uh, they are regurgitating materials that wasn’t even necessarily 
developed by the department.’ (Participant 4) 
 
These comments highlight the importance of including experts in the delivery of safety 
seminars. Hattie (2003) argued that, although the amount of knowledge between 
experts and experienced teachers does not differ much, experts possess knowledge 
that is more integrated by combining and relating new knowledge with prior 
knowledge. This allows experts to be able to plan lessons based on students’ needs by 
changing, combining and adding content accordingly (Hattie, 2003). 
 
In the case of TEM implementation in Australian general aviation, it was already 
established that the number of appropriately qualified TEM experts in CASA before 
and after TEM implementation was significantly lacking, and FOIs and ASAs were 
not adequately trained on TEM. This would likely have resulted in no specific TEM 
training sessions through PDP for FEs, and the collective views among the participants 
in all three studies indicated a lack of guidance and support from CASA. For instance, 
a statistically significant number of survey participants from Study 3 responded that 
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CASA did not provide adequate guidance and support when TEM was implemented 
in Australian general aviation. In addition, only 36% of the survey participants 
considered currently published safety publications and resources from CASA to be 
useful. 
 
The last key building block for successful implementation is the establishment of 
ongoing active management that comprises well-coordinated monitoring, review and 
evaluation processes (ANAO, 2014). Ongoing active management aims to 
appropriately inform and facilitate other relevant key building blocks for their 
decision-making and support activities to enable successful implementation of an 
initiative (ANAO, 2014). This is consistent with one of the commonly used evaluation 
approaches that consists of four levels of evaluation: (i) participants’ reaction to a 
newly implemented program or training initiatives (reaction), (ii) changes in 
participants’ attitude and improved skills and knowledge (learning), (iii) changes in 
behaviour (behaviour) and (iv) achievement of the predetermined final objectives of a 
program (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006). Participant 1 described the fourth and 
final level as a: 
 
‘… particularly commercial [CPL] level. We could say, ‘okay, schools, 
you have a reasonable amount of time to get students prepared for CPL 
and to instil the principles of TEM into the way they operate’. It would be 
good to do some tests at CPL level by the independent examiners to get 
some feedback on how TEM is working and see what the standard is like.’ 
(Participant 1) 
 
Participant 1 continued: 
 
‘Their [CASA’s] annual or 18-month roadshow would go around and 
saying, ‘we’ve done some appropriate sampling around the industry and 
the feedback is that there were still some weak areas—this, this and this 
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… this is how we recommend to fix them’. It is the normal close loop.’ 
(Participant 1) 
 
Based on an extensive literature search, it was noted that there was very limited, if any, 
formal post-implementation review of TEM in Australian general aviation. Participant 
1’s suggestions would certainly provide better insights regarding how each flight 
school performs in term of the way TEM principles are taught and practised, and the 
findings could be disseminated to other segments of general aviation, such as private 
flying. However, CASA’s auditing role and the way the audits were conducted were 
noted as a perceived barrier. The findings from a recent stakeholder survey (Colmar 
Brunton, 2016) suggested that participants in the private flying sector were particularly 
dissatisfied with CASA’s overly punitive approaches, rather than working with 
stakeholders in a more constructive manner to resolve issues and ultimately improve 
safety when performing its audit and compliance functions. 
 
The review of findings from the three studies, based on the six key considerations for 
successful implementation of TEM, suggested that TEM implementation in Australian 
general aviation is perceived by many as laissez-faire. It was evident from the findings 
that there was lack of guidance and support from CASA before and after TEM was 
implemented. This was largely because of CASA failing to establish a team of 
expertise in TEM within CASA, and suboptimal stakeholder engagement during the 
planning stage. In addition, there has been very limited formal review, assessment or 
evaluation to examine the situation after the introduction of TEM in Australian general 
aviation to determine how successfully it was implemented and which improvements 
were required.  
 
It was evident that TEM was poorly implemented, which would likely have led to 
negative views on the use of TEM in Australian general aviation. However, the 
collective responses from Study 3 signalled that the survey participants highly valued 
and used TEM principles when undertaking flying activities, and consequently 
considered TEM an important part of flight preparations. The following section 
presents further discussion on how TEM is viewed, taught, practised and examined. 
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7.2 Threat and Error Management in Practice 
 
The majority of findings indicated that TEM was poorly implemented in Australian 
general aviation, and the impracticality of TEM and lack of guidance and support from 
CASA were suggested to be the main contributing factors to these collective views. 
These factors likely led to negative views among the survey participants on how TEM 
is considered and practised in Australian general aviation. However, the responses to 
questions on the way TEM was viewed and practised were somewhat different. The 
general consensus was that the survey participants in Study 3 highly valued TEM 
when undertaking flying activities. Consequently, the survey participants considered 
TEM an important part of their flight preparation and used TEM principles when 
undertaking flying activities. This interesting and encouraging finding suggested that, 
despite poor TEM implementation, TEM was valued and practised, to varying degrees, 
in Australian general aviation. 
 
The participants in Study 1 (six trainees and eight trainers) who were engaged in flying 
activities before the mandating of TEM training confirmed that briefings and/or 
training syllabi were amended to incorporate TEM training. The majority of trainees 
and trainers in Study 1 also indicated that TEM training was incorporated in pre-/post-
flight briefings, ground schools and instructional flights. Participant 4 in Study 2 
described the way TEM was incorporated in his organisation: 
 
‘… so over a period of years, we’ve had, uh, development of the threat and 
error management material within our long briefings, within our ground 
school materials for PPL and CPL, um. We’ve probably actually 
completely changed the way we approached threat and error 
management, um, at a sequence long briefing level as well.’ (Participant 
4) 
 
Participant 5’s experience with incorporation of TEM in his organisation was similar: 
 
‘Yes, I was, uh, involved in that, uh, CASA gave us a training package in 
that and we went through it, we had staff leading, all went through 
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together, then I implemented some training measures, some study 
materials for the candidates and, uh, implemented changes to our briefing 
processes, to trying, uh, implement threat and error management as best 
as we can understand it.’ (Participant 5) 
 
Despite organisations’ endeavours to implement TEM, a statistically significant 
number of survey participants in Study 3 had difficulty adequately understanding the 
TEM concept. This might be due to the collective views among the majority of survey 
participants in Study 3 that CASA failed to appropriately translate TEM concepts into 
practical guidance, and offered inadequate practical examples relating to TEM 
principles and concepts for general aviation. In addition, Participant 1 in Study 2 
indicated that the degree of TEM implementation varied depending on the 
geographical locations of flight schools: 
 
‘So, I guess implementation in flight schools sort of varied from small 
ones—small country ones, who probably didn’t have and still haven’t got 
a clue about TEM, probably didn’t believe in it and therefore really did 
not implement it at all—to the major flying schools, like Flight Training 
Adelaide—an organisation that, yeah, would’ve embraced TEM. They 
would’ve had a clear understanding about what it was, and uh, would’ve 
implemented it into their procedures. So clearly it depends on which part 
of the industry you are looking at.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Participant 1 highlighted the importance of implementing an appropriate mix of 
required expertise and quantity of resources when introducing a new safety initiative, 
such as TEM: 
 
‘Places like Flight Training Adelaide, CAE Oxford get feedback from 
airline clients and/or their parent company. CAE Oxford down at 
Moorabbin, they used to be one of the QANTAS providers, previous named 
General Flying Services … They would’ve drawn a lot of their expertise 
on TEM down here from their parent company in UK and Europe because 
EASA brought TEM in a number of years before we did, so, you are right. 
They had resources and they have contracts in the big end of town to bring 
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the stuff in and probably did it quite well. The lower end, they don’t … 
that’s going to take a bit of time to filter down.’ (Participant 1) 
 
Participant 4 concurred with Participant 1’s observation and added that: 
 
‘There’re massive differences what you see there, but there’s very little 
difference between what I have experienced in flight with applicants from 
both ends of spectrum. I think everybody has always done a fairly good 
job of in-flight training students to identify threats and errors.’ 
(Participant 4) 
 
A statistically significant number of survey participants indicated that TEM principles 
were valued and practised when undertaking flying activities. This may have been 
contributed to by the inclusion of TEM considerations in pre-flight briefings, which 
usually comprise 15- to 20-minute one-on-one discussions on the aim of the flight and 
lesson sequences. Participant 4 commented that: 
 
‘Threat and error management better lives in a pre-flight briefing, where 
we are able to actually consider environmental factors of the day and the 
two organic beings on board the aircraft and the actual condition of the 
aircraft in which we are flying on that day—none of which is known at a 
long briefing stage. So, I prefer that it will create a discussion, threat and 
error management in a pre-flight briefing stage, despite the fact that, um, 
you know, in our long briefing format, there is a requirement for TEM.’ 
(Participant 4) 
 
Participant 5 added that: 
 
‘… we modified all our briefings and, um, we just put TEM as an addition 
to the briefings, okay, so the actual pre-flight briefing didn’t change, but 
we incorporated TEM at the end of the briefings … now, the last thing 
before you walk out the door, let’s see what can turn to worms.’ 
(Participant 5) 
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The majority of participants in Study 2 commented that certain elements and principles 
of TEM already existed in Australian general aviation well before TEM was formally 
introduced. Participant 1 commented that: ‘The elements of TEM, threat and error 
management, okay, it has been around for a long, long time, certainly back at World 
War II or probably before that’. Participant 3 shared the similar view that: 
 
‘… when it was taught, you know, we talk more generally as airmanship, 
I see good instructors taught the students what to be aware of and how to 
think when it wasn’t formally threat and error management as a subject.’ 
(Participant 3) 
 
Similarly, Participant 4 commented that: 
 
‘I would go as far as saying, whilst we didn’t have a name for this in the 
past, before every flight, we still always did this, you still try to identify 
any possible hazards that—it was hazard back then—it might have been 
associated with flight from organic hazards, um, to, you know, machine to 
environment. We did this anyway, we didn’t have a name for it. We didn’t 
know we were actually doing it.’ (Participant 4) 
 
Participant 5 also added: 
 
‘Threat and error management really … I didn’t think it was a new thing, 
it’s been around years, for years rather, ever since I’ve been involved in 
aviation. I think it was just that [with] TEM, someone finally defined it and 
put a name to it.’ (Participant 5) 
 
These collective observations highlighted the importance of careful planning through 
close and inclusive stakeholder engagement. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, this did not appear to have been well established during the planning stage of 
TEM implementation. Participant 4 commented that: 
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‘… the first question should’ve been asked is: What is that? Is this actually 
something new or is this something we’re already doing? … I think it 
already exists. If it did already exist, what was actually wrong with the 
way it’s been, what was it actually problem here?’ (Participant 4) 
 
This lack of engagement may have resulted in some resistance from FIs after TEM 
was mandated. Participant 4 recalled that: 
 
‘We probably had a fair bit of resistance at that time because we had a lot 
of older generation instructors, uh, who I guess, had an opinion that, well, 
I am a pilot, I look like a pilot, I’ve been training pilots since way this 
long, I haven’t had any problems yet, um … Otherwise, a lot more of us 
would’ve been dead if we hadn’t been applying threat and error 
management prior to practical standards.’ (Participant 4) 
 
However, the findings from Study 3 suggested that the FI group—compared with the 
non-FI group—were using TEM principles more when undertaking flying activities, 
and had a clear understanding of what was required when applying and teaching TEM 
principles. Similarly, the FI group considered TEM an important part of their flight 
preparation. 
 
Based on the findings from the series of studies in this thesis, it was identified that 
there was lack of guidance and support for TEM from CASA, and this might have 
contributed to the collective view of poor TEM implementation in Australian general 
aviation. However, an encouraging finding was that organisations endeavoured to 
incorporate TEM principles in their flying operations, and TEM principles were 
valued and viewed positively within general aviation.  
 
7.3 Two Additional Questions 
 
Two additional questions were included in Study 3. The first additional question asked 
whether the benefits of TEM training were overrated, and was included because, when 
this question was asked in Study 1, the results showed mixed views on the perceived 
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benefits of TEM training, and varied according to groups (Lee et al., 2016). The 
responses from the survey participants in Study 3 also indicated mixed views on the 
benefits of TEM training, with the non-FI group indicating more agreement that the 
benefits of TEM were overrated. This may be because the non-FI group, compared 
with the FI group, did not have a clear understanding of what was required when 
applying TEM principles, which led them to place less importance on TEM in their 
flight preparation. 
 
The second additional question considered the feasibility of expanding TEM training 
and principles to other sectors, such as the recreational aviation and RPAS sectors. 
The responses among survey participants in Study 3 were somewhat mixed. 
Participant 1’s comment sheds some light on the views of the survey participants who 
agreed that TEM training and principles should be expanded to other sectors: 
 
‘Well, my immediate reaction to that would be: why they would be any 
different? I mean, they are operating in the same environment, uh, 
essentially general aviation, the threats are by and large the same, errors 
that people are going to make and management of those … same principles 
are applied.’ (Participant 1) 
 
In contrast, Participant 3’s comment supports the survey participants who did not 
agree or were neutral about expanding TEM training and principles to other sectors: 
 
‘I would … my reaction would be to say, yes, it would be helpful 
everywhere, but I would say that the caution to that is, if it’s done the way 
it’s been done under my observation in aviation, general aviation, it would 
just be a distraction.’ (Participant 3) 
 
Participant 3’s comment highlights the importance of careful and thorough planning, 
alongside other key considerations, such as engaging stakeholders and resources, to 
ensure successful implementation.  
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7.4 Potential Limitations of the Present Study 
 
The main limitation of study 3 is a sample size for Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM). Although the total number of participants in study 3 exceeded the 
recommended minimum sample size of 91 it was achieved by increasing anticipated 
effect size to 0.5 while keeping the statistical significance (p value) of 0.05 (Figure 
6.35). The free online a-priori sample size calculator for SEM 
(https://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc/calculator.aspx?id=89)  offers three options: 
0.1 for a small effect; 0.3 for a medium effect and 0.5 for a large effect.  
 
Sullivan and Feinn (2012) described that with a large effect (i.e., 0.5) the likelihood 
of committing a Type II error would increase. A Type II error occurs when research 
fails to reject a null hypothesis (Field, 2009). Another word, A Type II error leads 
researchers to falsely believe that there is no effect even though there is an effect. This 
will also likely lead to lowering the statistical power, a chance of detecting an effect 
if there is one exists (Field, 2009; Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). Therefore, with the large 
effect selected in study 3 there is a probability the researcher may have failed to detect 
statistically significant effects when interpreting results after completing SEM. 
 
7.5 Where to from here 
 
There is a sufficient number of research (e.g., Bazargan & Guzhva, 2011; Hunter, 
Martinussen, Wiggins, & O’Hare, 2011; Salter & Alexander, 2000) and statistics (e.g., 
ATSB, 2018; NTSB, 2014) that have identified suboptimal safety performance of 
general aviation. These are mainly due to less rigorously trained pilots with a lack of 
appropriate, formal human factors training offered within general aviation. It was in 
this notion that TEM training was introduced in Australia to improve general aviation 
safety. However, the three studies in this thesis identified that TEM was poorly 
implemented. This was mainly due to the perceived impracticality of TEM and a lack 
of guidance and support from CASA. Therefore, it is considered to be an important 
and logical step to conduct a nationwide survey with a greater number of participants 
to identify areas that require immediate attention. These areas may include, but not 
limited to, how the requirements of TEM are taught and practised in different 
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organisations such as flight schools, aeroclubs and small charter operators and the 
need for practical guidance material on TEM. Comprehensively developed training 
sessions specifically targeting flight examiners, flight instructors, Flying Operations 
Inspectors (FOI) and Aviation Safety Advisors (ASA) on how to teach TEM principles 
and their practical applications will be valuable for the benefits of TEM training to be 
cascaded to general aviation pilots. A specifically tasked group may need to be 
established within CASA to be responsible for this purpose. The survey data and 
findings can also be supplemented if participants’ viewpoints are also collected 
through interview, focus group or other similar means so that CASA is better informed 
as to what remedial actions should be undertaken to improve underperforming areas 
and how these actions are framed to best fit into appropriate organisations. 
 
Findings from this thesis also suggested that it would be beneficial for TEM to be 
implemented in other sectors within Australian general aviation such as recreational 
aviation and Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) sectors. Careful planning such 
as a nationwide consultation with key stakeholders and other important considerations 
listed in the guidance by the Australian National Audit Office ([ANAO], 2014) need 
to be followed. Also, findings from this thesis, from the nationwide survey suggested 
above and from other research (e.g., Conley et al., 2011) should be reflected before, 
during and after TEM implementation so that intended outcomes are achieved. 
 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
 
The findings from the three studies in this thesis suggested that TEM was poorly 
implemented in Australian general aviation. The findings also suggested that two 
major barriers—impracticality and lack of guidance and support from CASA—were 
the main contributors for the collective views among the participants on poor TEM 
implementation. It was reasonable to assume that these views would likely lead to 
negative views on the use of TEM in Australian general aviation. However, the 
collective responses from Study 3 suggested that the survey participants highly valued 
and used TEM principles when undertaking flying activities, and consequently 
considered TEM an important part of flight preparations. This is an encouraging 
 	 234	
finding because considering TEM principles and concepts prior to and during flying 
will further improve safety in Australian general aviation. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Civil aviation is considered an ultra-safe industry and its safety record far exceeds 
other high-reliability industries, such as the healthcare industry. This high level of 
safety is attributed to a constant drive to develop and improve safety initiatives and 
training. One of the recent safety initiatives was the introduction of Threat and Error 
Management (TEM). Since the emergence of TEM, it has been well regarded as an 
effective method to improve aviation safety. Consequently, ICAO endorsed and 
recommended that TEM training be an integral part of pilot training and a requirement 
for all pilot licences. In response to ICAO’s acknowledgement and recommendation 
of the need for TEM training, CASA mandated TEM as an additional assessment item 
for various levels of flight tests and ground examinations, effective from July 2009. 
 
The findings from the three studies in this research suggested that two major barriers—
impracticality and lack of guidance and support from CASA—were the main 
contributors to the collective views among the study participants regarding poor TEM 
implementation. General aviation in Australia is primarily a vocationally based 
industry; thus, it is important to consider practical aspects when new safety initiatives 
are proposed and introduced in general aviation, such as TEM implementation. 
CASA’s failure to provide practical guidance and examples of how, why and when 
TEM principles and concepts should be adopted and practised in daily operations was 
due to CASA’s perceived lack of understanding of how general aviation operates. 
Although CASA offered a range of seminars and workshops, such as AvSafety, to 
assist general aviation pilots to stay up to date and to promote aviation safety, there 
was a lack of systematic and well-planned educational roadshows to promote TEM. 
This necessary educational opportunity was not offered to FEs, despite TEM 
becoming an additional testing item. This resulted in general consensus that TEM was 
not assessed in a standardised manner. 
 
The Australian National Audit Office ([ANAO], 2014) has highlighted six key 
considerations when implementing a new policy initiative, and the findings from the 
current research suggested that these key considerations were not adequately followed 
during TEM implementation. For instance, sound governance arrangements and 
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practices were not found to be well established, and an appropriate level of stakeholder 
engagement was not maintained throughout the implementation process. These 
failures resulted in a perceived lack of relevance of TEM among the intended 
recipients, and a subsequent lack of buy-in, which likely led to the manifestation of 
poor TEM implementation in Australian general aviation. 
 
It is evident that TEM was poorly implemented in Australian general aviation, and this 
would likely have led to negative views on the use of TEM principles and concepts. 
However, the findings suggested that the participants highly valued TEM when 
undertaking flying activities. Consequently, the participants considered TEM an 
important part of their flight preparation and used TEM principles when undertaking 
flying activities. This interesting, yet perhaps counterintuitive, finding suggested that, 
despite poor TEM implementation, TEM was valued and practised, to varying degrees, 
in Australian general aviation. In addition, it is understood that concepts similar to 
TEM have existed in general aviation for a long time; thus, although these principles 
and concepts were not labelled TEM, they have nevertheless been taught and exercised.  
 
In conclusion, there are clear indications that the effects of TEM implementation in 
Australian general aviation have not been experienced and translated as intended. The 
perceived impracticality of TEM and a lack of guidance and support were found to be 
the two major obstacles that adversely affected the successful implementation of TEM. 
However, despite the poor TEM implementation, it was found that TEM principles 
were highly valued among the study participants, and were considered an important 
part of flight preparation and subsequently exercised when undertaking flying 
activities. This is an encouraging finding given that the ultimate aim of TEM 
implementation is to further improve safety in Australian general aviation. 
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Appendix 1: Two types of threats with examples 
 
Environmental 
threats Examples 
Adverse weather Thunderstorms, turbulence, poor visibility, wind shear, icing conditions, IMC 
Airport 
Poor signage, faint markings, runway/taxiway closures, INOP 
navigational aids, poor braking action, contaminated 
runways/taxiways 
ATC Tough-to-meet clearances/restrictions, re-routes, language difficulties, controller errors 
Environmental 
Operational Pressure Terrain, traffic, TCAS, TA/RA, radio congestion 
Airline threats Examples 
Aircraft 
Systems, engines, flight controls, or automation anomalies or 
malfunctions; MEL items with operational implications; other 
aircraft threats requiring flight crew attention 
Airline Operational 
Pressure 
On-time performance pressure, delays, late arriving aircraft or 
flight crew 
Cabin Cabin events, flight attendant errors, distractions, interruptions 
Dispatch/Paperwork Load sheet errors, crew scheduling events, late paperwork, changes or errors 
Ground/Ramp Aircraft loading events, fuelling errors, agent interruptions, improper ground support, de-icing 
Ground Maintenance Aircraft repairs on ground, maintenance log problems, maintenance errors 
Manuals/Charts Missing information or documentation errors 
Source: adapted from Merritt and Klinect (2006, p. 5) 
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Appendix 2: Three types of errors with examples 
 
Aircraft Handling Errors Examples 
Automation Incorrect altitude, speed, heading, auto-throttle setting, mode executed, or entries 
Flight Control Incorrect flaps, speed brake, auto-brake, thrust reverser or power settings 
Ground Navigation Attempting to turn down wrong taxiway/runway, Missed taxiway/runway/gate 
Manual Flying 
Hand flying vertical, lateral, or speed deviations, Missed 
runway/taxiway failure to hold short, or taxi above speed 
limit 
Systems/Radios/Instruments Incorrect pack, altimeter, fuel switch or radio frequency settings 
Procedural Errors Examples 
Briefing Missed items in the brief, omitted departure, take-off, approach, or handover briefing 
Callouts Omitted take-off, descent, or approach callouts 
Cabin Cabin events, flight attendant errors, distractions, interruptions 
Checklist 
Performed checklist from memory or omitted checklist, 
Missed items, wrong challenge and response, performed 
late or at wrong time 
Documentation Wrong weight and balance, fuel information, ATIS, or clearance recorded, Misinterpreted items on paperwork 
Pilot Flying (PF) / Pilot Not 
Flying (PNF) Duty 
PF makes own automation changes, PNF doing PF duties, 
PF doing PNF duties 
SOP Cross-verification Intentional and unintentional failure to cross-verify automation inputs 
Other Procedural 
Other deviations from government regulations, flight 
manual requirements or Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) 
Communication Errors Examples 
Crew to External 
Missed calls, misinterpretation of instructions, or incorrect 
read-backs to ATC, Wrong clearance, taxiway, gate or 
runway communicated 
Pilot to Pilot Within-crew miscommunication or misinterpretation 
Source: adapted from Merritt and Klinect (2006, p. 9) 
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Appendix 3: Three types of UAS with examples 
 
UAS Types Examples 
Aircraft Handling 
Vertical, lateral or speed deviations; Unnecessary weather 
penetration; Unstable approach; Long, floated, firm or off-
centreline landings 
Ground Navigation Runway/taxiway incursions; Wrong taxiway, ramp, gate, or hold spot; Taxi above speed limit 
Incorrect Aircraft 
Configuration 
Automation, engine, flight control, systems, or weight/balance 
events 
Source: adapted from Merritt and Klinect (2006, p. 13) 
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Appendix 4: Ethics approval (Study 1) 
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Appendix 5: Participant information sheet (Study 2) 
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Appendix 6: Consent form (Study 2) 
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Appendix 7: Sample extract from P3 interview (Study 2) 
 
Facilitator: Yep. 
Interviewee: In 2008, 2005 and 2008 when they were introducing it. They were sort 
of saying things like we’re only still trying to find out how to do it, 
even later I spoke to a senior manager at CASA and he said, we have 
no idea what it’s about so we were enforcing something that we didn’t 
understand. 
Facilitator: Yep. 
Interviewee: Um, which I pointed out in my work. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: Um, so, what, the way they did that, because ATOs and FOIs came out 
who didn’t really understand the system themselves but they had to 
show formally that they were training it, so we would get what I called 
“ritual chant to please the gods”. 
Facilitator: [laughing], yep. 
Interviewee: I don’t know whether you read that because I think I put that in my 
work. The ritual chant to please the gods. That is… 
Facilitator: I can’t recall it exactly… 
Interviewee: To demonstrate it, for example, to demonstrate it that they were using 
Threat and Error Management, you’re coming in from a training area, 
uh, at Archerfield, and at some stage they’ve got to show that they are 
aware of threats and how they need to be managed, so I would get this 
ritual chant, it was all learnt off by heart and that was, that was 
practically the same, everybody from a school would say virtually 
exactly the same words, that is, I’m coming into Park Ridge… are you 
aware of these places in the training area, Paul? One of the rejoin 
points for Archerfield circuit is a place called, Park Ridge from 
southern training area and there is ‘Target’ from eastern training area. 
Coming to those points and say, we are coming into this approach 
point, it’s going to be traffic likely from the area converging here so 
there is likely traffic converging so I’ll have to keep my eyes on that 
traffic and be aware of what they’re doing and so they’re letting me 
know that they’re aware and thinking about it. 
Facilitator: Yep. 
Interviewee: So, they’re going through the same, so I have to be aware of traffic 
coming in and so I’m looking out for those and I’ll have to fit in and 
they might call first and I’ll have to call second and so… 
[indiscernible]… what he’s doing, what I need to hear it but 
nevertheless they were told to do it because instructors at a school said 
you have to make sure that you’re aware of doing this. 
Facilitator: Yes. 
Interviewee: So they told me about that. Once we passed here, I will make a call, I 
will be given rejoin instruction, I’m expecting to land on Runway 10 or 
28 and so I will go to this point and then I will come down and then I’ll 
come around to land on the left or right runway and then I’ll turn off at 
a taxi-way, whatever, because… [indiscernible]… taxi via, taxi to this 
and that and this comes back to my whole point. So they’ve given me 
whole this spiel and I’m sitting there and I’m watching this aircraft, 
converging on us from my right. 
Facilitator: Mmm. 
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Interviewee: So we were going, he’s going… so this guy’s focusing on this spiel, 
giving this spiel, he finally finishes it and then he says, ‘Ahhh’,  there 
is an aeroplane. 
Facilitator: [laugher] 
Interviewee: You haven’t seen that before? 
Facilitator: Mmm. 
Interviewee: But he was so busy with saying his spiels, you know, he wasn’t 
actually doing Threat and Error Management by keeping his eyes open. 
Facilitator: Yes. 
Interviewee: And caught him by surprise and this was common and I think because 
everybody said they were so worried about Competency Based 
Training and covering all, ticking all the boxes… 
Facilitator: Mm-hm. 
Interviewee: I would’ve… as a testing officer and as an instructor, I can see whether 
he’s noticing an aircraft because he would say, there’s an aircraft 
coming in to the right, 2 o’clock high, ½ miles.  
Facilitator: Yep. 
Interviewee: Well, that means he’s watching and so then when he does something… 
well, he’s managing threat and error, they were told to give this spiel 
and this happened in Archerfield at different schools, uh, Townsville, 
Rockhamton, at Toowoomba and the similar process for whole time 
because they felt that they had to produce by telling me all about it.  
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: And they are telling things that were going to happen after they landed 
but two seconds later, they call up and the tower will say they are 
landing on the other runway. 
Facilitator: Oaky. 
Interviewee: So the whole briefing meant nothing, which means they were wasting 
their time, trying to impress me with their Threat and Error 
Management and the whole thing was pointless because concentrating 
on that, they didn’t see the aeroplane, and telling me what they were 
going to do after they land and the runway was changed and everything 
is out the window so it became such a... and CASA emphasised this is 
really important and so they emphasise their response to it. And that’s 
why I said it was ritual chant to please the gods. The other ritual chant 
to please the gods was the before take-off and emergency briefs. You 
aware that they talk about what happens in case an engine failure and 
that kind of thing. So we’re sitting, at a runup point, and they say, okay 
I’m taking off from runway 10, left or right, and I’m going to, my, 
abort speed is whatever it was and then once I’m, if I’m short of that 
then I’m going to stop on the runway and if it’s passed that point, and 
again, everybody uses exactly the same practised spiels and said, after 
that I’m going to lower the nose, look 30 degrees either side of the nose 
for a suitable place to land and I’ll land on that suitable point. And so, 
at the end of that… I would say, I don’t know how many times I said 
this, so, okay, we’re taking off on 10 Archerfield, off the end of the 
runway, there is a whole industrial area, full of factories.  
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: So we land… “Um, ah, there’s a football field there just off the end of 
the runway” and I’ll land on that and I said, that football field is, what, 
about 100m long, where it crosses is probably 50m wide. When was 
the last time you cleared sheds, land cuts, touch down and before the 
next lot of sheds in 50 m. Well, I’ve never done at… So do you think 
that’s a realistic option?  
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Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: They’ve told to say that and I even said to some of the instructors… so 
on, well if you had an engine failure off Archerfield, how much height 
do you need, you think to turn back and land on the airfield 
somewhere, not on the runway so you’re not at conflicting traffic. 
“Ahh, probably need a 1000ft”. And I would say to instructors, how 
much height do you lose in a Cessna 152 or 172 in a 360° turn and they 
say, uh, probably 1000ft at least so I take them out to the aeroplane and 
say show me how much height we are losing. We are gliding, throttle’s 
back, I want you to do a 360° turn, hold, concentrate on the gliding 
speed, I want you to use 30 degrees of that. Well, a 180°	turn,	they	lose	250ft. 
Facilitator: Mm, yes. 
Interviewee: So I said, have you ever considered if you are above 300ft, you can 
turn back and land safely, you wouldn’t crash into all those factories 
that would kill you. 
Facilitator: Yes, yes. 
Interviewee: So, come back to the question, how did they implement Threat and 
Error Management, they did it very consciously, very formally and 
completely impractically and quite… would be a complete failure. 
Facilitator: Yep.  
Interviewee: They actually, it actually taught people not to think of safe ways of 
landing.  
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: You know, I even say, you said 30°	either	side	of	heading,	why	that?	And	part	of	the	problem	is	that	start	of	the	point	is	where	long	time	ago	people	would	say,	some	people	have	just	gone	solo	and	they	are	not	that	confident,	I	don’t	want	you	to	spend	time	looking	further	than	that,	do	the	best	you	can	from	there	and	then	at	least	you	might	crash	wings	level. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: Because what’s happened is that if I think I can turn back they’ll likely 
pull the aircraft around, stall, spin, crash and burn. But by the time 
they’ve done that little bit… the bit is now it will come automatic now, 
lower the nose, maintain the speed, now we can turn safely. And… 
that… that never got passed that first briefing and I’ve seen people at a 
commercial licence flight test. They’re still saying exactly the same 
thing. So nobody has taken them past the point where they 
automatically lower the nose and we’ll turn safely. They… They 
basically said, you can’t turn back and land on an airfield. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: And yet, around the world, some of the most successful engine failures 
after take-off in single engine aircraft have been a turn back. 
Facilitator: Yes, yes, that’s right. 
Interviewee: Often people criticise it, so how they’ve implemented it? Poorly. 
Consciously, very strong part of the process but to note it, it was a 
completely illogical way to deal with it. 
Facilitator: And the message I get, uh, from you’ve just said is, uh, there hasn’t 
been much of resources, uh, made available from CASA for a start and 
even if there was, uh, it was quite weak, uh, in terms of, being used, in 
terms of, uh, worse, implemented. 
Interviewee: That’s clear because I spoke to other, all the schools doing this ritual 
chant to please the gods as I said because CASA was… all the testing 
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officers and examiners were, going and saying, that’s good, that’s 
good. 
Facilitator: Mm, yep. 
Interviewee: But nobody had thought about it. Somebody came up with a formula 
and they said, they’re really doing it, everybody is doing the same, 
that’s right, we’ve succeeded it and I was thinking 90% of those people 
would die if they had an engine failure after take-off, so it hasn’t been 
implemented well at all. 
Facilitator: Sure.  
Interviewee: Completely impractical. 
Facilitator: Mm. And I guess, uh, that you as an examiner, have you got any 
special training from CASA in term of how you need to assess, uh, 
TEM, uh, when students are demonstrating it in the flight test? 
Interviewee: No, we… all ATOs had to, had to attend, about the time, 2008 onwards 
every two years, had to go to the professional development program. 
And in those things I raised some of those issues but generally 
everybody else was doing what I was observing. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: Most people were doing that, um, and so… and CASA was sort of 
reinforcing it in a way they were saying, you know, you’ve got to 
really do this but, and they say, you know even though in some of their, 
one of their civil aviation advisory publications, they say some of those 
things you’ve got to observe  over a period of time but nobody ever 
criticised that, um, the basic approach of TEM. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: Nobody criticised it. In fact people used to… I mean I passed people 
on the course because I figured that they are producing what they were 
taught and what CASA reinforced but all I do was to talk to instructors 
and say, um, you need to get back to... and I had some results from that 
but over time it was almost a lone voice in, uh, in criticising the ritual 
chant which everybody was using. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: So, spread of that sort of approach was quite poor, uh, in that sense but 
I didn’t fail anybody on that alone, I just said, look you guys, you need 
to think about this. 
Facilitator: Yes. 
Interviewee: Because everybody else was going to pass them so I had to be within 
the standard… 
Facilitator: Mm-hm. 
Interviewee: And, uh, I would’ve been standing as a lone voice, um, probably, um, 
an old… cranky old man… It will be a century… 
Facilitator: What about instructor training? Because, my… from my experience, 
uh, as an instructor if you really believe in strong and good airmanship, 
uh, and also TEM and so on, then it’s more likely that you can, uh, you 
as an instructor actually pass onto your students but if you are a bit 
vague about the concept then it’s unlikely, uh, the quality of whatever 
instructor is passing on is not going be a high quality. So, have you 
seen any of, uh, sort of, uh, special sessions or special training 
procedures, you know in a flight school, uh, when, uh, they are training 
their, uh, grade 3s or upgrading to grade 2 et cetera? 
Interviewee: I have to say apart from the formal way that people, schools were 
teaching, which I’ve just described, uh, and they wouldn’t say this is 
what you’ve got to teach to the students but generally speaking, no. 
CASA didn’t run anything particular, they’ve just said you have to 
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make people aware of it, that they have admitted it, it’s part of good 
airmanship. They said but we’ve spelled it out because it’s so 
important about managing threats and errors to prevent a problem 
occurring or reducing the likelihood of serious problems occurring. All 
of that good philosophy but say that what they’ve produced was poor 
in regard and say you have to, they didn’t say tick the boxes but that’s 
the result of it. What I found was that before that we had airmanship 
and it wasn’t, say, prescribed as it became broken down to microscopic 
little bits which you’d have to tick the boxes for, um, airmanship then 
people would talk about the ways they survive. I think the introduction 
of it and it’s very hard to separate it from the introduction of 
Competency Based Training which I know you are not dealing with, 
um, but it was a part of that process. They added in under Human 
Factors and so on and so… and in the flight test and the Day VFR 
syllabus, where they had elements listed and the conditions under 
which they were to be performed and all that sorts of things. When 
they produced it, not everybody understood it so they had to make it 
something separate from what we were used to do with airmanship. 
Now airmanship wasn’t a subject in a civil training school. It was in 
fact a subject in the Air Force . We had a subject called, airmanship, 
with an exam and that… the definition of airmanship was, uh, in effect 
anything to do with the safe and efficient conduct of air operations, uh, 
was a broad definition. So all sorts of things would come under that, 
from that kind of… what you discuss before you take off about how 
you handle emergencies, um, talking about a normal departure without 
emergencies before you take off so it’s clear in your head about, um, 
lookout was always in it, but not just lookout but, um, what are you 
looking for so you, you go in this direction on a crosscountry but 
you’re going to end up down there, why don’t you look after take-off 
to see what the weather looks like down there, so I had one where we 
got airborne and we are going to Gold Coast and so we crossed the 
little range, went to Gold Coast, all the way to there, rain/showers all 
the way along that little range. 
Facilitator: Mm-hm. 
Interviewee: I am not sure what we can do, we did a little circuit at Coolangatta. I’ve 
seen the direction you want to go after departing Coolangatta, looked 
and said, we can get through there, we can get through quite a long 
way and it looks fine past that. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: So, you take off and go but if he didn’t think about that until… to me, 
this is Threat and Error Management. We went and did the circuit, 
didn’t look at any of that, he got airborne and I looked out, all he could 
see was rain/shower there and he didn’t look past, say, around here is 
fine or at least I can go, below 4000ft then if I’m not sure what happens 
I can go there, if not I will turn back and come back here. He just 
looked up there and said, okay, we can’t go, we are going back to 
Archerfield, okay? 
Facilitator: Mm, yep. 
Interviewee: Threat and Error Management wasn’t there because the philosophy 
wasn’t there because it became so formal and CASA never 
emphasised, uh, a system of dealing with that, um, I did it in my school 
when I was a CFI, I used to get people to look passed that, we talk 
about it and I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t want ritual chant. What I wanted, 
every take-off from Archerfield, different runways, I wanted a different 
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briefing about where you would go, like taking off on 10, I wouldn’t 
talk about 30 degrees either side of the heading, I would say 90 degrees 
to the right, there’s an area which is going to be rough but you’ll 
survive if you have to land on it and if you are higher than that it will 
be 180 degrees and you will land back again. Taking off from the other 
way there is a golf course which is, if you are high enough you can 
reach, if you are not high enough there was an area which you would 
probably damage the aircraft and probably crawl out but, no, but that’s 
the best option from that direction. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: And I will run those things and I will tell FOIs that’s what I was doing 
and none of my students ever had a problem passing the Threat and 
Error Management part of it. 
Facilitator: Mm. 
Interviewee: They were giving different briefings in each case. They wouldn’t give 
spiels coming back into Archerfield. They would just say, okay, 
coming to Park Ridge, there’s likely to be traffic and they’re looking 
around and saying there’s an aircraft there. They always got ticked on 
Threat and Error Management, people accepted what I taught but they 
also accepted ritual chant. 
Facilitator: Mm-hm. 
Interviewee: Problem solved without criticising. So, so was there any special 
training on it? No, CASA had run courses for private pilots where they 
could talk about those things but I think I only attended one and mostly 
they were dealing with questions and they don’t, there was no overall 
philosophy except they’ve got to cover and demonstrate that you’re 
considering threats and how you manage them. 
Facilitator: And it sounds like, uh, there was a lack of practicality, uh, in terms 
of… 
Interviewee: Yes. 
Facilitator: What you use of TEM. 
Interviewee: Yes, I think what happened was when Competency Based Training 
came in, non of the schools changed their practice at all from previous 
training. 
Facilitator: Okay. 
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